[p2p-research] [-empyre-] seeing yourself a prototype - the limits of open source (innovation as manipulation)

[Michel Bauwens]

Thanks Andy,

I do think that social reserves play a key role. In the southern countries,
exclusion is much more massive (workers, farmers), and problems much more
existential (having land or not, food prices, representation); automatically
I think, motivation is higher and the people involved are not marginal. In
the northern countries, despite real issues, reserves are generally quite
high, and problems are less existential.

Otherwise, I think all the reasons  you mention below play a role,

Michel

On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 11:32 PM, Andy Robinson <ldxar1 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hiya,
>
> Yes, it isn't something I'd want to discount, and I think I'd end up
> disagreeing with certain insurrectionists and autonomists on this kind of
> thing.  The fetishist trap really worries me, because I see a lot of people
> using these kinds of arguments.  But on the other hand, if the people who
> are rebelling do not form wider links than among a small group who are
> already rebelling, the recomposition of social relations doesn't really
> occur.  I've seen a few ways it's handled - alternative media, forming links
> around areas of possible agreement (Food Not Bombs and the like), culture
> jamming, or hoping actions catch people's imagination and proliferate...
> all of which works to a degree, but not very often.  (The Greek revolt,
> incidentally, was very popular at its peak, and not simply a matter of a few
> dozen anarchists - though public opinion seems to have turned against it
> within a few months of it fizzling out.  There is no European movement which
> can do what the redshirts and the Bolivian bloqueos are capable of - to
> sustain a movement for months on end, and if suppressed, to regroup and try
> again a few months later.  It seems in Europe, one wins right away or else
> disillusionment sets in.  I time the longest recent revolts in Europe at
> three weeks maximum).
>
> Southern movements seem to be better at it, but that might partly be
> because the aversion to radical demands and to political conflict is often
> less.  I don't know if the redshirts are doing this, but many of the
> movements I mentioned, in Latin America especially, seem to have a dual or
> triple existence: their most visible aspect is a very concrete political
> demand (land for the landless, no privatisation, unemployment benefits), but
> they also have a wider anti-neoliberal politics, and also everyday practices
> tending towards subjective transformation.  The last of these is couched in
> different terms in different movements - sometimes as pedagogy, sometimes as
> spirituality, sometimes as psychotherapy (it is called 'social weaving' in
> Ruta Pacifica, education in MST, collective reflection in Venezuela).  It
> isn't so much a question of appealing to people as they are as transforming
> people through their involvement in the dialogical aspects of movement
> activity.  And it isn't directed at the undifferentiated public, it's
> directed very specifically at the movement's own constituency.  I get the
> impression it also ends up as an immanent process: it isn't a matter of
> certain people raising the consciousness of others, so much as a mutual
> learning process which comes out of the specific situation and diffuses
> horizontally.  The same movements are also often doing very militant things
> such as physically defending occupied spaces and roadblocks; and are also
> sometimes doing what might be called 'reformist' things, taking advantage of
> whatever openings are provided locally (they might for instance be involved
> in service provision through the state or linked to NGOs etc - particularly
> if there is a Morales or a Lula in power).
>
> Movements in the North are a long way behind.  I get the sense a lot of the
> same things are being done, or attempted, but with much fewer people, more
> decomposed and often less intelligently.  I think it is because Southern
> movements emerge from a very large space of the 'excluded' or
> quasi-autonomous who are already living in horizontal, networked ways simply
> to survive - whereas the stratum of people who feel radically excluded in
> the North is a lot smaller.  But, one of my friends who works on movements
> in the South thinks this is too simplistic - there are a lot of complexities
> in Southern movements and forces within marginal communities which tend to
> reproduce conformity and which movements have to actively overcome.  One of
> the difficulties I see in the North is a lack of connections between
> movements arising from the 'educated freeter' substratum, which I think is
> where most of the explicitly anarchist and autonomist movements and the
> activist 'scene' come from, and the lifeworld of the radically excluded (the
> deschooled freeter substratum one might say).  Yet it's not like links
> aren't being made at all - obviously anti-poverty activism brings in the
> poor, Food not Bombs targets the homeless, there are a lot of pro-refugee
> campaigns and so on.  It's more a problem with the density and depth of the
> links - it doesn't seem to reach the kind of educational critical mass which
> some of the Southern movements do, where the network among movement
> participants becomes more important than the dyadic connections all the
> participants have with various alienated social forms.  It might also be
> that the connections usually start at a material level.  It's very
> noticeable that the Southern movements always seem to start from a single
> big issue, even though they are never just about that issue and often
> outlast their victory on that issue (land rights recognition for instance).
> This also seems to happen with some of the more successful Northern
> activisms - the European squat scene for instance, at its peak was combining
> people who squatted because they were anarchists or autonomists, very poor
> people in need of housing, and marginal people (such as students) who found
> squatting a viable way to save money; South Central Farm managed a high
> level of integration between the LA activist 'scene' and a local poor
> community; the Poll Tax campaign was the last campaign in Britain which
> really reached beyond the activist 'scene'.  But there is still the question
> of how movements 'deepen' - the Poll Tax campaign for instance seems to have
> decomposed the moment the issue was won.
