[p2p-research] Fwd: Fw: [CTHEORY] Theory Beyond the Codes: Oil and the Regime of Capitalism
Michel Bauwens
michelsub2004 at gmail.com
Fri Jun 25 13:21:27 CEST 2010
dear tere,
I would like to present your essay in our blog, eventually as a series?
Michel
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Michael Bauwens <michelsub2003 at yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 24, 2010 at 3:40 PM
Subject: Fw: [CTHEORY] Theory Beyond the Codes: Oil and the Regime of
Capitalism
To: Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>
----- Forwarded Message ----
> From: "Theory, Technology and Culture" <ctheory at lists.uvic.ca>
> To: ctheory at lists.uvic.ca
> Sent: Thu, June 24, 2010 4:29:15 AM
> Subject: [CTHEORY] Theory Beyond the Codes: Oil and the Regime of
Capitalism
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> CTHEORY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE
> VOL 33, NOS 1-2
*** Visit CTHEORY Online:
> http://www.ctheory.net
> ***
TBC 003 06/23/2010
> Editors: Arthur and Marilouise Kroker
> _____________________________________________________________________
>
> *************************
> THEORY BEYOND THE CODES
>
> *************************
> _____________________________________________________________________
> Oil and the Regime of Capitalism: Questions to Philosophers of the
> Future
> ==================================================================
> ~Tere Vaden~
"What if the hegemony of the
> West was not, after all, defined
by modern natural
> science and technology, enlightenment and
individualism
> but by a one-time offering of coal, gas and oil?"
The
> anthropological record suggests that, typically, in pre-modern
and
> non-industrialized communities the foundation of meaning is not
separate
> from the world of material income: utility objects are
beautiful and beauty
> is purposeful. Contrary to this, industrial
civilization has often been
> described as a divider of the world of
values and tools, means and
> objectives, which, through calculated
reason, extracts everything it can
> without actually knowing why or
for what purpose.
There is much
> truth in this bi-partition theory, but perhaps an even
more disturbing
> picture of industrial civilization is obtained if it
too is seen as a
> uniform culture that reveals the foundation of
meaning through its utility
> objects. In places all around the globe,
on land and in the sea, pipes
> protrude from beneath the ground,
meandering towards enormous containers and
> networks of more pipes.ct
Oil tankers and tank trucks haul acrid-smelling
> liquids further and
further away to increasingly smaller containers and
> tanks, until the
thin pipes end up in a pressure chamber where droplets
> split into gas
are continuously combusted. What does this simultaneous
> foundation of
meaning and for material life say about us? At the very least,
> it
tells us that if it is the foundation we are blind to it, and the
> bi-partition theory is one form of blindness.
Capitalism and the
> bottlenecks
------------------------------
Let us examine two claims
> often presented about capitalism. According
to the first claim, capitalism
> is an endlessly adaptive system and
ideology. In an awkward way -- one that
> a revolutionary may almost
loathe -- capitalism can adapt to any
> circumstances. It swallows all
forms of resistance, transforming them into
> part of itself. Revolt
becomes commercialised and made into a product, big
> brother's
extra-large trousers become hip-hop fashion, and ethnic
> identity
becomes commercial bric-a-brac. The second claim is that
> negative
limits can be set for capitalism, particularly in relation to
> environmental problems such as pollution and climate change.
Supposedly,
> there is a physical limit to growth-oriented capitalism
after which nature
> can no longer withstand the use, and a
psycho-social, or even biological
> limit, beyond which man can no
longer endure life under capitalism.
> Our wager is that we can begin thinking about the future in
opposition to
> these claims. Firstly, capitalism is a very fragile
system. Indeed, the
> contemporary complex capitalist system is not
particularly flexible or
> strong, but is instead stiff and weak.
Secondly, environmental problems have
> no limit beyond which they
become intolerable. As long as it happens slowly
> enough, they can
always become worse. Likewise, human psycho-social or
> biological
environments can radically deteriorate without becoming
> impossible.
More than once the last century demonstrated that the zero point
> of
psycho-social conditions can be reached without provoking systemic
> breakdowns.
It is true that capitalism -- as an abstract notion, as an
> image of a
system where there exists private property, and a society where
> one
is rewarded for ownership and where capital must grow -- is, of
> course, extremely flexible and not dependent on any single value or
social
> order. It can operate in many different climatic conditions,
and accommodate
> many different religious, as well as secular,
environments. No single issue
> determines the fate of abstract
capitalism. For this reason, undermining
> capitalism is difficult
because of its ability to escape final grounding not
> only in any
single issue but also in any complex of individual
> issues.
The counter-argument is that every concrete form of capitalism,
> every
really existing capitalism -- for example, the system that
> prevails
in Finland, the Nordic countries or northern Europe in general,
> or
something even so abstract as Western capitalism -- is sufficiently
> concrete and consequently sensitive. Marx emphasised that capitalism
itself
> always produces crises, its own crises, moments when it
changes its
> preconditions. Indeed, the fact that capitalism is a
system that produces
> internal crises also demonstrates the claim that
capitalism is fragile.
