[p2p-research] Fwd: O'Gorman on Global Warming & Hybrid Approaches to the Tragedy of the Commons

[Michel Bauwens]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Bollier <david at bollier.org>
Date: Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 5:43 PM
Subject: Fwd: O'Gorman on Global Warming & Hybrid Approaches to the Tragedy
of the Commons



 Sent to you by Scott via Google Reader:


 O'Gorman on Global Warming & Hybrid Approaches to the Tragedy of the
Commons<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/08/ogorman-on-global-warming-hybrid-approaches-to-the-tragedy-of-the-commons.html>
via Legal Theory Blog <http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/> by Lawrence
Solum on 8/13/10

Maebh O'Gorman (University College Dublin, School of Law) has posted Global
Warming: A Tragedy of the
Commons<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656323>on
SSRN. Here is the abstract:

   This paper scrutinises two of the leading models for dealing with
   so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ issues as to their suitability to
   tackle the problem of global warming; the polycentric model favoured by
   Ostrom, and the Leviathan approach as advocated by Ophuls. The paper then
   sets out a hybrid approach which it argues is the only viable solution to
   the current crisis of global warming. It proposes that, while agreement
   setting out goals for reductions in GHG emissions must be reached on the
   international arena, such an agreement should confer on each individual
   nation the choice of the manner of implementation, and that each nation, and
   also each region or locality, should devise their own strategy for achieving
   their required reduction. Such decentralised implementation would not only
   reduce the costs of both formulation and enforcement of solutions, but also
   permit more broad-based input by the local community, thereby resulting in
   an enhanced solution. Furthermore, local solutions would enable the
   development of a more responsive framework of rules and also facilitate
   regulatory competition. While legal rules will necessarily constitute a
   large proportion of the governmental response, this paper also addresses the
   role that non-legal rules such as social norms may play. Such norms can be
   altered through the use of taxation, which can effect “carefully biased
   options,” as well as education as to the consequences of certain everyday
   actions. As Charny noted, systems of non-legal sanctions for the violation
   of the rules of conduct specified by the norm system help to explain, “in
   terms of ‘rationality’” why individuals often act in ways that
   ostensibly depart from rational self-interest. Such departure from rational
   self-interest is exactly what is required to counteract the rational actions
   which result in ‘the tragedy of the commons.’ That efficient norms may
   evolve among members of a close-knit community is yet another argument in
   favour of decentralisation of the implementation of centrally agreed goals.




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