>
> Anyway...  I think there is a kind of social movement memory guiding
> activism in Britain which is the transmission belt between the repressive
> context and movement decomposition (the fact that activists are far ewer,
> less active, and less effective than before): the memory is of struggles in
> the period roughly from the 1970s to the early 1990s, and focuses on a
> grouping of tactics around civil disobedience, nonviolent direct action and
> publicity stunts - the basic model of an activist being someone who takes
> part in 'actions', and a basic 'action' being to lock onto something, sit
> down in front of something, trespass on something, etc.  The tactic has
> three components: it produces direct disruption and potentially large costs
> (e.g. a company has to shut down for the day); it grabs publicity for the
> activist's cause; and the risk of repression is taken to be relatively light
> and quite predictable.  It was a very effective way of operating in a
> broadly liberal-democratic setting: firstly the British state used to be
> very badly organised, and had great difficulty dealing with sudden
> disruptions; if activists were prosecuted, they would turn the court setting
> into a further publicity coup, and if there was severe repression, this
> would be used both as a further source of publicity and as grounds for legal
> action against the state, which used to be quite effective.  The problem
> today is that all the assumptions are problematised: firstly the state
> responds quickly and viciously, often before any disruption occurs; secondly
> the media has largely stopped covering activism or does so only in hostile
> ways (it really is only the Guardian and the Independent which are at all
> interested), so activists have lost most of the publicity effects; and
> thirdly repression is more severe, more intrusive and more unpredictable -
> in addition to the likelihood of years-long state harassment after a
> successful action (through bail terms and the like even if there is no
> grounds for prosecution), there is the danger that quite innocuous actions
> might be deemed conspiracy, terrorism-related and so on, or that irregular
> measures will be used to escalate repression (e.g. ASBOs, harassment laws).
> Decomposition has happened because movement learning predicts a situation
> which does not actually arise, and the gap between the experience of an
> 'action' and the narratives transmitted within the movement causes people to
> drop out, to become confused and so on.  Recomposition will occur through
> new forms of learning in the new situation.  I think there is also a move
> towards increasingly antagonistic positions on the one hand (because
> activists feel very directly persecuted and at risk), and also, a move
> towards tactics which are not directly attributable to an individual or
> group.
>
> Similar repression has not had the same effect in certain other countries
> for a number of reasons, some to do with state capacity (it takes a lot of
> resources to follow up persecution of a significant number of people over
> time), but many to do with the movement already having an autonomist
> disposition (different movement learning) and a certain matter of scale.  It
> is not at all simple for instance, to suddenly try to clear out squats in a
> country with a thousands strong squatters' movement - firstly each squat
> clearance will be resisted, and highly costly; secondly, each clearance will
> lead to protests, indirect costs, etc; and thirdly, the movement will tend
> to respond to each clearance by opening at least one new squat - the war of
> position is ultimately unsustainable.  In Britain, it used to be very hard
> to close squats for other reasons - for one, it had to go through civil not
> criminal law - but there is a real risk they will ban it outright after the
> next election, and the movement really has little capability to respond.  To
> take another example, the Iraq war was highly disorienting and demobilising
> in Britain, because millions-strong protests achieved very little.  Yet
> British involvement in the Iraq war could easily have been stopped by a few
> effective direct actions - a few thousand more at Fairford for example,
> blockades of military transports, etc.  Italian involvement was heavily hit
> by activism - actually, Italy did not dare attempt more than token
> involvement (quickly withdrawn at the first mishap), and most of the other
> countries with significant autonomist movements did not even attempt that
> (Germany, Greece, etc).  The difficulty is that people in Britain still
> expected to be listened to if they asked nicely.  It seems it will take a
> long time for people to learn that we are no longer in the kind of society
> where the government cares if millions are against it.
>
> bw
> Andy
>
>
>
>
>  On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 4:18 PM, Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> Thanks Andy,
>>
>> makes a lot of sense, also to understand the thai tacticians of the red
>> shirt,
>>
>> yet, I don't one should discount the effects on getting broader
>> sympathies, which are an important part of any struggle,
>>
>> Michel
>>
>>   On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 5:58 PM, Andy Robinson <ldxar1 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> This would be a big debate to get into, which I don't really have the
>>> time for at the moment.  You're right that I'm thinking of more than simply
>>> European insurrectionism, though I think many of the movements have similar
>>> characteristics.
>>>
>>> To summarise a few things briefly.
>>>
>>> 1) The question is not so much whether violence "justifies repressive
>>> measures" or "fails to get majority support".  The question is whether
>>> "majorities" (conformists) are *right* in their rather irrational aversion
>>> to the use of force by protesters, and where they get this aversion from.
>>> If it is the case that the majority are incurable bigots, or that they
>>> believe whatever they are told in the tabloids/Fox News/Berlusconi's
>>> channels, this actually *strengthens* the insurrectionist case to ignore
>>> what they think.
>>>
>>> 2) Insurrectionism does not try to be effective by influencing the
>>> 'majority'.  It tries to be effective by directly disrupting
>>> control-infrastructures or by imposing costs on state repression.
>>>
>>> 3) The point is that insurrectionism emerges partly because effective
>>> nonviolent direct action is successfully repressed in certain societies and
>>> is no longer a viable strategy for effective transformation.
>>>
>>> I'm rather worried about the 'fetishist' position (in a Freudian sense)
>>> of 'we know very well the majority are wrong, but still we keep observing
>>> their limits (because of the other supposed to believe)' - it is absolutely
>>> corrosive of autonomy in agency.