> Crisis is always crisis: and it can also lead
to destruction.
This
> is linked with a morphological observation concerning forms and
sizes which
> is easiest to explain with an animal allegory. Let us
think, for example, of
> an animal in the shape of a mouse: the mouse
has thin legs, an oblong body,
> a relatively large head with a long
snout, etc. There exist other animals
> that are roughly the same as a
mouse, such as the shrew and rat.
> "Mouse-shaped", however, cannot be
any size, for instance the size of a dog
> or horse. Its constitution
would not function at that scale. The head would
> be too heavy, the
legs too thin, or something else along those lines.
> "Mouse-
shapedness" cannot arbitrarily grow so that the proportions of
> all
parts remain the same. For the same reason, capitalism reaches a
> crisis point. It cannot continuously grow so that the proportions of
> different parts remain the same. The parts and the proportions of the
parts
> must change. From this follows delicacy. Every concrete
capitalism is
> extremely frail at some point and in some way delimited
by a morphological
> bottle-neck, namely scarcity. At different moments
and in different concrete
> forms of capitalism the bottleneck is
different.
A second claim,
> according to which environmental problems, pollution,
climate change and so
> forth have no limits, is simultaneously related
to the claim concerning life
> under a capitalist system. In his book
_Planet of Slums_ [1] Mike Davis
> describes the mega-cities of Africa,
Latin America, India, China and
> Indonesia, where tens of millions of
people, and in continuously increasing
> numbers, live in slum
conditions. Davis tells about the single mother in the
> slum, who
already lives in unbearable conditions, is the poorest of the
> poor,
having two jobs, but with no comforts, no water or sanitation.
> What
happens when one more child is born? The mother will bear it. What
> about when the old and sick grandmother has to be taken care of? The
mother
> will bear it because she has to. There is no limit after which
the slum
> mother can no longer bear it because the option of not
bearing it does not
> exist. Demands can always be increased,
circumstances made worse, and she
> will always endure. The same can be
said for more widely based living
> conditions and the environment. As
long as change occurs slowly enough,
> conditions will not likely
appear so negative that people would not consent
> to accommodating
themselves to their (capitalist) fate.
Following
> these leads, we must take a closer look at present
capitalism. Do we
> encounter a negative limit after which we no longer
tolerate it? No. The
> limit of capitalism must therefore be looked for
from the positive side
> through morphological frailty. What are the
preconditions -- environmental
> prerequisites, raw material
prerequisites -- that present capitalism needs?
> Due to the frailty of
capitalism, one must concentrate on what is particular
> and concrete,
what this capitalism needs. What is *this* capitalism?
> Capitalism, which is based on the principle of economic growth,
necessarily
> needs raw materials, free trade, world trade, and
globalization -- though
> there do perhaps exist forms of capitalism
that do not need, for instance,
> world trade. Is there a form of
capitalism that does not need economic
> growth? That is already more
debatable. Can one date the birth of present
> capitalism? One of the
best indicators is the start of economic growth.
> Roughly during the
1820s in Europe there began a long period of economic
> growth and
increased production, which also corresponded with the growth
> in
population: these are depicted by the famous "hockey stick" graph,
> where the point where the handle reaches the blade represents, at the
> latest, the 1950s. Economic growth is not a generally applicable or
common
> phenomenon. Rather, the incipient economic growth had
comparatively clear
> reasons and forms: coal and the steam engine, the
electric motor and the
> combustion engine, oil and natural gas. The
era of fossil fuels and the
> motors and machines that utilise them is
inseparable from economic growth
> and the bottleneck of present
capitalism.
Therefore, a philosophical
> claim: to a great extent, theoretical
discourse concerning capitalism
> concerns *this* concrete capitalism
and not abstract capitalism, even though
> such discourse is always
aware of its own limited knowledge. For example,
> when Marx and Engels
in _Manifesto of the Communist Party_ (1848)
> characterise capitalism
as a system where "all that is solid melts into air
> and all that is
holy is profaned" [2] the question then is about *this*
> concrete
capitalism based on economic growth that has been fed with
> cheap
fossil fuel energy. This capitalism changes with the economy of
> coal
and oil, like a mouse becomes a dog and a dog becomes an elephant.
> These metamorphoses are not the platonic phenomena of abstract
capitalism
> but are instead directly attached to the movements of
black raw
> materials.
Oil dependency and the oil peak
> -------------------------------
Oil dependency means that the present
> capitalism needs cheap oil. Oil
is a non-renewable natural resource.
> "Non-renewable" means that as
oil is used it runs out. The question,
> however, concerning when oil
*completely* runs out is not particularly
> interesting. What is
decisive is the bottleneck question: when does the
> sufficiently
cheap, easy oil that can be pumped in large amounts, run out?
