From: Emlyn (emlyn@one.net.au)
Date: Sun Dec 10 2000 - 21:37:36 MST
----- Original Message -----
From: <hal@finney.org>
To: <extropians@extropy.org>
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2000 6:58 AM
Subject: Re: Immortality
> Emlyn writes, regarding using information + atoms to generate
consciousness:
> > Undoubtedly. But in no way is it the same consciousness as that from
which
> > the original information was garnered.
>
> I think a lot of this debate is fruitless because ultimately it is a
> question about what the word "same" means in this context.
>
> Imagine that I buy a book from a bookstore that offers a 100% satisfaction
> guarantee. I start to read it, but I don't like it, so I take it back
> and ask to exchange it.
>
> "Certainly, sir. Here you go," says the clerk, handing me another copy
> of the same title.
>
> "But that's the same book!"
>
> "No, it isn't. See, you have a book there, and I have one here.
> They're not the same at all!"
>
> Are they the same book, or aren't they? Can the clerk and I have a useful
> discussion on the matter? Aren't we just arguing about words?
>
> Hal
>
Well, the clerk is arguing that the physical books are different. They are
undoubtedly seperate objects. They happen to contain a description of the
same information.
However, you are objecting that the books are the same, because they contain
the same information. The information is the same.
To the clerk they are different; after all, he can sell each one seperately
and get seperate money (except maybe to John Clarke). That's because he
sells the physical object, not the information. You buy the physical object
because of the encoded information that it contains.
Of course, he is violating the policy, as you undoubtedly are not satisfied.
If a replacement guarantee was in place, that would be ok, although this
kind of action would probably end up destroying the business.
--- There is a big problem I think in the metaphors used in this debate. We are talking about physical objects vs information, and lots of crap about computers. Also, lots of people talk about vitalism and the phlogiston, as examples of past inneffable stuff which have since been stored in the round filing cabinet. The problem is that nothing is like Consciousness. This is purely because of the subjective nature of consciousness; we experience consciousness, subjectively, and this experience cannot be externally measured or verified. Vitalism, the phlogiston, even god, all fall prey to the functionalist argument - "so what? even if these things do exist, we can't see any effect, so they are unnecessary". Not so consciousness; we care about it (at least, I do). But then, caring about it is an observable effect. Maybe there is a clue in that? Emlyn
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