>>>
>>> There are certainly other reasons for nonviolent activism, which are not
>>> affected by any of this.  I think it's quite possible to be autonomous and
>>> also nonviolent (as in Ruta Pacifica).  There is a certain relation,
>>> however, between autonomy and antagonism, or 'violence' in Benjamin's sense,
>>> which is clearest in Clastres' argument about the conditions for indigenous
>>> autonomy.
>>>
>>> On your other point:
>>>
>>> I don't take the view that repressive closure is the *only* cause of
>>> movement demobilisation.  Of course there are many societies which are very
>>> repressive but never achieve such closure.  It all has to do with the
>>> relative balance of political and social principles in society.  In some
>>> societies, the social principle is very resilient.  State repression has the
>>> effect of decomposing horizontal relations (p2p you might say) and creating
>>> authoritarian dyads.  However, counter-agency can recompose horizontal
>>> relations.  There are a lot of factors affecting whether this happens: the
>>> extent of cooptation of movements, the size and degree of organisation of
>>> autonomous spheres, the tradition or lack of it of 'everyday resistance' and
>>> 'weapons of the weak', whether there's a mainly hierarchical commodified
>>> economy and a mainly formal economy or whether people are economically
>>> composed in other fields (subsistence, petty commodity production, gift
>>> economy, moral economy, etc).
>>>
>>> I think the basic point however, is that state repression decomposes
>>> horizontal relations - the state is an 'antiproduction assemblage' as
>>> Deleuze and Guattari put it.  Hence there is a need to ward off such
>>> actions, otherwise horizontal relations are doomed from the start.  Hence
>>> the need for some kind of response which imposes costs on the state, makes
>>> it difficult for it to decompose movements at will.  We are unfortunately
>>> long past the point where 'it will look bad in the Guardian' is cost enough.
>>>
>>> bw
>>> Andy
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 9:17 AM, Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>
>>>> when you refer to insurrectional anarchists, I was more thinking of
>>>> small groups in France, or the black block in the G8-G20 demonstrations, or
>>>> the Greek youth revolts, and I don't find these tactics particularly
>>>> fruitful on the contrary, they justify repressive measures which get
>>>> majority support because of the perceived violence.
>>>>
>>>> This is not an argument against violence of insurrection as such, though
>>>> I would tend to think that nonviolence is better not just as a matter of
>>>> principle, but also in terms of efficience, and of course, with non-violence
>>>> I do not mean coopted ngoi's, but mass movements on the ground.
>>>>
>>>> Since you refer not necessarily to what Im mentioning above, but to
>>>> massive social movements, like the examples you cite, I have of course to
>>>> acquiesce, but I didn't see them neither as anarchists nor as
>>>> insurrenctionists, though they may apply certain tactics. You have to see
>>>> their aims, which are often very moderate (non-privatisation of water in
>>>> bolivia, free elections in thailand), and their tactics which are mostly
>>>> event driven, often by the repression and non-reaction to nonviolent
>>>> tactics. But insurrection and violence are always dangerous and can
>>>> backfire, the thai movement for example, does not seem to attract middle
>>>> class democrats, nor much youth. I don't think most of these movements, and
>>>> their leaders, are familiar neither with Agamben, nor Italian autonomists; I
>>>> find Zapatista manifesto's eminently readable by the way: i have no
>>>> objection against specialist language as such, if it is instrumental, but I
>>>> do have objections against building whole theories on questionable premisis.
>>>>
>>>> For example you explain the lack of social movements in western europe
>>>> by repressive closure, but I would question that, I don't think those
>>>> regimes are more repressive than the southern european ones where more
>>>> actions are occuring; I think the lack of activism has other causes. How
>>>> could could prove that there is such a direct link between presumed
>>>> repression and lack of activism. For example, both thailand and the US are
>>>> quite repressive, but have very activie social movements,
>>>>
>>>> I'm just against easy equations, that's all,
>>>>
>>>> Michel
>>>>
>>>>   On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:52 PM, Andy Robinson <ldxar1 at gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> "the way I see the method is: take something which has a grain of
>>>>> truth, say measures of exception, take it as the absolute truth, then build
>>>>> a whole system of thought on that doubtful premise," - this is probably
>>>>> true, a lot of the continental theorists work that way.  It's an effect of
>>>>> trying to do empirical social science by means of philosophy.  The thing is
>>>>> though, that people who use these theories (whether activists or academics)
>>>>> will generally use them selectively, use them in a kind of bricolage of
>>>>> several of the theories.
