From: Chris Russo (extropy@russo.org)
Date: Thu Dec 07 2000 - 13:37:44 MST
>Chris Russo boldly asked:
>
>>What makes you you?
>
>>Besides the physical characteristics that I think that we can all
>>agree upon are copied down to the smallest detail, the mental
>>characteristics define who we are.
>
>You're assuming Cartesian duality, I take it, in that you assume the brain
>and mind to be two separate entities. This is only true if you regard the
>mind to not be comprised of "physical characteristics."
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to imply that there was some non-physical
aspect of the mind. I can see how what I wrote could be read that
way. I was only trying to explain that if I were copied into a new
being, that the physical aspect - how high I can jump, what I look
like, etc. - would be one component that would be of some importance
to me, but who I *really* am is defined by my thoughts. The thoughts
are determined by the chemistry of the meat, though.
> >Basically, my "mental characteristics" are comprised of memories
>> I have and the neural algorithms that drive my thoughts, as well as
>>any capacity to support those algorithms.
>
>True, true, but are these not physical characteristics? Are you familiar
>with the idea of "synaptic plasticity" in memory cells and the assignment
>of weights in neural networks?
I was trying to define "me" in more than just in terms of the
hardware (in this case organic). If you run the above definition on
some future quantum computing hardware and it still roughly worked
the same, it would still be "I". I probably went too far in trying
to define the importance of separate aspects of the same physical
thing, and then just confused my stance on this position. Too much
crack, I'd guess. :)
> >Copy the mental and physical "me" exactly, and there's no real
>>distinction between the two.
>
>This is where you run into some serious trouble (more serious than
>philosophical trouble). First of all, by nature of the definition of a
>"copy," there is a definite distinction between the two, in that there is
>a usually quantifiable spatial sepation between the two entities which
>prevents them from being one in the same thing.
>
>Take for example a correlative analogy between the dynamics of an exact
>replica of you and, for the sake of application to computer science, an
>exact copy of your Windows 98 platform transferred to another computer.
>Say your biological replica, which is NOT you (because it moves to the
>Congo in an attempt to avoid the concept of dualism while you remain in
>Western Civilization) and your Windows 98 copy both are infected with
>viruses - your replica gets ebola while your Windows gets a virused copy
>of this email.
>
>Up until this point, assume both copies might have the same dynamics,
>unaffected by environment (which is untrue from the first millisecond
>after the copy is made). Therefore, arguably (with a really compelling
>argument) there would be no "real" distinction between the two. After your
>replica comes down with ebola, however, you can bet there will be
>observable-measurable-quantifiable changes in you and your replica,
>distinguishing the two on many levels. Same goes with the Windows 98
>example. After a week or so, the difference will be great enough that one
>will be functional and the other will not.
I'm not sure what you're arguing here. I concur that if both the
original and copy exist that they will diverge from one another.
What conclusion are you drawing from that?
>You also said something earlier to the effect of sentimentality hindering
>the acceptance of the idea that me and my replica have different
>consciousnesses,
No, I said that if you're restored from a just-made backup at the
moment of your destruction, you have effectively the same
consciousness, and that any feeling that your continuity has been
eliminated is sentimentality.
Note the question in my post regarding use of a futuristic
teleportation device that is essentially destroying then recreating
you from information. I may have sentimental problems about losing
my original meat, but my continuity is maintained.
Regards,
Chris Russo
--
"If anyone can show me, and prove to me, that I am wrong in thought
or deed, I will gladly change. I seek the truth, which never yet
hurt anybody. It is only persistence in self-delusion and ignorance
which does harm."
-- Marcus Aurelius, MEDITATIONS, VI, 21
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