[p2p-research] on the greek crisis (must-read)

Wed May 12 00:42:28 CEST 2010

The good news is that there are now lots of efforts from Ireland to Estonia
that will either end well or badly.  So we will know next time what worked
and what didn't (at least under these circumstances.)

My own view is that taking the hard medicine now is wise.  I predict Ireland
and Latvia, and Estonia will outperform.  When their people return from
abroad, they will come back with investment and know-how.

The only real answer is to be competitive.  Short of that, there will be
pain.  You can certainly abandon the world system, but that has actually
worked far worse than these drastic contractions.   Truth is, devaluing a
local currency would have given a haircut too, just more to the rich than
the poor.  And what would happen?  The rich would leave.  Some thing that's
good, but it isn't.  If the rich leave, they take skills and capital with
them.  All that is left is old fixed expenditures...never very exciting as
the Bolsheviks found out.

It is a dark time.  But there are no simple answers.  The world let
Argentina off relatively lightly.  But no such sympathy will exist for small
nations that produce little of any real value to the rest of the world.  I'd
personally stay with the Euro...and try to get stronger.  If a nation
doesn't do that, they impoverish generations of people.

Ryan

On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 3:02 AM, Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>wrote:

>  A Baltic future for Greece?
>
> Latvia and Estonia show us what Greece may look forward to if it follows
> the advice it gets from the IMF and European Union
>
>    - [image: Digg it]
>    <http://digg.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.guardian.co.uk%2Fcommentisfree%2F2010%2Fapr%2F28%2Fgreece-financial-crisis&title=A+Baltic+future+for+Greece%3F+%7C+Mark+Weisbrot>
>    - [image: Buzz up]
>    <http://uk.buzz.yahoo.com/buzz?publisherurn=the_guardian665&targetUrl=http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/28/greece-financial-crisis&summary=%3Cp%3E%3Cstrong%3EMark+Weisbrot%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E+Latvia+and+Estonia+show+us+what+Greece+may+look+forward+to+if+it+follows+the+advice+it+gets+from+the+IMF+and+European+Union%3C%2Fp%3E&headline=%20A%20Baltic%20future%20for%20Greece?%20%7C%20Mark%20Weisbrot%20%7C%20Comment%20is%20free%20%7C%20guardian.co.uk>
>    - [image: Share on facebook] (36)<http://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.guardian.co.uk%2Fcommentisfree%2F2010%2Fapr%2F28%2Fgreece-financial-crisis>
>    - Tweet this
>    <http://twitter.com/home?status=http%3A%2F%2Fgu.com%2Fp%2F2gjkb%2Ftw>
>    (21)<http://topsy.com/tb/www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/28/greece-financial-crisis>
>    - Comments (84)<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/28/greece-financial-crisis#start-of-comments>
>
>
>    - [image: mark] <http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/markweisbrot>
>    -
>       - Mark Weisbrot <http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/markweisbrot>
>       - guardian.co.uk <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>, Wednesday 28 April
>       2010 21.00 BST
>       - Article history<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/28/greece-financial-crisis#history-link-box>
>
>  As I have noted previously<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/jan/15/latvia-economy-eu-imf>,
> Latvia <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/latvia> has experienced the worst
> two-year economic downturn<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/latvias-recession-cost-of-adjustment-internal-devaluation/>on record, losing more than 25% of GDP. It is projected to shrink further
> during the first half of this year, before beginning a slow recovery, in
> which the International Monetary Fund (IMF<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/imf>)
> projects that it will not reach even its 2006 level of output by 2015 – nine
> years later.
>
> With 22% unemployment, a sharp increase in emigration, and cuts to
> education funding that will cause long-term damage, the social costs of this
> trajectory are also high.
>
> By keeping its currency pegged to the euro<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/euro>,
> the government gives up the opportunity to allow a depreciation that would
> stimulate growth by improving the trade balance. But even more importantly,
> maintaining the peg means that Latvia cannot use expansionary monetary
> policy, or expansionary fiscal policy, to get out of recession. (The United
> States has used both: in addition to its fiscal stimulus, and cutting
> interest rates to near zero, it has created more than 1.5 trillion dollars
> since the recession began).
>
> Some who believe that doing the opposite of what rich countries do – ie