> Oil may
"always" be available somewhere at some price but the point where
> it
starts to hurt, however, is the lack of abundant, cheap oil. The
> question becomes philosophical when we remember that the Marxist
> theoreticians describe themselves as materialists, who pay attention
at the
> ground level to the concrete forms of production and their
conditions.
> Fossil fuel or energy in general have, however, been
relatively little
> discussed in Marxist theory.
Famous Marxist political leaders certainly
> realised the importance of
energy -- Lenin had his motto "socialism =
> electricity + the power of
the soviets"; Stalin began his career by
> organizing strikes and
blockades in the Baku oil fields -- but not
> necessarily the
limitations to productivism caused by the finite nature of
> fossil
fuels. Cuba and Latin American countries may provide the crucial
> exceptions to this pattern. In Cuba, the so-called "Special Period"
after
> the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the decades-long US embargo
have,
> without a doubt, made energy a prominent topic for political
thought. In his
> autobiography, speaking with Ignacio Ramonet about
the environmental
> disaster, Fidel Castro makes the crucial
observation: "Marx thought that the
> limit on the development of
wealth lay in the social system, not in natural
> resources, as we know
today." [3]
Let's think, for example, of work.
> Production can be increased in two
ways; by doing more work or by doing the
> same tasks more efficiently,
more productively. The history of contemporary
> capitalism is the
history of both these branches: efficiency is increased by
> the
division of labour, specialization, technology and automation. At
> the
same time, also more work is carried out: human work and non-human
> work powered by energy. Both Marxists and anti-Marxists have had much
to say
> about how a new labour force is created by turning people into
paid labour.
> Yet surprisingly little has been said precisely about
the increase of
> non-human labour, and its morphological effects. Oil
is not, of course,
> "produced", even though the term is generally in
use. Oil is not "man-made".
> It is discovered, extracted and then
used. The use of oil as energy is,
> according to the definition in
physics, "the ability to work": when burned
> and manipulated, oil does
work. Which factors in *this* capitalist system
> depend upon the
amount of easy and cheap non-human labour? Which of
> these
dependencies are arbitrary, and which ones are necessary?
In
> the 1950s, M. King Hubbert, a geologist working for the Shell
company,
> predicted that oil production in the USA would reach its
peak in 1970, which
> subsequently proved correct, one consequence of
which was the oil crisis of
> the 1970s. [4] The calculations regarding
availability and sufficiency of
> oil are, for many reasons, virtually
secret. First of all, the starting
> points are obscure because the oil
producing countries and oil companies
> have many reasons to keep the
estimates for oil production and the resources
> a secret or to distort
them. This is already in itself an interesting fact
> about the
"transparent market economy": the market economy itself hides
> the
basis for its continuity as a side product of its own actions.
> Scientifically peer-reviewed information about oil quantities simply
does
> not exist. In the same way as the stock market can act only
under the
> circumstances of unfree and unbalanced information, the
combustion engine of
> *this* capitalism can only keep running if the
fuel gauge is
> unreliable.
There are many different ways, however, of assessing the
> situation.
Hubbert's classic calculation was based on a simple observation:
> the
production of a single oil well can be described roughly with the
> help of the Gauss curve. Production increases, reaches its peak and
then
> decreases. This is represented by a bell curve, where the
highest point
> represents the moment of peak production (*peak oil* or
*Hubbert's peak*).
> When the output indicators of individual oil wells
are added together we
> still get a bell curve -- a much bigger one. Of
course a curve describing
> production is not totally symmetrical.
Hubbert's first estimate from 1956
> was based on the idea of how much
oil reserves there were in the USA (adding
> together the already
produced oil, the known resources and the assumption of
> still to be
found oil wells). [5]
When the amount of total reserves
> as well as the rise in production
are known, it is also possible to estimate
> the peak point and
decrease in production with the help of the bell curve.
> Hubbert's
second method used as its starting point a curve that included
> the
amount of oil discovered. Production followed the curve of the
> (total) amount of discovered oil with a delay of about 10 years.
Already
> then the number of discoveries was declining, anticipating
future decreases
> in production. Hubbert also calculated the time of
the peak using a third
> method based on the assessment of the success
of oil exploration: how much
> oil has been discovered when 10 million
feet has been drilled in
> exploration. The (total) amount of oil
discovered per drilled million feet
> decreased exponentially. Hubbert
predicted that peak production for the
> entire world would occur in
around the 1980s and 1990s. His methods and
> starting points have
subsequently been made more precise, but the basic
> assessments have
remained the same. [6] The discovery of new oil reserves
> have
decreased for decades and a large number of oil producing nations
> have already passed their oil producing peak. A good example is the
UK,
> which thanks to the oil discovered in the North Sea in the 1970s
became an
> important oil exporter in the 1980s, passed its peak in
1999, and after that
> slid into an oil importing country at the
beginning of the 21st
> century.