>>>>>
>>>>> The rest of your construction here...  well, there's quite a few
>>>>> assumptions need unpacking.  One of these is, which movements/people you are
>>>>> taking to be 'real social movements' or 'activists on the ground'.  If
>>>>> you're thinking of the Thai context, then it is rather unusual
>>>>> internationally (though you will notice standard insurrectionist tactics -
>>>>> blockading airports, occupying and shutting down key nodes, storming summits
>>>>> - used by both sides).  In Britain and America, activism is at an all-time
>>>>> low, old reformist and civil disobedience orientations are proving to be
>>>>> really very ineffectual in the current conjuncture, and movements are
>>>>> decomposing drastically.  The people who are still active are gravitating
>>>>> towards autonomous/insurrectional modalities of action (the biggest events
>>>>> in Britain over the last few years have been the G20 and G8, the Climate
>>>>> Camps, and then a raft of smaller campaigns such as against DSEi, Smash EDO,
>>>>> SHAC, etc).  If you look at continental European countries - France, Greece,
>>>>> Denmark - the repressive closure is less far-gone and is only now being
>>>>> imposed, and the response has been a wave of insurrectional politics - the
>>>>> Ungdomshuset revolt, the constant preparedness to physically defend
>>>>> Christiania, the banlieue revolts, the rise of the 'anarcho-autonome' scene
>>>>> in France, the Greek revolt of December 2008.  In the South the pattern is
>>>>> slightly different but basically similar.  In South Africa for instance the
>>>>> old 'civil society' has been demobilised by the ANC in power; what is left
>>>>> is an insurgent outside, groups like APF, SECC, LPM, Abahlali, who mobilise
>>>>> mainly throuhg popular revolt in the townships.  Chile is similar, the
>>>>> Philippines is similar.  Argentina has had constant revolts which are at an
>>>>> ebb now, but the movements which came out of the revolts are intractably
>>>>> autonomous.  Bolivia the movements got to such a point that neoliberalism
>>>>> became unsustainable.  China, the only real resistance to the current
>>>>> trajectory comes from the periodic, and rather frequent, uprisings in the
>>>>> peripheral zones.  Then there's the very peripheral areas where things get
>>>>> even more messy: Chiapas, the Niger Delta, West Papua, etc.  In these cases
>>>>> opposition most often emerges as armed opposition.
>>>>>
>>>>> Some of these have been very effectual.  Governments overthrown in
>>>>> Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador.  Mining shut down in Bougainville.  The Peru
>>>>> Amazon law defeated multiple times.  Huge concessions in the Niger Delta.
>>>>> Autonomous zones for over a decade in Chiapas.  Christiania still going,
>>>>> much to the chagrin of the Danish elite.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand, there are a great many 'civil society' organisations
>>>>> with memberships dwarfing those of the autonomous social movements,
>>>>> ostensibly with the ear of government, which have achieved absolutely
>>>>> nothing (think Drop the Debt for example).
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you come up with any examples of social movements which have
>>>>> anti-neoliberal and anti-repressive demands, which have succeeded through
>>>>> reformist or ameliorative means in the current period?
>>>>>
>>>>> Off the top of my head, I can only think of a handful of examples.
>>>>> They either happened in a context of militant autonomous mobilisation mixed
>>>>> with insider strategies, in rather unusual contexts where global pressure
>>>>> was working for the protest, and where a government is terrified of losing
>>>>> legitimacy (TAC in South Africa); or they happened in cases where a
>>>>> social-movement-based party had taken political power and either had been
>>>>> intermittent in its attempts to, or had failed to, recuperate social
>>>>> movements (as in Venezuela).  Most of the time it is the same old story:
>>>>> adverse incorporation.  Either social movements are 'listened to' and
>>>>> ignored, or their leaders are coopted, or they are drawn into the realm of
>>>>> service provision funding bids and lose their oppositional purpose.  None of
>>>>> which stops the onward march of neoliberalism or the growth of state
>>>>> repression, or even slows it down significantly.  There are a few countries
>>>>> where the pattern is a bit different because they remain either broadly
>>>>> social-democratic, or broadly within the field of patronage-based
>>>>> insertions.
>>>>>
>>>>> The question of 'language used', or styles of theorising, is another
>>>>> one which needs to be unpacked.  It's not clear if you're saying the
>>>>> language is too difficult for activists or too Manichean.  If the former,
>>>>> this varies a lot across contexts, and you would find for instance activist
>>>>> writings in Italy are often as difficult as Agamben's - it happens to be a
>>>>> society with a high level of theoretical discussion.  I'd also suggest
>>>>> comparing the Zapatistas' style of writing, which is developed specifically
>>>>> for the Mayan indigenous context, and yet reads very much like 'postmodern'
>>>>> expression.  Of course there is a difficulty in that radical theory is not
>>>>> speaking directly to the banlieue youth for instance, but it's by no means
>>>>> clear that a 'simplified' version would be either; marginal groups often
>>>>> have their own subcultures and linguistic styles (slang, dialects and
>>>>> suchlike).  There's little point seeking to imitate since these differences
>>>>> are partly expressive, they are designed to be specific not general.  On the
>>>>> other hand, I have heard from someone who grew up in this kind of
>>>>> background, that very marginal groups are more responsive to action than
>>>>> words.  On the second point, this would be rather ironic to claim, since
>>>>> activists of all kinds (even the liberal-reformist ones) are nearly always
>>>>> accused of being too Manichean and cut-and-dried about things.