> pro-cyclical policies – can work point to neighbouring Estonia<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/estonia>as a success story. Estonia has kept its currency pegged to the euro, and
> like Latvia is trying to accomplish an "internal devaluation". In other
> words, with a deep enough recession and sufficient unemployment, wages and
> prices can be pushed down. In theory this would allow the economy to become
> competitive again, even while keeping the (nominal) exchange rate fixed.
>
> But the cost to Estonia has been almost as high as in Latvia. The economy
> has shrunk by nearly 20%. Unemployment has shot up from about 2% to 15.5%.
> And recovery is expected to be painfully slow: the IMF projects that the
> economy will grow by just 0.8% this year. Amazingly, by 2015 Estonia is
> projected to still be less well off than it was in 2007. This is an enormous
> cost in terms of lost actual and potential output, as well as the social
> costs associated with high long-term unemployment that will accompany this
> slow recovery. And despite the economic collapse and a sharp drop in wages,
> Estonia's real effective exchange rate was the same at the end of last year
> as it was at the beginning of 2008 – in other words, no "internal
> devaluation" had occurred.
>
> Yet Estonia is being held up as a positive example, even used<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0624d74-0d07-11df-a2dc-00144feabdc0.html>to attack economists who have criticised pro-cyclical policies in Latvia.
> The reason is that Estonia has not had the swelling deficit and debt
> problems that Latvia has had in the downturn. Its public debt of 7% of GDP
> is a small fraction of the EU average of 79%, and its budget deficit for
> 2009 was just 1.7% of GDP. It is therefore on its way to join the eurozone,
> perhaps adopting the euro at the beginning of next year.
>
> How did Estonia manage to avoid a large increase in its debt during this
> severe downturn? First, the government had accumulated assets during the
> expansion, amounting to some 12% of GDP; and it was also running a budget
> surplus when the recession hit. And it has received quite a bit in grants
> from the European Union <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/eu>: in 2010, the
> IMF projects an enormous 8.3% of GDP in grants, with 6.7% of GDP the prior
> year.
>
> Greece <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/greece>, unfortunately, is not
> being offered any grants from the European Union or the IMF. Their plan for
> Greece is all about pain and punishment. And with a public debt of 115% of
> GDP and a budget deficit of 13.6%, Greece will be forced to make spending
> cuts that will not only have drastic social consequences but will almost
> certainly plunge the country deeper into recession.
>
> This is a train going in the wrong direction, and once you go down this
> track there is no telling where the end will be. Greece – like Latvia and
> Estonia – will be at the mercy of external events to rescue its economy. A
> rapid, robust rebound in the European Union – which nobody is projecting –
> could lift these countries out of their slump with a huge boost in demand
> for their exports, and capital inflows as in the bubble years. Or not:
> Western European banks still have hundreds of billions of bad loans to
> Central and Eastern Europe from the bubble years. Some big shoes could still
> drop that would depress regional growth even below the slow recovery that is
> projected for the eurozone. And Germany, which has been dependent on exports
> for all of its growth from 2002-2007, could continue to soak up the regional
> trade benefits of a eurozone and/or world recovery.
>
> No matter how you slice it, these 19th-century-brutal pro-cyclical policies
> don't make sense. They are also grossly unfair, placing the burden of
> adjustment most squarely on poor and working people. I would not wish
> Estonia's "success" on any population, simply because they avoided a debt
> run-up and are on track to join the euro. They may find, like Greece – as
> well as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy – that the costs of adopting a
> currency that is overvalued for a country's level of productivity are
> potentially quite high over the long run, even after these economies
> eventually recover.
>
> The European Union and the IMF have the money and the ability to engineer a
> recovery based on counter-cyclical policies in Greece as well as the Baltic
> states. If it involves a debt restructuring – or even a haircut for the
> bondholders – so be it. No government should accept policies that tell them
> they must bleed their economy for an indeterminate time before it can
> recover.
>
>
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-- 
Ryan Lanham
rlanham1963 at gmail.com
Facebook: Ryan_Lanham
P.O. Box 633
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