EROEI, or does the cake grow by eating it?
> ------------------------------------------
Oil is a quite incredible,
> lyrical, metaphysical substance. [7] A
natural scientist would say that oil
> consists of long hydro-carbon
chains. Depending on the different lengths of
> chains and adjacent
impurities, crude oil is classified as light, heavy,
> low-sulphur,
high-sulphur, and so on. Hydro-carbon chains are
> interesting
chemically: they are difficult to manufacture, making them
> requires a
lot of effort and energy, and they have many beautiful
> properties.
The formation of the hydro-carbon chains of oil required an
> unimaginably long period of time. Generally, it is estimated that the
> largest oil deposits began to form about 400 million years ago (the
human
> species is about 200,000 years old, the first oil rig was built
in
> Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859). One of the oldest known oil
properties
> is that it burns. And in recent times it has been
discovered that it is
> possible to make almost anything from it:
microphones, walls, medicines,
> bags, computer parts, plates,
fertiliser, artificial joints, floor planks,
> and so on. In a way long
hydro-carbon chains are the alchemist's dream, a
> substance from which
you can form anything you desire -- albeit not gold.
> Even when trying
to describe oil in a soberly natural-scientific way --
> chemically,
geologically, paleobiologically -- one ends up almost inevitably
> with
ecstatic and mystic visions.
In one year approximately one
> cubic mile of oil is used globally. [8]
Correspondingly, in the 21st century
> global consumption has been
about 85 million barrels per day. Contained in a
> cubic mile of oil is
an enormous amount of energy, the ability to carry out
> work. The same
amount of energy would be obtained if 50 nuclear power plants
> of the
type at Olkiluoto in Finland would produce electricity
> continuously
for 50 years (or put differently, if 2500 Olkiluoto nuclear
> power
plants would operate continuously for one year). Similarly, 104
> coal-fired power plants of 500 megawatts would be needed to operate
for 50
> years (or 5200 such plants for one year). Nobody is prepared
to calculate
> how much carbon-dioxide emissions that would create. In
the same vein, one
> could consider what it would mean to build 2500
new nuclear power plants.
> Would there be enough steel, concrete,
uranium, time, money... Here is a
> view into the cruel beauty of oil:
a cubic mile is, after all, not an
> impossibly large mass, [9] but the
energy it creates is virtually stellar.
> Only the sun exceeds oil in
energy amounts, and oil is, of course,
> "preserved sun".
The enormity can be further illustrated by transforming
> these issues
into human labour -- these transformations are, naturally, a
> mere
play of ideas and contain simplifications and unsubstantiated
> assumptions. It is estimated that the energy consumption of the
entire world
> in 2005 was 15 terrawatts. [10] Out of this roughly 13
terawatts was
> accounted for by fossil fuels. Let us presume that one
human can work with
> an efficiency of 100 watts. If in 2005 there were
6.5 billion people on the
> planet their total annual work efficiency
(maximally) was 0.65 terawatts.
> Fossil fuel, in other words, gave
each person a 20-fold work increase (and
> other types of energy about
a triple increase). Because the energy increase
> has not been spread
evenly around the globe, one can assume that a typical
> Westerner has
tens of "oil slaves" in his service. If all this work were
> carried
out with human labour, 20 times more labour would be needed in
> the
world.
The gauge of the enormous work ability of oil is also
> accounted for
with a ratio called EROEI, "Energy Return on Energy Invested".
> The
matter in itself is simple. EROEI measures how much energy is
> required when a certain amount of energy is used; in other words, how
much
> potential additional energy is acquired by doing some actual
amount of work
> (e.g. how much heating energy is obtained when
firewood is chopped for a
> couple of hours). EROEI is not the same as
thermal efficiency, which
> measures how large an amount of the used
energy goes towards the intended
> purpose and how much goes wasted as
heat, etc. At the most, EROEI could be
> seen as the thermal efficiency
of energy acquisition work: i.e. how much
> work must be done, for
example, to fill a barrel with oil; is the amount of
> work greater or
smaller than the energy contained in a barrel of oil? EROEI
> is
calculated by dividing the amount of energy gained by the energy
> expended. If the number is greater than 1 we get an "energy profit",
but if
> it is smaller we get a loss. Again, an example from the animal
kingdom will
> help to illustrate. The capercaillie in the wintry
forest needs energy to
> keep warm, for digestion, to move about, and
maybe a little bit for growth
> and renewal. Energy is obtained by
eating spruce needles. If the frost
> condition is severe, the bird
will need to fly far to obtain sustenance.
> Energy-wise, its day is
likely to flip to the negative side of the EROEI
> calculation.
Realistically, it would have been better for the bird to
> have
remained in its snow shelter. Obviously, a state of negative EROEI
> cannot last long.
So now we return to the bottleneck of capitalism when
> studying the
best oil and gas fields, which have an EROEI ratio in the
> tens.
According to the most optimistic claims, the EROEI of some oil
> fields
would have been even over 100; in other words, with the work of
> one
oil barrel one would have gotten 100 new barrels of oil. [11] Maybe
> it is possible to believe such claims when one remembers how in old
films
> oil is shown spurting from the ground. At its easiest, oil can
indeed be
> found directly under the surface. These most easily
discovered and
> productive oil fields are naturally used up first, and
the EROEI of the
> fields in present production is well under 100,
under 50, if not even under
> 20.
Virtually free -- or at least manifold rewarding -- energy
> spurting
out from the ground: herein lies the material and mystical
> foundation
of growth-oriented capitalism. It is mystical because it masks
> its
existence so that neither capitalist nor anti-capitalist theory
> refers to it when explaining economic growth and changes in the
economic
> systems over the last 150 years. The oil of the high EROEI
is the pulse of
> the economy but, to employ a different metaphor, it
also produces a blind
> spot in the middle of the theoretical analysis
of growth.
>From the
> same black spot slither out also horrific tentacles.
Division of labour and
> technological development have raised
productivity. Billions of people have
> taken up and been born into
paid labour instead of life. From this obviously
> follows economic
growth. But at the same time the best energy sources of all
> time have
been bled dry. The stored solar energy of countless ancient years
> has
been used up in mere moments. As mentioned earlier, the work carried
> out by this extra energy is ten times larger in comparison to human
work.
> The capitalist and socialist economic systems of the last
century received a
> unique gift; unique in the sense that there is
only one gift, and unique in
> the sense that the gift has soon been
used up. Worst of all is how dependent
> the post-green revolution
intensive farming is on the high EROEI oil.
> Farming with tractors,
combine harvesters, and artificial fertilisers made
> from natural gas
are not "primary production" but, from the EROEI
> perspective, a way
to consume energy. [12] We eat tons of
> fossil-fuels.
>From uniqueness follows, inevitably, further questions. If
> many
generally applicable observations of political economy science are
> concerned not with abstract capitalism (or socialism) [13] but rather
the
> uniquely oil-injected capitalism, then could the same category
error be
> evident also in some critiques of modernism, technology or
the Western
> lifestyle? What if the hegemony of the West was not,
after all, defined by
> modern natural science and technology,
enlightenment and individualism but
> by a one-time offering of coal,
gas and oil? As is well known, natural
> science and technology,
enlightenment and individualism cannot be exported
> -- and have not
once been exported -- without also exporting and using coal,
> gas and
oil. The Catholic faith needed only coal and wind.
From
> the Bottleneck to Tate
---------------------------
In Alfonso
> Cuaro's film ~Children of Men~ (2006) people in the year
2027 are living in
> a dystopian world where no children have been born
since 2009. At one point
> in the film, the sympathetic character
Jasper (played by Michael Caine), who
> was apparently modelled on John
Lennon, tells a joke. All the geniuses of
> the world have been
gathered together in a conference that tries to
> establish the cause
for the infertility: chemicals, radiation, mutation...
> In the corner
sits an Englishman who does not participate in the discussion
> but
gorges himself on the conference food. Eventually others ask for his
> opinion on why "we can't make babies anymore?" And he replies, "I
haven't
> the faintest idea, but this stork is quite tasty isn't he?"
Calculating
> the EROEI of different forms of energy is not easy if
indeed possible at
> all. What should be taken into account when
calculating the EROEI of, for
> example, nuclear energy? Building the
power plant itself surely, as well as
> quarrying the uranium and
transport. What about the final disposal of the
> waste? For what
period of time? And what about the power grid,
> transformers,
accumulators...? What about the training required for experts
> in
nuclear power? In any case, the number of energy slaves goes down
> rapidly with diminishing EROEI. No known energy source can even get
close to
> the EROEI figures of the best oil fields (coal comes
closest), particularly
> not nuclear energy, the EROEI calculation of
which may be less than one. Not
> a single nuclear power plant has been
built without a considerable
> consumption of fossil fuel. [14] Roughly
the same applies to all so-called
> alternative energy sources. Their
planning, construction and maintenance
> requires considerable amounts
of high EROEI fossil fuels, and they
> themselves produce energy with a
much lower EROEI. "Why is there
> continuously less energy left over?"
"I don't know, but come here and have a
> look at what kind of solar
panel we built..."
Nobody knows the
> steepness of the down-slope of the bell curve.
Besides the Export Land Model
> (see footnote 6), it is steepened by
the decrease of the EROEI of the
> producing oil wells. The new and
already productive oil wells are
> increasingly in more difficult
locations -- deeper under the sea, etc. --
> and contain crude oil of
an increasingly inferior quality, such as the
> famous "oil sands" of
Canada, which are really a tar-like substance, if not
> asphalt-like
stone. When descending along the down slope of the bell curve,
> an
increasingly larger part of the economy must be directed at energy
> production; in other words, an increasingly smaller part of energy is
in the
> service of the rest of the economy.