>>>>>
>>>>> bw
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 7:01 AM, Michel Bauwens <
>>>>> michelsub2004 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I think we had this discussion about 18 months ago, when you talked
>>>>>> about the contempary situation as a new type of fascism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What is demobilizing about it, in my view, is that it overemphizes the
>>>>>> enemy, it presumes a total defeat of civil society, which is not the case,
>>>>>> yes, there are new state powers, yes democracy is in crisis, but do we live
>>>>>> in a totalitarian state, or totalitarian capitalism, no, absolutely not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think that the fact the you mention insurrectionist anarchism,
>>>>>> surely the most ineffectual strategy at present, as using Agamben, is
>>>>>> indicative, it leads to nihilism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Otherwise of course, I do find your thoughts and contributions very
>>>>>> informative, since I probably won't have the time to read it all, but I
>>>>>> truly feel that the language the post-modern left is using, is bringing it
>>>>>> further and further away from any contact with real social movements, and
>>>>>> totally away from the construction of a new p2p world, I feel it is the
>>>>>> scholastics of our time,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> the way I see the method is: take something which has a grain of
>>>>>> truth, say measures of exception, take it as the absolute truth, then build
>>>>>> a whole system of thought on that doubtful premise,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> of course, I wouldn't be able to engage in a convincing discussion
>>>>>> about this, but I noted how activists on the ground, often felt the same way
>>>>>> as me during this type of academic conferences ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Michel
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2010 at 10:02 PM, Andy Robinson <ldxar1 at gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hiya,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why do they see state of exception theories as demobilising?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've seen Agamben namedropped or concept-dropped in insurrectionist
>>>>>>> anarchism, so he seems to be attracting attention from people who are
>>>>>>> certainly not 'demobilised'.  On the other hand his view is strongly against
>>>>>>> any kind of reformism or gradualism, since the problem is inherent to the
>>>>>>> state as a social form.  I wonder if this is where Hardt and Negri feel
>>>>>>> threatened - it demobilises *their* kind of politics.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I also think Agamben and Virilio are too simplistic sometimes (a
>>>>>>> strange accusation when they're difficult to read, but I'm thinking of their
>>>>>>> conceptual frame rather than their language).  They have quite correctly
>>>>>>> deduced the social logic of the state - what Kropotkin calls the 'political
>>>>>>> principle' - but they wrongly use it as a general meta-theory of reality,
>>>>>>> ignoring the roles of other social logics which either syncretise with or
>>>>>>> oppose this logic (to be sure, neither of them deny that there is at least
>>>>>>> one other social logic - 'popular defence' in Virilio,
>>>>>>> 'whatever-singularities' in Agamben - but there seem only to be these two
>>>>>>> logics).  In Kropotkin there is a similar construct but the 'social
>>>>>>> principle', the other pole, is given a lot more prominence, and this leads
>>>>>>> in people like Martin Buber, Gustav Landauer and Colin Ward (and maybe Hakim
>>>>>>> Bey?) to a great deal of openness to the strategic construction of autonomy,
>>>>>>> even in quite 'reformist' ways (provided their tendency is to re-empower the
>>>>>>> social principle - e.g. squatting, mutual aid, etc).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Obviously, I theorise this alternative logic in terms of
>>>>>>> affinity-networks.  The theory of the alternative pole to state power is
>>>>>>> already tending this way in Kropotkin, and I've already explained the extent
>>>>>>> (and limits) to which Hardt and Negri conceive it in this sense, but in
>>>>>>> Agamben it tends to be rather amorphous, almost a kind of minimum life-force
>>>>>>> which is irreducible.  I have a sense that Agamben and Virilio actually
>>>>>>> *mean* affinity-networks - Agamben's model is derived from
>>>>>>> Deleuze's, which is explicitly network-based; Virilio's draws on the density
>>>>>>> of ecological and social connections in peasant/artisan/indigenous
>>>>>>> communities, similar to Kropotkin's social principle - but it isn't very
>>>>>>> developed.  (If there was no 'second pole', state of exception theories
>>>>>>> *would* be thoroughly disempowering - as in their Lacanian
>>>>>>> incarnation for instance.  In Agamben's case, 'The Coming Community' is very
>>>>>>> clear in terms of the articulation of a second pole - this is the text used
>>>>>>> by Richard Day when he discusses Agamben.  My first reaction to Agamben -
>>>>>>> based on Homo Sacer - is that he was pessimistic and disempowering.  We need
>>>>>>> to remember that Agamben has over a dozen books in English alone - his
>>>>>>> theory is not limited to Homo Sacer).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However, it's not only their under-theorisation of the
>>>>>>> affinity-network pole which bothers me a bit - it is also their failure to
>>>>>>> conceive of other social logics which are not either the state (at its most
>>>>>>> fascistic) or affinity-networks (at their most anarchic).  While this might
>>>>>>> ultimately be how the social field splits, there are also other logics
>>>>>>> operative which don't quite fit - in particular, the capitalist logic, the
>>>>>>> logic of the 'included' (addition of axioms), the 'mass' (in Baudrillard's
>>>>>>> sense), and reactive networks.  (Looking at the current field, one might
>>>>>>> specify for instance the people at the World Economic Forum who opposed the
>>>>>>> Iraq war as bad for business; movements such as Drop the Debt; or something
>>>>>>> like the RSS or al-Qaeda - none of these are either pure statist sovereignty
>>>>>>> movements or affinity-networks).  If the social field is not 'bipolar' (in
>>>>>>> the IR sense), if there are three or more logics (I count at least six,
>>>>>>> maybe seven if tributary modalities are included, and possibly others I
>>>>>>> haven't identified yet), things get a lot more complicated.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I want to emphasise here that I think Agamben and Virilio are
>>>>>>> ultimately *right* - they have identified the social logic of the
>>>>>>> state very clearly.  But they have failed to identify adequately the field
>>>>>>> in which this logic operates.  They can't really explain why the state
>>>>>>> doesn't *always* behave in this way, why it has taken so long to
>>>>>>> actualise its social logic, why it does so more in some places than others.
