[p2p-research] The three exodus and the transition towards the p2p society

Mon May 17 18:47:55 CEST 2010

Dear  joss,

I'm republishing your points on the 22nd, I will reply in the next few days,
as you know, i'm on the road until june 8 and it is not always easy to find
internet connectivity,

michel

On Mon, May 17, 2010 at 11:00 PM, Joss Winn <joss at josswinn.org> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> I have recently published the blog post I mentioned in the recent
> discussion below, and left a comment on the P2P blog (see below).
>
> I'd be really interested in what people on this list think about the
> future of P2P in a near-term scenario of energy depletion. While I am
> hugely supportive of P2P values and approaches, I do worry that while
> still in their embryonic forms, a global Peak Oil scenario will do
> serious damage to the gains that have already been made.
>
> Perhaps you can offer potential opportunities for P2P in such a
> scenario? Simply, I see a future of greater social unrest and struggle,
> which may offer revolutionary opportunities, which P2P can harness in
> some way. I should add that I don't view myself as a 'doomer' nor do I
> advocate a survivalist mentality in such a scenario, yet having
> researched this area quite closely for several months now, I am finding
> it hard to be optimistic for a net culture that draws on such huge
> energy resources, not just in sourcing electricity, but in the
> manufacture of hardware in which much of the embodied energy of the net
> lies.
>
> The problems I see are a combination of technical, temporal, economic
> and social.
>
> Technical, because we do not have replacement technologies that can be
> deployed on the required scale to smoothly transition to a post-oil world.
>
> Temporal, because by all accounts, the period required to transition to
> a post-oil world is measured in decades, even with intense and
> co-ordinated effort.
>
> Economic, because our model of growth is tied to our production of
> energy. I think that while in its embryonic form, P2P is still reliant
> on a model of growth to maintain the infrastructure required to support
> and spread the values of P2P and develop non-net-based forms of P2P.
>
> Social, because unplanned de-growth and the development and
> implementation of alternative technologies on the scale required, to
> combat the negative consequences of both Peak Oil and Climate Change,
> arguably requires countries to be on 'a war footing', with intense,
> co-ordinated and sustained national effort. During WWII, the UK
> mobilised half of national productivity towards the single goal of
> winning the war. Is that possible today? What are the policy implications?
>
> I say a little more about that here:
>
>
> http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/04/23/climate-change-and-the-language-of-war/
>
> Anyway, here's the comment I made on the P2P blog:
>
> -------------
>
> http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/time-scales-for-p2p-oriented-change-the-2030-scenario/2010/05/09
>
> I have recently summarised six recent publications that provide an
> up-to-date overview of the social and technological challenges of Peak
> Oil and Climate Change.
>
>
> http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/05/13/peak-oil-and-climate-change-notes/
>
> I worry that Peak Oil has serious implications for the development of a
> P2P culture which, in its current embryonic form, remains largely
> reliant on cheap energy, globalisation and economic growth, all of which
> are threatened by dwindling oil supplies over the next decade. As liquid
> fuels become more expensive and difficult to source, economies will
> experience zero or degrowth, providing opportunities for more
> authoritarian modes of government that emphasise the need for
> 'stability' and 'efficiency'. I also fear that Net access is similarly
> likely to peak over the next decade and then decline as it becomes too
> expensive to maintain the current infrastructure.
>
> In addition, if governments decide to seriously tackle climate change,
> it will require the full resources of developed countries, much like
> when in a national state of war, again providing further opportunities
> for greater authoritarianism, in contrast to the distributed, autonomous
> sites of P2P production.
>
> Although I am still inclined to think that long-term, a P2P
> commons-based culture can still thrive, I think we face decades of
> struggle during a difficult transition to alternative forms of less
> intensive sources of energy.
>
>  -- Joss
>
> On 01/05/10 19:54, Joss Winn wrote:
> > On 01/05/10 16:37, Samuel Rose wrote:
> >
> >> I think the projections I've seen on P2P foundation list of "30
> >> years","50 years" etc are too long for:
> >>
> >> 1. Radical change in biosphere (enough changes to cause significant
> >> pressure on people employing industrial era approaches)
> >>
> >> 2. Shift to commons and p2p based approaches
> >>
> >> An argument can be made that in as little as 10-15 years, multiple
> >> pressures will coincide all at the same time. Peak oil figures are set
> >> near 2030 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil
> >
> > The growing consensus is that the peak of conventional oil was in 2005
> > and that the peak of all liquid fuels will be between 2010 - 2014.
> >
> > I've summarised this and a few other things relating to climate,
> > technology and efficiency, here:
> >
> >
> http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/02/12/revisiting-thinking-the-unthinkable/
> >
> > Since writing that, a paper from an Oxford University research group
> > (including ex-Chief Scientific Advisor to UK gov, Sr. David King) has
> > added to the growing Peak Oil consensus.
> >
> > http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.026
> >
> > I've got a blog post half-drafted on this paper. Here's the summary I
> > give for it:
> >
> > ---
> >
> > Owen, Inderwildi and King’s recent paper, The status of conventional
> > world oil reserves—Hype or cause for concern?, supports previous studies
> > by others which show that conventional oil production peaked in 2005 and
> > that the peak production capacity of all liquids (excluding gas), will
> > peak around 2010. Conventional oil supply is declining by over 4%/annum,
> > with the shortfall and anticipated additional demand being met by
> > non-conventional oil (deep sea, tar sands) and other liquid sources such
> > as gas and bio-fuels. In just ten years, 50% of the global demand for
> > liquid fuel will have to be met by sources that are not in production
> > today. Not surprisingly then, speculation over the price of oil based on
> > fundamental supply and demand factors, as well as global events such as
> > the invasion of Iraq, Hurricane Katrina and Israel threatening to attack
> > Iran, has resulted in increased volatility of prices, reaching a high of
> > $147 a barrel in July 2008. In 2000, a barrel of oil cost around $20. A
> > decade later, the price of oil is around $80 a barrel and the trend
> > remains upwards.
> >
> > Different economic theories applied to the supply and demand of oil
> > offer opposite outcomes. One suggests that the law of diminishing
> > returns would create an incentive to invest further in unconventional
> > sources such as tar sands and deep sea resources. On the other hand,
> > some economists argue that due to the inextricable link between oil and
> > economic activity, high oil prices can’t be sustained and that a price
> > of $100 a barrel would induce global recession, driving down oil prices
> > and paradoxically reducing investment in alternative fuels. While rising
> > oil prices can damage economic growth, lowering oil prices do not have
> > the same, proportionate effect on stimulating growth. It has been
> > estimated that oil price-GDP elasticity is -0.055 (+/- 0.005) meaning
> > that a 10% rise in oil prices leads to a 0.55% loss in global GDP.
> >
> > Owen, Inderwildi and King’s paper concludes that published world oil
> > reserve estimates are inaccurate and should be revised downwards by a
> > third. Over-reporting since the 1980s due to the ‘fight for quotas’
> > whereby OPEC agreed to set export quotas in proportion to reserve
> > volumes, and the inclusion of tar-sands into reserve estimates since
> > 2004 have distorted reality. They add that “supply and demand is likely
> > to diverge between 2010 and 2015, unless demand falls in parallel with
> > supply constrained induced recession” and that “the capacity to meet
> > liquid fuel demand is contingent upon the rapid and immediate
> > diversification of the liquid fuel mix, the transition to alternative
> > energy carriers where appropriate, and demand side measures such as
> > behavioural change and adaptation.”
> >
> > ----
> >
> > I wouldn't otherwise disagree with the 2030 scenario you outline below.
> >
> > Joss
> >
> >> speed up of Arctic
> >> and Antarctic thaw right now
> >> http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100404/sc_nm/us_climate_nitrous  by 2030
> >> it is plausible that we will have already passed the tipping point for
> >> carbon dioxide in the atmosphere affecting climates world wide.
> >>
> >> Food and energy demand are projected to increase by 50% by 2030, fresh
> >> water by 30%
> http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/327/5967/812
> >>  India and China (2 most populous nations) both warn their populations
> >> that their demand will outstrip their supplies severely by 2030
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_crisis  (links there to reports on
> >> this subject)
> >>
> >> Many food producing corporations that run industrial farming
> >> operations are switching large scale agricultural production to
> >> biofuel
> http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2009/10/12/118291/Massive-increase-in-global-biofuel-production.htm
> >>  which can further increase food costs by raising commodity prices
> >> worldwide, and causing food shortages. This price and biofuel
> >> production increase is already happening now.
> >>
> >> Meanwhile, multiple corporations are relentlessly pursuing total
> >> control of communications infrastructure, (and already have total
> >> control of) financial systems, energy and food distribution, etc
> >>
> >> So, by 2030 (not later) it is plausible that we will already be in a
> >> state where millions, if not billions will be marginalized by all
> >> existing basic sustenance systems (food, water, energy, access).
> >>
> >> Stuart Kauffman, and other complex systems theorists have shown that
> >> in all systems, change tends to happen in an "s curve" fashion.
> >> Kauffman uses a sandpile as an example in his book "At Home In The
> >> Universe". He describes the data signature of a massive pile of sand
> >> collapsing. First small bits fall of, then large chunks, then larger
> >> and larger, faster and faster. The total rate of collapse towards the
> >> end is exponentially faster than the beginning. I think we are seeing
> >> the same with global human systems now, and that we are *now* in the
> >> beginning time of collapse, with signals already present around the
> >> world. This means we have maybe 15 years, starting *now*, to start
> >> changing things in significant ways for at least 45% or more of people
> >> on the earth. 45% minimum probably will get us enough inertia in the
> >> opposite direction to slow down the momentum that is starting *now*.
> >> That is what I think.
> >>
> >>
>
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