From ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com Fri Apr 3 02:51:15 2020 From: ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com (ZmnSCPxj) Date: Fri, 03 Apr 2020 02:51:15 +0000 Subject: [Lightning-dev] Proof-of-closure as griefing attack mitigation In-Reply-To: References: <3N2W7o-6QbX0lG38elnlTiG5bcgI5yRhSORS7ibxgZEtLe2mGyI4gW6jVK1IP6cXF-F97uSDWTlKIygsCcx_yUkIiYt2COYBTRLTLH3ofV0=@protonmail.com> Message-ID: Good morning Nadav, > I could be missing something, but it seems to me like the proposal to close channels after a soft timeout unless non-cooperation can be proven upstream adds?a cost to the attacker of two on-chain transactions, which they can immediately revoke (as they know both pieces to the revocation priv key), but still allows very long lock-ups of other's funds (with a 10x multiplier if they choose a long route). I do think that this is certainly an improvement?on what we have now but I'm not sure it properly punishes the attacker in its current form. Ah, right, E knows the revocation for the unilateral close of EE, because it is a self-channel, sigh. And by this revocation clause it can claim the money immediately and put it into a channel as well. Regards, ZmnSCPxj