>>>>>>> Their account is too much a matter of inner unfolding, almost a Hegelian
>>>>>>> process - the state becomes what it has always been.  Yet in fact, the state
>>>>>>> only unfolds its basic logic to the extent to which it is able to do so in a
>>>>>>> field where this logic is contested by other social forces.  The pure state
>>>>>>> of exception does not emerge, for instance, in syncretic Southern states
>>>>>>> connected to social networks; they are capable of brutal violence, but of a
>>>>>>> different order, that of the reactive network and the energised mobilisation
>>>>>>> of reactive forces (fear, hatred, etc).  And it does not emerge in the
>>>>>>> social-democratic state, because the power of the state as a social logic is
>>>>>>> mediated by the included and by a particular configuration with capital (the
>>>>>>> tripartite alliance of the state, capital and the included through
>>>>>>> negotiated social pacts).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think what is peculiar about the current conjuncture is that
>>>>>>> previously the state was very much constrained by capital - except in
>>>>>>> Bonapartist situations (necessarily temporary) or Stalinist situations
>>>>>>> (excluding capital from their frame - but not their actual functioning), the
>>>>>>> state was not allowed to actualise the 'state of exception' because doing so
>>>>>>> is 'bad for business' (the frame of bourgeois constitutionalism).  So if
>>>>>>> states are realising this logic today, it is because their relationship to
>>>>>>> the capitalist logic has changed: in neoliberal capitalism, the logic of the
>>>>>>> state of exception is re-enabled because it becomes compatible with the
>>>>>>> unconstrained realisation of the capitalist logic of accumulation, whereas
>>>>>>> previously the two had been antagonistic and 'mediated'.  Also important is
>>>>>>> the way the role of the included stratum or the logic of the addition of
>>>>>>> axioms mediates between the capital-state axis and the excluded or
>>>>>>> exploited.  The included stratum *hate* the state of exception (look
>>>>>>> at the Guardian for proof of this), but they've been pushed out of political
>>>>>>> power in the places where the state of exception has been actualised most
>>>>>>> drastically (and crucially, have *not* been pushed out of power in
>>>>>>> the places where it has not been actualised so much).  This supports the
>>>>>>> Deleuzian hypothesis of the contestation between addition and subtraction of
>>>>>>> axioms as different strategies within the alienated/capitalist field.  The
>>>>>>> current situation of the included stratum is a situation of 'adverse
>>>>>>> incorporation' - being kept on board through ever-decreasing concessions
>>>>>>> tending towards zero, or by the absent promise of influence which never
>>>>>>> emerges.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Of course, this also alters the strategic position of autonomous
>>>>>>> social movements and the affinity-network social logic, though I don't think
>>>>>>> it alters it very much.  Hardt and Negri put a lot of faith in alliances
>>>>>>> with the included as a means to tilt the world towards the unfolding of
>>>>>>> affinity-networks.  I don't think this is likely to work, because the
>>>>>>> included have been quite thoroughly disempowered.  Today it is not so much a
>>>>>>> matter of settling for social-democracy as the complete self-disempowerment
>>>>>>> of would-be reform movements through the 'Third Way', which is neoliberalism
>>>>>>> repeated.  The danger in this approach is that autonomous social movements
>>>>>>> disempower themselves by tying themselves to the sinking ship of the
>>>>>>> excluded, when in fact, the power of the included was always conditional on
>>>>>>> the threat posed by autonomous social movements in fact or in potential (the
>>>>>>> included were given power because of their role as a pole of mediation, as
>>>>>>> placeholders for the absent excluded).  I think it also fundamentally
>>>>>>> misunderstands what autonomous social movements are.  There is a fundamental
>>>>>>> structural antagonism between autonomous social movements and the
>>>>>>> affinity/horizontal/p2p logic and the logica of the included, because the
>>>>>>> logic of the included is firmly within the logic of alienation,
>>>>>>> representation and transcendental signification, whereas the
>>>>>>> affinity-network logic is firmly outside.  So a strategy of working through
>>>>>>> the included cannot lead to a world in which the affinity-network form has
>>>>>>> primacy.  In this sense, Agamben and Virilio are right that the hope of
>>>>>>> opposing the neoliberal conjuncture lies with autonomous social movements
>>>>>>> and not with some kind of neo-reformism.  To go back to the IR analogy, on a
>>>>>>> global scale and in most of the key sites in the current global
>>>>>>> configuration, what we have in terms of social logics is a multipolar field
>>>>>>> which nevertheless resolves itself in the current conjuncture in a largely
>>>>>>> bipolar way because of the operation of alliances:  on one side the state
>>>>>>> logic + capital + included stratum as very subordinate element + some
>>>>>>> incorporated reactive networks; on the other, the affinity-network logic,
>>>>>>> sometimes composing into a 'black hole' space with non-incorporated reactive
>>>>>>> networks, informal economies, and the tributary logic owing to its emergence
>>>>>>> from forcible delinking rather than active assertion of the affinity-network
>>>>>>> logic itself.  Since the state operates as the enforcement wing of the first
>>>>>>> coalition, the 'fourth world war' tends to pan out as a social war between
>>>>>>> the state logic (with state of exception) and the affinity-network logic
>>>>>>> (autonomous social movements)  However, it's fairly easy to find local sites
>>>>>>> where this is not how the different logics line up.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> bw
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  On Fri, Apr 30, 2010 at 2:36 PM, Michel Bauwens <
>>>>>>> michelsub2004 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> thanks for the interesting comments,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm reading commonwealth, which has an interesting critique of state
>>>>>>>> of exception theories as demobilizing, I tend to agree,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>   On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 3:24 AM, Andy Robinson <ldxar1 at gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hiya,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Reminds me a lot of Virilio actually.  The idea that crises are
>>>>>>>>> only crises for civilians, and that unfriendly environments operate in
>>>>>>>>> favour of the state by reducing the capability for popular defence and
>>>>>>>>> creating dependence on those who can work in such environments.  Also Negri
>>>>>>>>> on the 'crisis-state', which seems to suggest that this model operates in
>>>>>>>>> contemporary capitalism in terms of imminent catastrophe as a pretext for
>>>>>>>>> states of exception.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It can be traced in corporate and statist discourse, that the
>>>>>>>>> people in charge view terrain complexity as something frightening and
>>>>>>>>> threatening, and unregulated ecosystems as dangerously chaotic - they
>>>>>>>>> fantasise about concreting over everything.  I am thinking here of Sherene
>>>>>>>>> Razack on Somalia (discourses trying to mitigate human rights atrocities by
>>>>>>>>> 'peacekeepers' tended to fuse the hostile environment with local hostility
>>>>>>>>> and miltiary difficulties in the account of Somalia as a hellish place), and
>>>>>>>>> Spivak's essay 'Responsibility' (treating water in Bangladesh as the enemy
>>>>>>>>> and seeking to regulate it to 'protect' people who will actually end up
>>>>>>>>> dispossessed as a result).  In a sense, most of us (in urban settings) are
>>>>>>>>> already living in 'created' environments in this sense: urban environments
>>>>>>>>> are physically harsh, do not have food sovereignty and are highly dependent
>>>>>>>>> on artificial institutions (states, markets, welfare regimes) for
>>>>>>>>> material/ecological and social provisions which might be a lot easier to
>>>>>>>>> obtain in other settings (water needs to be stored up and piped in, energy
>>>>>>>>> concentrated and provided from outside, security provided artificially
>>>>>>>>> because of the lack of face-to-face interaction, mass transit becomes a need
>>>>>>>>> because of the zoning of cities, space becomes scarce and has to be set
>>>>>>>>> aside for purposes which less concentrated space would allow automatically
>>>>>>>>> e.g. leisure, health problems need to be treated rather than simply warded
>>>>>>>>> off - for most of history cities were population sinks for health
>>>>>>>>> reasons...)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is thus an extent to which the contestation of urban spaces
>>>>>>>>> (squatting, guerrilla gardening, urban foraging, autoreduction, social
>>>>>>>>> centres, etc) can be viewed as 'ruralisation' or 'ecologisation', somewhat
>>>>>>>>> akin to weeds peeping through the cracks and eventually eating away concrete
>>>>>>>>> - the city becomes a dense ecosystem in its own right to the extent that
>>>>>>>>> contestation of urban spaces restores an ecosystemic (rather than a
>>>>>>>>> dependent-dominant) dynamic, remembering that ecosystems are peer-networks
>>>>>>>>> rather than hierarchies, whereas the urban-rural division is hierarchical.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> bw
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 9:47 AM, Michel Bauwens <
>>>>>>>>> michelsub2004 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>>>>>>> From: Dante-Gabryell Monson <dante.monson at gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> Date: Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 2:25 PM
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Fwd: [-empyre-] seeing yourself a prototype - the limits
>>>>>>>>>> of open source
>>>>>>>>>> To: Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> interesting reply revolving around
>>>>>>>>>> *
>>>>>>>>>> *
>>>>>>>>>> *" **an interest in introducing an innovation with the intention
>>>>>>>>>> of forcing adaptation
>>>>>>>>>> in the population. "*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>>>>>>> From: davin heckman <davinheckman at gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> Date: Thu, Mar 18, 2010 at 10:35 PM
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [-empyre-] seeing yourself a prototype - the limits
>>>>>>>>>> of open source
>>>>>>>>>> To: soft_skinned_space <empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Julian,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'm sorry for being unclear.  What I had meant to say is that,
>>>>>>>>>> typically, a prototype is a discrete thing which is created with
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> intention of being tested.  Certainly the way the prototype is
>>>>>>>>>> tested
>>>>>>>>>> is a) the object itself is put through various challenges that are
>>>>>>>>>> anticipated uses and stresses, and b) the general integration of
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> thing into the system is also tested at that point (how the thing
>>>>>>>>>> might fare in light of unanticipated uses and stresses).  The
>>>>>>>>>> distinction I was trying to draw was the coercive potential of
>>>>>>>>>> innovations.  Where there is less an interest in testing an
>>>>>>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>> thing with the intention of improving it....  and more of an
>>>>>>>>>> interest
>>>>>>>>>> in introducing an innovation with the intention of forcing
>>>>>>>>>> adaptation
>>>>>>>>>> in the population.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I was less concerned with individuals modifying themselves
>>>>>>>>>> through,
>>>>>>>>>> say, education or societies changing populations through
>>>>>>>>>> educational
>>>>>>>>>> institutions.  These things, on their face, have the intention of
>>>>>>>>>> shaping the person and society.  They are, at least in principle,
>>>>>>>>>> geared towards the preservation of individual and social
>>>>>>>>>> existence.
>>>>>>>>>> Or, at least, they do insofar as they are generated by a public in
>>>>>>>>>> service of the ideal public which they represent.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On the other hand, there are technologies that seem to be
>>>>>>>>>> introduced
>>>>>>>>>> with the stated purpose of achieving one objective, yet have the
>>>>>>>>>> larger objective of changing human populations.  Take, for
>>>>>>>>>> instance,
>>>>>>>>>> the infamous case of Nestle's infant formula strategy in Africa.
