From joost.jager at gmail.com Fri Oct 23 05:58:11 2020 From: joost.jager at gmail.com (Joost Jager) Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 07:58:11 +0200 Subject: [Lightning-dev] Hold fees: 402 Payment Required for Lightning itself In-Reply-To: References: <0hQYsditdQaLVQpwyuLn5mOMsM6mxOY3TwM3teUDurYr7wFx0016M6wxJUlIM-Y3KP6g1YwtyhbXw34BFsbz3jNDfe1JsUf15UHBQ0sM4xw=@protonmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Bastien, We add a forward upfront payment of 1 msat (fixed) that is paid > unconditionally when offering an HTLC. > We add a backwards upfront payment of `hold_fees` that is paid when > receiving an HTLC, but refunded > if the HTLC is settled before the `hold_grace_period` ends (see footnotes > about this). > It is interesting that the forward and backward payments are relatively independent of each other. In particular the forward anti-spam payment could quite easily be implemented to help protect the network. As you said, just transfer that fixed fee for every `update_add_htlc` message from the offerer to the receiver. I am wondering though what the values for the fwd and bwd fees should be. I agree with ZmnSCPxj that 1 msat for the fwd is probably not going to be enough. Maybe a way to approach it is this: suppose routing nodes are able to make 5% per year on their committed capital. An aggressive routing node could be willing to spend up to that amount to take down a competitor. Suppose the network consists only of 1 BTC, 483 slot channels. What should the fwd and bwd fees be so that even an attacked routing node will still earn that 5% (not through forwarding fees, but through hold fees) in both the controlled and the uncontrolled spam scenario? - Joost -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: