[p2p-research] The three exodus and the transition towards the p2p society

[Joss Winn]

Hello,

I have recently published the blog post I mentioned in the recent
discussion below, and left a comment on the P2P blog (see below).

I'd be really interested in what people on this list think about the
future of P2P in a near-term scenario of energy depletion. While I am
hugely supportive of P2P values and approaches, I do worry that while
still in their embryonic forms, a global Peak Oil scenario will do
serious damage to the gains that have already been made.

Perhaps you can offer potential opportunities for P2P in such a
scenario? Simply, I see a future of greater social unrest and struggle,
which may offer revolutionary opportunities, which P2P can harness in
some way. I should add that I don't view myself as a 'doomer' nor do I
advocate a survivalist mentality in such a scenario, yet having
researched this area quite closely for several months now, I am finding
it hard to be optimistic for a net culture that draws on such huge
energy resources, not just in sourcing electricity, but in the
manufacture of hardware in which much of the embodied energy of the net
lies.

The problems I see are a combination of technical, temporal, economic
and social.

Technical, because we do not have replacement technologies that can be
deployed on the required scale to smoothly transition to a post-oil world.

Temporal, because by all accounts, the period required to transition to
a post-oil world is measured in decades, even with intense and
co-ordinated effort.

Economic, because our model of growth is tied to our production of
energy. I think that while in its embryonic form, P2P is still reliant
on a model of growth to maintain the infrastructure required to support
and spread the values of P2P and develop non-net-based forms of P2P.

Social, because unplanned de-growth and the development and
implementation of alternative technologies on the scale required, to
combat the negative consequences of both Peak Oil and Climate Change,
arguably requires countries to be on 'a war footing', with intense,
co-ordinated and sustained national effort. During WWII, the UK
mobilised half of national productivity towards the single goal of
winning the war. Is that possible today? What are the policy implications?

I say a little more about that here:

http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/04/23/climate-change-and-the-language-of-war/

Anyway, here's the comment I made on the P2P blog:

-------------
http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/time-scales-for-p2p-oriented-change-the-2030-scenario/2010/05/09

I have recently summarised six recent publications that provide an
up-to-date overview of the social and technological challenges of Peak
Oil and Climate Change.

http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/05/13/peak-oil-and-climate-change-notes/

I worry that Peak Oil has serious implications for the development of a
P2P culture which, in its current embryonic form, remains largely
reliant on cheap energy, globalisation and economic growth, all of which
are threatened by dwindling oil supplies over the next decade. As liquid
fuels become more expensive and difficult to source, economies will
experience zero or degrowth, providing opportunities for more
authoritarian modes of government that emphasise the need for
'stability' and 'efficiency'. I also fear that Net access is similarly
likely to peak over the next decade and then decline as it becomes too
expensive to maintain the current infrastructure.

In addition, if governments decide to seriously tackle climate change,
it will require the full resources of developed countries, much like
when in a national state of war, again providing further opportunities
for greater authoritarianism, in contrast to the distributed, autonomous
sites of P2P production.

Although I am still inclined to think that long-term, a P2P
commons-based culture can still thrive, I think we face decades of
struggle during a difficult transition to alternative forms of less
intensive sources of energy.