>>>>>>>>>> Company reps masquerading as health workers introduce infant
>>>>>>>>>> formula
>>>>>>>>>> to a population that had not used it previously.  The suggested
>>>>>>>>>> purpose is to provide nutrition and humanitarian aid.  But when
>>>>>>>>>> women
>>>>>>>>>> stopped lactating and suddenly found themselves forced to pay for
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> product or watch their children starve, a much more radical
>>>>>>>>>> technical
>>>>>>>>>> innovation becomes apparent--the forced creation of a new social
>>>>>>>>>> web
>>>>>>>>>> in service of corporate interests.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> More current (and relevant) examples might be the sort of
>>>>>>>>>> biological
>>>>>>>>>> innovations that have been spurred by petrochemical industries as
>>>>>>>>>> ubiquitous products (plastics, agricultural products, drugs, etc)
>>>>>>>>>> saturate ecosystems with chemicals that interfere with hormone
>>>>>>>>>> production across the food chain, resulting in an explosion of
>>>>>>>>>> diseases requiring treatment.  I don't know that I know enough to
>>>>>>>>>> say
>>>>>>>>>> that there is anything resembling a conspiracy here....  other
>>>>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>>>> the sort of conspiracy of opportunistically imposed apathy and
>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.  But the general recklessness of big business seems to
>>>>>>>>>> suggest that there is something intentional about turning quick
>>>>>>>>>> profits, letting major catastrophic accidents happen, and then
>>>>>>>>>> profiting further.  Habituating people to live in a precarious
>>>>>>>>>> state
>>>>>>>>>> of withered consciousness seems to have been the real "value"
>>>>>>>>>> uncovered by the pervasive barrage of technical innovations....
>>>>>>>>>>  human
>>>>>>>>>> beings can be turned into quivering beasts who will tolerate any
>>>>>>>>>> injustice simply to hope for another day, and in many cases, who
>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>> tear at each other's throats in defense of the paymasters
>>>>>>>>>> responsible
>>>>>>>>>> for this exploitation.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I suppose I should hang it up, here.  I might be drawing a false
>>>>>>>>>> distinction.  And I certainly am off the rails for this month's
>>>>>>>>>> discussion.  There is something moralistic in my argument,
>>>>>>>>>> resembling
>>>>>>>>>> the months old discussion of "good" and "bad" that we had here.
>>>>>>>>>>  Yet,
>>>>>>>>>> I wonder that there might be some value in drawing distinctions
>>>>>>>>>> between orders of technological existence.   That the fast-forward
>>>>>>>>>> orientation of prototyping is fascinating and productive....  but
>>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>>> is a loaded term...  and it is one that I have a hard time
>>>>>>>>>> unpacking.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Davin
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 18, 2010 at 11:50 AM, Julian Oliver <
>>>>>>>>>> julian at julianoliver.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> > ..on Thu, Mar 18, 2010 at 03:10:01PM -0000, Johannes Birringer
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> >> >> Davin wrote:>> At one point in time, discrete objects were
>>>>>>>>>> things that were considered prototypes that could be thrown into an existing
>>>>>>>>>> system and tested. Increasingly, it seems like the prototypes are geared to
>>>>>>>>>> test individual and collective consciousness.  In other words, maybe we are
>>>>>>>>>> the  prototypes?  Being tested so that we can be effectively processed,
>>>>>>>>>> shrink-wrapped, labeled, bought and sold>>
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Hmm, This statement from Davin confused me also. I thought it
>>>>>>>>>> was fairly clear
>>>>>>>>>> > that any act of learning - or any 'attempt', which all action is
>>>>>>>>>> at it's root -
>>>>>>>>>> > simultaneously produces the self as a prototype, even if only
>>>>>>>>>> for the duration
>>>>>>>>>> > of that act. The very notion of a prototype assumes a platonic
>>>>>>>>>> and eventuating
>>>>>>>>>> > objecthood, a finished thing. When are people ever so singularly
>>>>>>>>>> resolved?
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Second order prototyping is the work of other people, especially
>>>>>>>>>> aquaintances,
>>>>>>>>>> > marketeers and those that resource people.
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > Beast,
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> > --
>>>>>>>>>> > Julian Oliver
>>>>>>>>>> > home: New Zealand
>>>>>>>>>> > based: Berlin, Germany
>>>>>>>>>> > currently: Berlin, Germany
>>>>>>>>>> > about: http://julianoliver.com
>>>>>>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> > empyre forum
>>>>>>>>>> > empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>>>>>> > http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> empyre forum
>>>>>>>>>> empyre at lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University -
>>>>>>>>>> Think thank:
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  -
>>>>>>>>>> http://blog.p2pfoundation.net
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
>>>>>>>>>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens;
>>>>>>>>>> http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens; http://twitter.com/mbauwens;
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University -
>>>>>>>> Think thank:
>>>>>>>> http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  -
>>>>>>>> http://blog.p2pfoundation.net
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
>>>>>>>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens;
>>>>>>>> http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens; http://twitter.com/mbauwens;
>>>>>>>> http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University - Think
>>>>>> thank: http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
>>>>>>
>>>>>> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  -
>>>>>> http://blog.p2pfoundation.net
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
>>>>>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
>>>>>> http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University - Think
>>>> thank: http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
>>>>
>>>> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  -
>>>> http://blog.p2pfoundation.net
>>>>
>>>> Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
>>>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>>>
>>>> Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
>>>> http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University - Think
>> thank: http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
>>
>> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net
>>
>> Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>
>> Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
>> http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>


-- 
P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net

Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org

Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
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