[p2p-research] Am I missing any commons?

Ryan Lanham rlanham1963 at gmail.com
Fri Feb 26 01:17:09 CET 2010


Hi David:

In summary, I basically agree with all of your points.  I'll detail a bit.

On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 5:46 PM, David Bollier <david at bollier.org> wrote:

>
> I'm enjoying the discussion, too -- and I hope to jump into it with a few
> thoughts next week.  Thank you, Ryan, for making so many valuable
> distinctions & basic definitions.  However, in the meantime, a couple of
> things jumped out at me from these proposed definitions:
>
>
>
>  A commons is not a corporation because a corporation has a defined
>>>>  purpose other than useful sharing.  A commons may be organized as a
>>>>       corporation legally but a corporation cannot become a commons
>>>> unless its purpose is free, open sharing with minimal purposes
>>>> beyond those ends.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
> The idea of "free, open sharing" needs to be qualified because many commons
> manage finite, subtractable resources such as land, fish, timber, etc.,
> which simply cannot allow free, open sharing with everyone.  This is just a
> reminder about the conceptual divide between digital/cultural commons and
> most natural resource commons.  The latter generally need to be "stinted" in
> order to preserve the asset and/or the unit-flow of resources.
>
>
>
Agreed of course.  But the idea of sharing the benefit in some legitimately
common way is a priority even for fixed or limited assets.  Land trusts are
a great favorite of mine and I call them commons. Heck, I think a public
library is a commons of sorts.  But I've always erred expansively.




>  A commons is not a co-op because it is perfectly reasonable for a
>>>> co-op to attempt to maximize the intrinsic value of its assets.  A
>>>> commons would not do this as a stated goal.  Still, a co-op could
>>>> be structured to be a commons or to have many commons-like
>>>> features.  The similarities are perhaps greatest here.
>>>>
>>>> A commons is not a state because it does not create its own
>>>> mechanisms for policing and enforcement beyond rudimentary social
>>>> guides and constraints.  It also does not hold "public" property.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
> I agree that "rudimentary social guides and constraints" are central to the
> policing and enforcement of usage norms.  But I disagree that those guides &
> constraints are necessarily rudimentary -- they can be quite involved and
> complex -- or that state-issued law is not involved.  In some instances,
> there may be actual legal frameworks promulgated by the state that create
> enforceable boundary conditions the facilitate the emergence of the commons
> and its social relationships and collaboration.  A key example is free
> software, which Stallman discovered does not work on social norms alone.
>  His invention of the GPL was an admission that there needs to be a legally
> enforceable "backstop" (copyright law) to enable the social cooperation &
> trust in the sustainability of the resource to flourish.
>
> Elinor Ostrom also notes how state law and authorities may set broad
> parameters within which commons may self-organize.  (Ostrom's famous case is
> California state authorities, who created a general framework within which
> municipal water districts in LA organized cooperative arrangements to
> protect groundwater supplies from intrusions of seawater.)
>
> The state charters corporations.  Why could it not, in benign ways, use law
> to facilitate the formation and maintenance of commons?  Indeed, why should
> commoners forswear or ignore the instrumentalities of the state to advance
> the commons (so long as the state & commons do not commingle in unholy
> ways)?
>
>
I agree that all the mechanisms and technologies of active societies should
be brought to bear--including all legal and organizational means.  But not
every is so pragmatic.  That is where I was headed with "strong and weak
forms" of some typology.



>
>  A commons is not a commune because individual property rights are
>>>> not inconsistent with the commons.  A person may use, for example,
>>>> a creative commons license and still participate in the commons.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
> I agree, esp. re a commune vs. a commons, but it is worth noting that some
> left-wing critics criticize commons based on CC licenses as "commons without
> commoning."  In other words, the individual choice and ownership of a given
> work is a "liberal, capitalist" notion of a commons, and not a more socially
> based, coherent type of commons.  I think we should err on the side of more
> expansive notions of the commons (i.e., CC-licensed commons), but this point
> is worth pondering internally.
>
>
Again, I agree.  From my view, most co-ops are commons.  But I think there
is room for a more restrictive view that sees the commons in fairly pure
tones and in concert with differing intellectual heritages.

What we do at the P2PF (often) is to think in ideal and future perfect terms
so as to attempt to gain some directional confidence for our own acts and
theories.  Of course we all like movements toward more collaborative and
shared forms, but there is often distinction and contest over "ideal" forms
with anarchists arguing against liberals, etc. if such titles continue to
hold much meaning--and I think they do.

So, there is clearly a pragmatism for "now" (which overwhelmingly interests
me) and then there is, for some, a more revolutionary spirit that is, to my
mind, often more European, more intellectual and less inclined to
accommodations with Elinor Ostrom's fairly pragmatic analyses--which I have
long been a fan of.

Personally, I make a poor communist/Marxist/anarchist in either heart or
mind.  But Michel encourages, and I think quite rightly so, a heterodox set
of voices on theoretical issues.  And we have it in our little
foundation--at times almost frighteningly so (for me).

I have found, not surprisingly, that I learn a great deal when people of
differing views make their cases. It is impossible not to recognize a stream
of commons has roots to anarchist theories, to utopian socialism, and to
Marxian forms both practiced and theoretical.  Of course this is news to no
one.  It isn't my personal theoretical heritage, as I have said.  But it is
legitimate and reasonable...particularly outside North America and
increasingly in European grass roots commons movements.  I find the Germanic
countries to be particularly well represented with people steeped in such
views.

I was responding to those influences (where Michel is well known and highly
appreciated for his openness to differences as I understand the situation)
and trying to allow for inclusion of more "radicalized" views within the
boundaries.  Sometimes more radicalized views can only be accommodated by
having narrower terms of core ideals.  I completely agree, however, that the
full definition ought to be more expansive with regard to possible linkages
and associates for the overall idea of the commons.  Still, I think there is
good cause to walk with those who are theoretically anti-state, etc. so long
as actions are pragmatic and theories are not fundamental.


> David Bollier
>

Ryan Lanham
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