 -- Joss

On 01/05/10 19:54, Joss Winn wrote:
> On 01/05/10 16:37, Samuel Rose wrote:
> 
>> I think the projections I've seen on P2P foundation list of "30
>> years","50 years" etc are too long for:
>>
>> 1. Radical change in biosphere (enough changes to cause significant
>> pressure on people employing industrial era approaches)
>>
>> 2. Shift to commons and p2p based approaches
>>
>> An argument can be made that in as little as 10-15 years, multiple
>> pressures will coincide all at the same time. Peak oil figures are set
>> near 2030 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil  
> 
> The growing consensus is that the peak of conventional oil was in 2005
> and that the peak of all liquid fuels will be between 2010 - 2014.
> 
> I've summarised this and a few other things relating to climate,
> technology and efficiency, here:
> 
> http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/02/12/revisiting-thinking-the-unthinkable/
> 
> Since writing that, a paper from an Oxford University research group
> (including ex-Chief Scientific Advisor to UK gov, Sr. David King) has
> added to the growing Peak Oil consensus.
> 
> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.026
> 
> I've got a blog post half-drafted on this paper. Here's the summary I
> give for it:
> 
> ---
> 
> Owen, Inderwildi and King’s recent paper, The status of conventional
> world oil reserves—Hype or cause for concern?, supports previous studies
> by others which show that conventional oil production peaked in 2005 and
> that the peak production capacity of all liquids (excluding gas), will
> peak around 2010. Conventional oil supply is declining by over 4%/annum,
> with the shortfall and anticipated additional demand being met by
> non-conventional oil (deep sea, tar sands) and other liquid sources such
> as gas and bio-fuels. In just ten years, 50% of the global demand for
> liquid fuel will have to be met by sources that are not in production
> today. Not surprisingly then, speculation over the price of oil based on
> fundamental supply and demand factors, as well as global events such as
> the invasion of Iraq, Hurricane Katrina and Israel threatening to attack
> Iran, has resulted in increased volatility of prices, reaching a high of
> $147 a barrel in July 2008. In 2000, a barrel of oil cost around $20. A
> decade later, the price of oil is around $80 a barrel and the trend
> remains upwards.
> 
> Different economic theories applied to the supply and demand of oil
> offer opposite outcomes. One suggests that the law of diminishing
> returns would create an incentive to invest further in unconventional
> sources such as tar sands and deep sea resources. On the other hand,
> some economists argue that due to the inextricable link between oil and
> economic activity, high oil prices can’t be sustained and that a price
> of $100 a barrel would induce global recession, driving down oil prices
> and paradoxically reducing investment in alternative fuels. While rising
> oil prices can damage economic growth, lowering oil prices do not have
> the same, proportionate effect on stimulating growth. It has been
> estimated that oil price-GDP elasticity is -0.055 (+/- 0.005) meaning
> that a 10% rise in oil prices leads to a 0.55% loss in global GDP.
> 
> Owen, Inderwildi and King’s paper concludes that published world oil
> reserve estimates are inaccurate and should be revised downwards by a
> third. Over-reporting since the 1980s due to the ‘fight for quotas’
> whereby OPEC agreed to set export quotas in proportion to reserve
> volumes, and the inclusion of tar-sands into reserve estimates since
> 2004 have distorted reality. They add that “supply and demand is likely
> to diverge between 2010 and 2015, unless demand falls in parallel with
> supply constrained induced recession” and that “the capacity to meet
> liquid fuel demand is contingent upon the rapid and immediate
> diversification of the liquid fuel mix, the transition to alternative
> energy carriers where appropriate, and demand side measures such as
> behavioural change and adaptation.”
> 
> ----
> 
> I wouldn't otherwise disagree with the 2030 scenario you outline below.
> 
> Joss
> 
>> speed up of Arctic
>> and Antarctic thaw right now
>> http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100404/sc_nm/us_climate_nitrous  by 2030
>> it is plausible that we will have already passed the tipping point for
>> carbon dioxide in the atmosphere affecting climates world wide.
>>
>> Food and energy demand are projected to increase by 50% by 2030, fresh
>> water by 30%  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/327/5967/812
>>  India and China (2 most populous nations) both warn their populations
>> that their demand will outstrip their supplies severely by 2030
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_crisis  (links there to reports on
>> this subject)
>>
>> Many food producing corporations that run industrial farming
>> operations are switching large scale agricultural production to
>> biofuel http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2009/10/12/118291/Massive-increase-in-global-biofuel-production.htm
>>  which can further increase food costs by raising commodity prices
>> worldwide, and causing food shortages. This price and biofuel
>> production increase is already happening now.
>>
>> Meanwhile, multiple corporations are relentlessly pursuing total
>> control of communications infrastructure, (and already have total
>> control of) financial systems, energy and food distribution, etc
>>
>> So, by 2030 (not later) it is plausible that we will already be in a
>> state where millions, if not billions will be marginalized by all
>> existing basic sustenance systems (food, water, energy, access).
>>
>> Stuart Kauffman, and other complex systems theorists have shown that
>> in all systems, change tends to happen in an "s curve" fashion.
>> Kauffman uses a sandpile as an example in his book "At Home In The
>> Universe". He describes the data signature of a massive pile of sand
>> collapsing. First small bits fall of, then large chunks, then larger
>> and larger, faster and faster. The total rate of collapse towards the
>> end is exponentially faster than the beginning. I think we are seeing
>> the same with global human systems now, and that we are *now* in the
>> beginning time of collapse, with signals already present around the
>> world. This means we have maybe 15 years, starting *now*, to start
>> changing things in significant ways for at least 45% or more of people
>> on the earth. 45% minimum probably will get us enough inertia in the
>> opposite direction to slow down the momentum that is starting *now*.
>> That is what I think.
>>
>>