From: scerir (scerir@libero.it)
Date: Sun Feb 18 2001 - 15:32:59 MST
>> Further, where a series has a completion (telos),
>> all the preceding steps are for the sake of that.
>> Now surely as in intelligent action, so in nature;
>> and as in nature, so it is in each action,
>> if nothing interferes. (Aristotle)
Damien Broderick wrote:
> This was a shockingly erroneous analysis,
> even for someone writing so long ago.
> (long snip)
> ŠŠŠ we know that this is a complete happenstance,
> unintended, however necessary in hindsight for
> the development of minds able to see the difference
> between intentionless physical sequences and the
> telic actions of complex beings.
> Aristotle had his analogical arrow of explanation
> pointed in the wrong direction. How can you find
> his mistake `very interesting'?
Aristotle spoke about: the material cause,
the efficient cause, the formal cause,
the spontaneity <automaton>, the chance <tyche>,
the inner final cause <telos>, the hylomorphic way
(matter becomes form or, shall we say?, information).
We all know, at least after John Bell, that chance
is not 'incidental' (as Aristotle said), and that
physical sequences are intentionless, and that Lamark
was wrong.
But his idea that a cosmic 'evolution' (self-referential,
Aristotle said: ³doctor doctoring himself²) is going on
is still alive (Wheeler¹s ŒU¹, etc.). And this is the
Œvery interesting¹ point, imo.
- scerir
Aristotle in nuce.
Spontaneity and chance differ in that spontaneity
is the wider term. Every result of chance is from
what is spontaneous, but not everything that is from
what is spontaneous is from chance. Chance is in
the sphere of moral actions. Hence what is not capable
of moral action cannot do anything by chance.
The spontaneous on the other hand is found both
in the lower animals and in inanimate objects.
Spontaneity and chance are causes of effects
which though they might result from intelligence
or nature, have in fact been caused by something
incidentally. Both (spontaneity and chance) belong
to the mode of causation source of changes,
for either some natural or some intelligent agent
is always the cause. But in this sort of causation
the number of possible causes is indefinite.
Now since nothing which is incidental is prior to what
is per se, it is clear that no incidental cause can be
prior to a cause per se. Spontaneity and chance, therefore,
are posterior to intelligence and nature. Hence, however
true it may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity,
it will still be true that intelligence and nature
will be prior causes of this ³all² and of many things
in it besides.
For those things are natural which, by a continuous
movement originated from an internal principle,
arrive at some completion: the same completion
is not reached from every principle; nor any chance
completion, but always the tendency in each is towards
the same end, if there is no impediment. The end and
the means towards it may come about by chance.
But it is absurd to suppose that purpose is not
present because we do not observe the agent deliberating.
The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself:
nature is like that. It is plain then that nature
is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose.
> Da: Damien Broderick <d.broderick@english.unimelb.edu.au>
> Risposta: extropians@extropy.org
> Data: Sun, 18 Feb 2001 13:04:08 +1100
> A: extropians@extropy.org
> Oggetto: Aristotle's teleology
>
> At 01:44 AM 18/02/01 +0100, serafino wrote:
>
>> Aristotle already pointed out very
>> interesting things about these issues.
>> - scerir
>
>> - Aristotle, Phys. II, 8:
>
>> Further, where a series has a completion (telos),
>> all the preceding steps are for the sake of that.
>> Now surely as in intelligent action, so in nature;
>> and as in nature, so it is in each action,
>> if nothing interferes.
>
> This was a shockingly erroneous analysis, even for someone writing so long
> ago. I suppose it might seem plausible if you assume that people arrived at
> the same time as the rest of nature and not at the end of a very long
> adaptive process that generated ab initio novelties such as planning and
> intention. But even then, it's dopy in the extreme. A human opens her mouth
> and sends gases moving across the vibrating folds inside her throat; we
> call this speech, and know that it was indeed intended for communication. A
> burst of air movement across a stand of trees causes the leaves to shake
> audibly; we know that this is a complete happenstance, unintended; any
> analogy with speech is a foolish superstitious error. A star reaches a
> certain age and collapses into a supernova that scatters elements necessary
> to the emergence of life in some distant as-yet-unborn solar system; we
> know that this is a complete happenstance, unintended, however necessary in
> hindsight for the development of minds able to see the difference between
> intentionless physical sequences and the telic actions of complex beings.
>
> Aristotle had his analogical arrow of explanation pointed in the wrong
> direction. How can you find his mistake `very interesting'?
>
> Damien Broderick
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