[p2p-research] The three exodus and the transition towards the p2p society

[Joss Winn]

On 01/05/10 16:37, Samuel Rose wrote:

> I think the projections I've seen on P2P foundation list of "30
> years","50 years" etc are too long for:
> 
> 1. Radical change in biosphere (enough changes to cause significant
> pressure on people employing industrial era approaches)
> 
> 2. Shift to commons and p2p based approaches
> 
> An argument can be made that in as little as 10-15 years, multiple
> pressures will coincide all at the same time. Peak oil figures are set
> near 2030 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil  

The growing consensus is that the peak of conventional oil was in 2005
and that the peak of all liquid fuels will be between 2010 - 2014.

I've summarised this and a few other things relating to climate,
technology and efficiency, here:

http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/02/12/revisiting-thinking-the-unthinkable/

Since writing that, a paper from an Oxford University research group
(including ex-Chief Scientific Advisor to UK gov, Sr. David King) has
added to the growing Peak Oil consensus.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.026

I've got a blog post half-drafted on this paper. Here's the summary I
give for it:

---

Owen, Inderwildi and King’s recent paper, The status of conventional
world oil reserves—Hype or cause for concern?, supports previous studies
by others which show that conventional oil production peaked in 2005 and
that the peak production capacity of all liquids (excluding gas), will
peak around 2010. Conventional oil supply is declining by over 4%/annum,
with the shortfall and anticipated additional demand being met by
non-conventional oil (deep sea, tar sands) and other liquid sources such
as gas and bio-fuels. In just ten years, 50% of the global demand for
liquid fuel will have to be met by sources that are not in production
today. Not surprisingly then, speculation over the price of oil based on
fundamental supply and demand factors, as well as global events such as
the invasion of Iraq, Hurricane Katrina and Israel threatening to attack
Iran, has resulted in increased volatility of prices, reaching a high of
$147 a barrel in July 2008. In 2000, a barrel of oil cost around $20. A
decade later, the price of oil is around $80 a barrel and the trend
remains upwards.

Different economic theories applied to the supply and demand of oil
offer opposite outcomes. One suggests that the law of diminishing
returns would create an incentive to invest further in unconventional
sources such as tar sands and deep sea resources. On the other hand,
some economists argue that due to the inextricable link between oil and
economic activity, high oil prices can’t be sustained and that a price
of $100 a barrel would induce global recession, driving down oil prices
and paradoxically reducing investment in alternative fuels. While rising
oil prices can damage economic growth, lowering oil prices do not have
the same, proportionate effect on stimulating growth. It has been
estimated that oil price-GDP elasticity is -0.055 (+/- 0.005) meaning
that a 10% rise in oil prices leads to a 0.55% loss in global GDP.

Owen, Inderwildi and King’s paper concludes that published world oil
reserve estimates are inaccurate and should be revised downwards by a
third. Over-reporting since the 1980s due to the ‘fight for quotas’
whereby OPEC agreed to set export quotas in proportion to reserve
volumes, and the inclusion of tar-sands into reserve estimates since
2004 have distorted reality. They add that “supply and demand is likely
to diverge between 2010 and 2015, unless demand falls in parallel with
supply constrained induced recession” and that “the capacity to meet
liquid fuel demand is contingent upon the rapid and immediate
diversification of the liquid fuel mix, the transition to alternative
energy carriers where appropriate, and demand side measures such as
behavioural change and adaptation.”

----

I wouldn't otherwise disagree with the 2030 scenario you outline below.

Joss

> speed up of Arctic
> and Antarctic thaw right now
> http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100404/sc_nm/us_climate_nitrous  by 2030
> it is plausible that we will have already passed the tipping point for
> carbon dioxide in the atmosphere affecting climates world wide.
> 
> Food and energy demand are projected to increase by 50% by 2030, fresh
> water by 30%  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/327/5967/812
>  India and China (2 most populous nations) both warn their populations
> that their demand will outstrip their supplies severely by 2030
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_crisis  (links there to reports on
> this subject)
> 
> Many food producing corporations that run industrial farming
> operations are switching large scale agricultural production to
> biofuel http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2009/10/12/118291/Massive-increase-in-global-biofuel-production.htm
>  which can further increase food costs by raising commodity prices
> worldwide, and causing food shortages. This price and biofuel
> production increase is already happening now.
> 
> Meanwhile, multiple corporations are relentlessly pursuing total
> control of communications infrastructure, (and already have total
> control of) financial systems, energy and food distribution, etc
> 
> So, by 2030 (not later) it is plausible that we will already be in a
> state where millions, if not billions will be marginalized by all
> existing basic sustenance systems (food, water, energy, access).
> 
> Stuart Kauffman, and other complex systems theorists have shown that
> in all systems, change tends to happen in an "s curve" fashion.
> Kauffman uses a sandpile as an example in his book "At Home In The
> Universe". He describes the data signature of a massive pile of sand
> collapsing. First small bits fall of, then large chunks, then larger
> and larger, faster and faster. The total rate of collapse towards the
> end is exponentially faster than the beginning. I think we are seeing
> the same with global human systems now, and that we are *now* in the
> beginning time of collapse, with signals already present around the
> world. This means we have maybe 15 years, starting *now*, to start
> changing things in significant ways for at least 45% or more of people
> on the earth. 45% minimum probably will get us enough inertia in the
> opposite direction to slow down the momentum that is starting *now*.
> That is what I think.
> 
>