It is possible that there exists an
> unknown limit for what the EROEI
of the energy economy must be so that
> *this* capitalism can function.
[15] One part of the ongoing crisis is that
> the summit of the bell
curve has already been passed. Since 2003 the oil
> consumption of the
OECD countries has been on a slight decline.
> Correspondingly, the
price of oil went up from the 2001 level (20-30 dollars
> a barrel) to
the crazy price peak of 2008 (at its highest almost 150 dollars
> a
barrel; in 2009 almost 70 dollars a barrel). These two trends
together
> describe, with the help of the law of demand, the
unrenewability of oil;
> even though the price of oil multiplied in a
few years production (or
> consumption) did not go up. The peak moment
of global oil production was
> somewhere around the summer of 2005. How
far down the slope are we now?
> Nobody knows, but in any case it has
come so far that production cannot be
> compared to what it was in
2005, and the time of sustained industrial
> economic growth and the
very cheapest oil has passed. [16]
In the
> beginning of the 1980s the energy consumption per capita in
the USA ceased
> to grow. The increase of energy no longer functioned
as a motor for economic
> growth, as it had during the whole time since
the 1860s, with the exception
> of the 1970s. From then onwards, US
economic growth has been reliant on
> debt. The ending of the energy
excess is one reason for the increase in the
> number of loans. And the
waning of cheap oil is one reason for the increase
> in costs for the
continuous taking of loans. The financial crisis and the
> oil crisis
are closely linked; amidst the lost growth shines the black light
> of
the oil well. The recession that we are currently living in is the
> first one of its kind since the Second World War, at least according
to two
> gauges: for the first time the world's economic production is
decreasing and
> for the first time the number of miles driven by car
is decreasing.
> Due to the present crisis, the famous invisible hand cannot optimally
use up
> resources. When the price of oil per barrel is simultaneously
too high for
> the consumer and too low for the producer, that too is a
fault of the
> decreasing EROEI. Instead of the law of demand putting
things in order, it
> pushes a wedge between consumers and producers.
Consequently, new drilling
> projects are put on hold and productive
oil wells are abandoned; the
> invisible hand masks the resource while
at the same time there is a
> shortage. 'The invisible hand' may be one
of those thought experiments that
> only work in a capitalism into
which one can continuously feed more cheap
> energy. The invisible hand
has a harder time under the conditions of a
> shrinking or stagnant
economy.
Also, in the era of "negative growth"
> division of labour as a cause
of prosperity becomes suspect. Division of
> labour is surely one of
the reasons for economic growth during the last 150
> years, but was it
itself a result of the high EROEI ratio of fossil fuels?
> Lasse
Nordlund [17] has shown in experiments that in the living
> conditions
of eastern Finland an adult can feed himself by using a 400m^2
> area
of farming land, as well as additionally picking mushrooms and
> berries in the surrounding forest. According to Nordlund's
calculation, this
> requires about 4 hours of work a day divided evenly
throughout the whole
> year. Nordlund is suspicious not only towards
animal husbandry but also
> towards metal tools, because in a
self-reliant economy they are easily more
> trouble than they are
worth. From this viewpoint, specialization, and
> becoming tool and
technology dependent, explicitly require a continuous feed
> of excess
energy. It is possible that an important part of the
> specialization
and technologization of the modern world is dependent on and
> caused
by the magnificent, uniquely high EROEI of large oil wells. If
> this
is the case, then the claim that modern prosperity is mainly the
> effect of improved technology and specialization, has to be revised.
> And finally to the beginning
----------------------------
The first
> conclusion in this situation is somewhat self-evident. If
economic growth is
> based on more work [18] (in terms of either amount
or productivity) and if
> the EROEI of all known energy sources is
considerably weaker than the EROEI
> of the oil fields that have
already been used up or are now in production,
> then the future
possibilities for an economy that continuously has to grow
> (in other
words *this* capitalism) seem weak. In fact, only a
> technological
miracle can save continuous growth and technological novelty
> cannot
be anticipated ~a priori~. Empirically, we see that all methods
> of
energy production in use are based on rather old technology and
> science (the first versions of solar panels are from the end of the
1800s,
> the modern versions form the 1940s and nuclear power from
roughly the same
> decade). Does this promise fast breakthroughs or
rather the opposite? In any
> case, barring ground-breaking new energy
technology such as cold fusion,
> economic growth will in the future be
local and short term. What does the
> continuous shrinking of the
economy mean for science, technology, modernism
> and individualism? If
it means something significant at all, we have to
> realise that many
of the theories concerning these phenomena -- which are
> based on the
idea that fossil fuel driven economic growth has nothing
> essential to
do with them -- turn out to be limited and maybe even
> unfounded.
