From pedrorechezmailinglists at gmail.com Thu Feb 11 17:03:09 2021 From: pedrorechezmailinglists at gmail.com (Pedro Moreno-Sanchez) Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 18:03:09 +0100 Subject: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning? In-Reply-To: References: <5F48CD40-A1C7-4D72-8616-19BA3B1F033A@gmail.com> <2809CC61-3ACB-454C-8518-9E8F34A295C3@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4557C028-80D1-4EA7-B2A7-35FB7A3E49D6@gmail.com> > On Feb 11, 2021, at 6:31 AM, ZmnSCPxj wrote: > > Good morning Pedro, > >> Hi Nadav, >> >> You are right that the intermediary (i.e., Ingrid) needs to hold a certain amount of coins to allow the virtual channel between Alice and Bob. Some comments here: >> - The protocol makes sure that Ingrid will get paid whatever fee she decides to charge for the service of creating a virtual channel. Note that Ingrid does not have the guarantee that enough payments would be routed through her node to gain the same fee in the same amount of time. > > Have not examined this deeply, but what happens if any of the *actual* Alice-Ingrid or Ingrid-Bob channels are forced unilaterally onchain before the purported lifetime of the virtual channel? As a safe fallback, the protocol gives time to Ingrid (or Bob depending on the case) to put the other channel onchain before the punishment can be triggered. > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj