From: Chris Ledwith (chris.ledwith@gte.net)
Date: Wed May 30 2001 - 16:45:55 MDT
> > Now, in my view, this is very different
> > from committing suicide in the present -- suicide, in the old sense
> > (pre-upload technology) is something I would never do, even though
> > I don't fear death.
>
> Uh huh. Ok, how exactly is suicide without the existence of a copy any
> different from suicide with the existence of said copy?
>
Because the copy is exactly you, at the moment the copy is
made. After that point, you and the copy diverge, but if you end
your life then, and the copy goes on, they can have all the same
experiences that you do (they're you!) The experience of dying will
have never occurred for this new copy. That is the only experience
lost. The end result is the same as making a copy the way you
would prefer, which is neuron replacement one-at-a-time. The
means are different, the ends are not.
> > However, knowing that a being which is 'exactly
> > me' would carry on seems sufficient to me to end my own
> > existence. And why shouldn't it?
>
> Um, because it actually isn't you? Maybe you believe in destiny, or fate, or
> something about being put on the planet for some great work or some such.
> Personally, I don't. Thus, no matter how similar another being is to me, no
> matter how well it can carry on where I would leave off, etc etc, it's still
> not me, and doesn't influence in any way my personal decision whether to
> exist or not.
>
I don't believe in fate at all, but I do believe that if this copy is 100%
accurate, it's going to experience the same things I do. It's fate of a
different flavor, I guess.
> Quick disclaimer... I'm no luddite, and I'm all for uploading. I personally
> prefer the gradual-substrate-change method, where you gradually swap neurons
> (and any other necessary bits and pieces, perhaps the whole body) for
> simulated neurons, one by one, until you move into the machine. I believe
> that such a process would maintain the integrity of the system that is my
> mind, and move what I consider is actually me from a biological substrate to
> a non-biological one. I could of course be completely and utterly wrong
> about this, but I reckon I'd be willing to risk death to try it, under
> appropriate circumstances.
>
Right, but as I think you admit, it's a contrived illusion for your
benefit.
> Anyway, that's my piece. One final remark... if you have made a copy of
> yourself, why would you want to kill the original self? Surely being copied
> isn't *so bad* that you need to commit suicide...
>
Well, I figure that most people who would make a first copy do so
with the intent of transference to a more permanent substrate, in
addition to enhanced abilities. So there's no reason to leave the
original around when the other 'you' will be able to accomplish so
much more. I guess the original can't fully know the glory of being
that more powerful copy, so the original might want to go on as it
always was. But the copy of you would really pity you! =)
How about this: you are unconscious when the copy is made. The
copy comes into the world, also unconscious (in fact, in the very
same state you are in). The original is then hacked to pieces with
an axe, and the copy awakes. You are now the copy, and notice
no discontinuity. You probably don't even feel remorse for the loss
of the other, at least not on the same level as you would for a loved
one. Is that better?
Of course, I know that the easiest solution to this illusory 'dilemma'
is the method of uploading that you prefer: neuron replacement one-
at-a-time.
-Chris L.
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