Emphasis on economic growth, technology and efficiency
> have
characterised the major part of the political thinking of the last
> century. Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that an ideological
> blindness to the basis of economic growth has been widespread. A
culture
> that is not aware of its own basic prerequisites can be
called not only
> blind but also nihilistic. If many
socio-philosophical ideas have
> unknowingly been based on the
assumption that a unique and in some sense
> arbitrary phenomenon
(i.e., economic growth based on high EROEI fossil
> fuels) is
universal, and have incorporated this blind spot into almost all
> our
thinking concerning modern economy, politics and technology, then
> our
glass is both half empty and half full. Half empty in that not many
> philosophers, economists, critics of modernism or social thinkers
have said
> a rational word about the future where the economy shrinks
year after year.
> We have arrived in an uncharted region, where the
unknown is fully
> equivocal. Half full: talk about the end of history
and other cultural
> saturation should be forgotten. Even a large part
of philosophy can be
> started again from the beginning.
Notes
> -------------------
[1] Mike Davis, _Planet of Slums_ (London: Verso,
> 2006).
[2] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, _Manifesto of the
> Communist
Party_ (1848)
> href="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/
"
> target=_blank
> >http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/
> index.htm (accessed on 18 June 2010).
[3] Fidel Castro, with Ignacio
> Ramonet, _My Life_ (London: Penguin,
2008), 355. Interestingly, Castro also
> speculates that the reason for
the low fuel efficiency of Soviet cars was
> based on the fact that the
Soviets got more than enough gasoline (petrol) as
> a by-product of
their massive production of heavy fuel, such as diesel,
> for
agriculture, industry and the military, ibid., 357.
[4] On
> Hubbert's calculations see David Strahan, _The Last Oil Shock_
(London: John
> Murray, 2008), 36-56.
[5] In the calculations for the oil peak, the
> estimation of future
finds is usually taken into account. For this reason,
> the claim
sometimes presented that some new find will overthrow the oil
> peak
theory is erroneous. An individual find would have to be the
> largest
and most easily accessible of all time for it to considerably
> effect
the time of the oil peak. It is this second condition, easy
> access,
that seems impossible to fulfill.
[6] There are two central
> public organisations for monitoring oil
production; the Energy Information
> Administration (EIA), which is
under the US Ministry of Defence, and the
> International Energy Agency
(IEA). The assessments of EIA and IEA on
> production and consumption
are published with a delay of a couple of months
> or sometimes even
years. Also, the reliability of the assessments has been
> questioned,
most recently by an anonymous whistleblower from inside the IEA,
> as
reported in November 2009 in the _Guardian_ by Terry Macalister, "Key
> oil figures were distorted by US pressure, says whistleblower",
> href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/09/peak-oil-"
target=_blank
> >http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/09/peak-oil-
> international-energy-agency2009 (accessed 18 June 2010). Consultant
> companies and oil companies have real time information that is not
published
> or is only available at a price. Therefore the best public
assessments are
> compiled by various peer groups and independent
researchers and journalists.
> Networks exist that gather information
from several sources; for example,
> counting (on the basis of
satellite photos) how many oil tankers pass
> through the Strait of
Hormuz at a certain time period, or how much oil
> drilling equipment
has been ordered recently, and so forth. In this way it
> is possible
to estimate, for example, the oil production of Saudi Arabia,
> which
otherwise is a closely guarded secret. The information is compiled
> and assessed on many different internet sites, including Wikipedia
(e.g. > href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_megaprojects" target=_blank
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_megaprojects). A good example
of the
> oddities of the "scientific" information concerning oil --
whether economic
> or engineering science -- is the so-called Export
Land Model (ELM). ELM has
> been developed on the Internet site "The
Oil Drum" (> href="http://www.theoildrum.com" target=_blank >
http://www.theoildrum.com),
> where professionals and
amateurs in different fields -- oil engineers,
> investors, geologists,
environmental activists, prophets of doom -- discuss
> oil news.
According to the ELM model, the right side of the bell curve,
> that
is, the recession, will be much steeper than the left edge, that
> is,
the growth period. This is because the producer countries' own
> consumption increases (as they get richer) at the same time as their
> production decreases. Often, in the producer countries consumption of
oil
> goes *up*, when price goes up. There is thus less oil for export
than what
> one might expect based merely on geological depletion. Even
such a simple
> thing has had to be invented outside the "official"
economic science and
> research because the public information and
research concerning oil is
> rather limited and basic.
[7] Correspondingly, some of the best
> descriptions of the
world-historic relevance of oil are literary. The
> metaphysical and
mystical character of oil is beautifully exposed in
> Reza
Negarestani's _Cyclonopedia_ (Melbourne: Re-press, 2008) where one
> of
the themes is the blind but necessary infestation that oil exerts.
