[p2p-research] Data Roads: P2P network physical topology.

Michel Bauwens michelsub2004 at gmail.com
Wed Aug 25 15:26:11 CEST 2010


Hi Jared,

if at some point you want to publish your project on our p2p foundation
blog, but in not too technical fashion, please don't hesitate,

Michel

On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 1:31 AM, Jared Hardy <jaredhardy at dataroads.org>wrote:

> Thank you all for looking at DataRoads.Org. Please understand that
> this project is in the early outreach phase, and the blog contents are
> addressed at a widely mixed audience of mostly lay computer users. A
> lot of my friends are from my video game and artistic circles, and
> they understand very little about network hardware. I imply many of
> the technical underpinnings while only explaining them by way of
> analogy -- Data Roads itself is one such analogy. I think it might
> catch on because USA culture is so car-centric.
>
> It's nice to talk to more diverse hackers here -- I need to get back
> in the habit of using my GPG keys. :)
>
> On Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 8:34 AM, jaromil <jaromil at dyne.org> wrote:
> > congratulations for DataRoads, looks like an interesting illustration
> > and hopefully it will achieve what we all dream of, also with projects
> > like Netsukuku.
>
> I have studied similar projects to Netsukuku here, and I've been in
> contact with the CUWiN project leader Sascha Meinrath.
>    I try to avoid talking about wireless when talking about Data
> Roads, because I believe it can operate in a link-layer agnostic way.
> Many of the concepts actually started out as wired networks, but can
> easily be expanded to fixed wireless meshes. Part of the reason for
> geoposition numbering in DataRoads is to provide a means of easily
> "stitching" separate meshes when they eventually converge
> topographically. I want to provide a large and consistent number space
> that can be routed throughout the whole world without prior
> coordination. Geolocation routing also avoids a lot of the edge-case
> loop issues of more traditional routing systems. It makes packet route
> navigation a lot more like video game AI navigation.
>
> > i've taken the initiative to forward this to our hackers network at
> > dyne.org for comments, which i'll gladly forward to you. even after a
> > quick look I'm undoubtely interested in its forthcomings: the approach
> > to geoposition looks like a good idea, although some privacy concerns
> > would arise, as they do already with efforts like IPv6.
>
> As you note those privacy concerns already exist, even with IPv4
> geolocation systems. Data Roads organization will petition ICANN for a
> 64-bit or larger IPv6 subnet space for its geoposition numbering
> system, to maintain compatibility with (but not dependency on) the
> legacy ICANN-dependent networks. I hope to alleviate privacy concerns
> with a series of security and anonymity oriented protocols, utilizing
> "Web of Trust" (WoT) metrics to determine first-tier protection
> exchanges, similar to FreeNet. Each router node should have a unique
> private/public key pair that it uses for all communications.
>
> One idea is what I call "matryoshka doll packets" -- a series of
> encrypted packets nested inside each other, with only one "destination
> header" shown at any phase of transfer. Each "destination node"
> decrypts one inner packer further, and then forwards it on to the
> newly revealed header's destination. No "destination" should be able
> to detect the true final destination, nor the true sender, because it
> has no knowledge of how deeply the "matryoshka doll packet" is nested
> at any phase. If a return address is required, that would be hidden
> inside the final inner encrypted packet.
>
> Another idea is "registered recipient lists" -- multiple WoT peers are
> asked to receive response packets from a foreign service on a node's
> behalf. The foreign service should have no clue which "recipient" the
> real request is originating from, if any. A per-session key can be
> created separately from any one node identity, so the entire session
> can be encrypted without revealing the true destination. Each
> "registered recipient" peer node only gets a small piece of the
> request/response puzzle, to prevent them from spying or intervening on
> the transfer in whole.
>
> Many more protections can be built into the DataRoads:IPv4/6 gateway
> specifications, similar to ToR and I2P. A lot of the protections
> involve WoT-enabled black/white-list distribution, and game theory
> agents to automate conflict resolutions. I've been reading the works
> of Dr. Elinor Ostrom (Nobel Prize in Economics, 2009) for a lot of the
> relevant game tactics.
>
>    Thank you,
>    Jared Hardy
>



-- 
P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net

Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org

Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens

Think tank: http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://listcultures.org/pipermail/p2presearch_listcultures.org/attachments/20100825/1df2c0b4/attachment.html>


More information about the p2presearch mailing list