From: John Clark (jonkc@worldnet.att.net)
Date: Sun Jun 10 2001 - 23:30:29 MDT
Lee Corbin <lcorbin@ricochet.net> Wrote:
> In over thirty years of lively disputes about identity, I have found
> that along one particular scale, people fall into seven categories:
> 1. Will travel by space warp, but won't permit atomic disassembly.
I have no objection as long as you put me back together.
> 2. Will permit teleportation, but only if the same atoms are used.
To object for that reason would be nothing but superstition, pure
silliness. Atoms are generic, they have no scratches on them.
> 3. Will teleport, unless there is a delay.
>Suppose the original at the the point of departure is scanned and the
> information is used to construct the remote duplicate, but then there
> is a delay before the original is destroyed.
My backup is out of date so when you put a gun to my head I am very
unhappy.
> 4. Will teleport, but finds backups to be useless.
Again, backups are very useful, if up to date.
> 5. Finds backups acceptable, provided that they've had no run time.
I'm not so worried that my backup has had run time since the copy but I
am worried if I've had run time since the copy.
> 6. Anticipates future experiences of duplicates, but only one in
>particular.
I see no reason to be limited to one.
> 7. Logically, but not necessarily emotionally, anticipates all
> experiences of all duplicates past or future, near or far.
Yes, if the memories were merged you would have the experience of
living several lives in parallel. Might be fun.
John K Clark jonkc@att.net
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