> See also the devastatingly prophetic text _Petroleum Petroleum_,
> href="http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=12&xid=1848&kapitel=43&cHash="
> target=_blank
> >http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=12&xid=1848&kapitel=43&cHash=
> 925ba3ce332 (accessed 18 June 2010) written in 1903 by Gustav
Meyrink, about
> a man-made oil-leak in the Gulf of Mexico.
[8] The cube model and its
> energy correspondences have been developed
to illustrate oil use, but the
> correspondences have also with good
reason been criticised. See, for
> example, Harry Goldstein and William
Sweet, "Joules, BTUs, Quads -- Let's
> Call the Whole Thing Off" _IEEE
Spectrum_, January 2007.
> href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/fossil-fuels/joules-btus-quadslets-"
> target=_blank
> >http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/fossil-fuels/joules-btus-quadslets-
> call-the-whole-thing-off (accessed 14 October 2009) and the Wikipedia
entry
> "Cubic mile of oil",
> href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cubic_mile_of_oil" target=_blank
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cubic_mile_of_oil (accessed 18 June
> 2010).
[9] It is estimated that the glaciers of Greenland lost 36-60
> cubic
miles of ice between 2002 and 2006; NASA, 23 March 2007, "Gravity
> Measurements Help Melt Ice Mysteries",
> href="http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/lookingatearth/grace-20070320.html"
> target=_blank
> >http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/lookingatearth/grace-20070320.html,
> (accessed 14 October 2009).
[10] Vaclav Smil, _Global Catastrophes and
> Trends_ (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2008), 83.
[11] For EROEI figures
> see, for example, Charles A.S. Hall and Cutler
Cleveland, "EROI: Definition,
> History and Future Implications".
Presentation at the ASPO-US conference, 10
> October 2005.
> target=_blank >http://www.esf.edu/efb/hall/talks/EROI6a.ppt (accessed 14
> October
2009).
[12] Calculating the EROEI figure for mechanised
> modern agriculture
is difficult and depends on many details. It is often
> stated that its
EROEI figure would be approximately 0.1; in other words, by
> using the
energy of ten barrels of oil, the amount of food corresponding to
> the
energy of 1 barrel of oil is achieved. See, for example, Chad
> Hellwinckel and Daniel De La Torre Ugarte, "Peak Oil and the
Necessity of
> Transitioning to Regenerative Agriculture", _Energy
Bulletin_, 6 October
> 2009. > >http://www.energybulletin.net/50316
(accessed 14 October 2009).
> [13] It has been suggested that the passing of the oil peak in 1987
was a
> contributing reason to the collapse of the Soviet Union. See,
for example,
> Douglas B. Reynolds, "Peak Oil and the Fall of the
Soviet Union", _Energy
> Bulletin_, 28 August 2006.
> href="http://www.energybulletin.net/node/19837" target=_blank
> >http://www.energybulletin.net/node/19837 (accessed 14 October
> 2009).
[14] The only non-labour intensive way of getting rid of
> nuclear
waste is probably to dump it in the sea, in the style of the
> Italian
mafia. See, for example, Greenpeace, "Mafia Links to Toxic Waste
> Trade - Europe".
> href="http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-press-releases/1997/"
> target=_blank
> >http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-press-releases/1997/
> msg00375.html (accessed 18 June 2010).
[15] Experts have presented
> estimates varying between 5 and 50. See,
for example, Charles A. S. Hall,
> Stephen Balogh and David J. R.
Murphy, "What is the Minimum EROI that a
> Sustainable Society Must
Have?", _Energies_ 2009, 2, 25-47;
> doi:10.3390/en20100025,
> target=_blank >http://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/2/1/25/pdf (accessed 18 June
> 2010).
[16] The widespread collapse of the economy could possibly lower
> the
price of oil back to a level of 20 dollars a barrel. The collapse
> would, in itself, be the end of *this* capitalism.
[17] Lasse Nordlund,
> _The Foundations of Our Life. Reflections about
Human Labour, Money and
> Energy from Self-Sufficiency Standpoint_ (New
Delhi: SADED, 2008).
> [18] The calculated and reported economic growth can also be based
on, for
> example, taking loans, printing new money or the rise of the
value of stock
> shares. For these no or minimal additional labour
would be needed.
> ----------------
Translation from Finnish: Kristina Kolhi and Gareth
> Griffiths.
Tere Vaden is a philosopher living in Tampere, Finland.
> He teaches
interactive media and philosophy at the University of Tampere and
> is
an editor of the philosophical journal _niin & nain_. Most
> recently
he has published the books _Wikiworld_ with Juha Suoranta,
> (London:
Pluto Press 2010) and _Artistic Research_ with Mika Hannula and
> Juha
Suoranta, (Gothenburg: ArtMonitor 2005).
> _____________________________________________________________________
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