[p2p-research] Concept for a Giving Reward System for a Commons

Wed Oct 14 17:08:31 CEST 2009

Hi Ryan,

some treatment here, captured via http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out

Introduction

Crowding out refers to the phenomena that within peer production projects in
particular, and volunteering in general, paying those volunteers actually
diminishes their motivation and might destroy the dynamic of peer production
projects. It leads to the conclusion that Peer
Production<http://p2pfoundation.net/Peer_Production>are not
price-incentivized systems, and that
Revenue-Sharing <http://p2pfoundation.net/Revenue-Sharing> may be
counterproductive.

More generally, see our entry on Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic
Motivation<http://p2pfoundation.net/Intrinsic_vs._Extrinsic_Motivation>,
extrensic motivation will crowd out intrinsic motivation.

It may also refer to the related issue that giving power to experts may
weaken the motivation on non-experts.

See also this very interesting study on Incentives for
Participation<http://p2pfoundation.net/Incentives_for_Participation>

 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=2>
] Examples

"Look at what happened to Mojo Nation - which tried to reward participants
in a swarm peer file distribution system with "mojo" convertible into
goodies as compare to BitTorrent, which did not. Compare the level of use
and success of pay-per-cycle distributed computing sites like Gomez
Performance Networks or Capacity Calibration Networks, as compared to the
socially engaged platforms like SETI at Home or Folding at Home. It is just too
simplistic to think that if you add money, the really good participants will
come and do the work as well as, or better than, the parallel social
processes." (http://www.roughtype.com/archives/2006/07/benkler_on_cala.php)

 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=3>
] Explanation about Crowding-Out in Peer Production

Yochai Benkler [1]<http://www.roughtype.com/archives/2006/07/benkler_on_cala.php>on
why, under certain conditions, peer production functions better than
price incentives, and why the latter may undermine the former:

"The reason is that the power of the major sites comes from combining
large-scale contributions from heterogeneous participants, with
heterogeneous motivations. Pointing to the 80/20 rule on contributions
misses the dynamic that comes from being part of a large community and a
recognized leader or major contributors in it, for those at the top, and
misses the importance of framing this as a non-priced social process. Adding
money alters the overall relationship. It makes some people "professionals,"
and renders other participants, "suckers." It is not impossible to mix paid
and unpaid participants, as we see in free and open source software and even
to a very limited extent in Wikipedia. It is just hard, and requires a
cultural form that is definitely not "now at long last we can tell who's
worth something and pay them, while everyone else is just worthelss." What
Calacanis is doing now with his posts about the top contributors to Digg is
trying to alter the cultural interpretation of what they are doing: from
leaders in an engaged community, to suckers who are being taken for a ride
by Ross.Maybe he will succeed in raining on Digg's parade, though I doubt
it, but that does not mean that he will succeed in building an alternative
sustained social process of peer production, or in replacing peer production
with a purely paid service. Once you frame the people who aren't getting
paid as poor sods being taken for a ride, for example, the best you can hope
for is that some of the "leaders" elsewhere will come and become your
low-paid employees (after all, what is $1,000 a month relative to the
millions Calacanis would make if his plan in fact succeeds? At that point,
the leaders are no longer leaders of a community, and they turn out to be
suckers after all, working for pittance, comparatively speaking.)

There is an abiding skepticism, born of many years in the industrial age,
about the sustainability and plausibility of nonmarket-based cooperation and
productive collaboration. We have now, on the other hand, almost two decades
of literature in experimental economics, game theory, anthropology,
political science field studies, that shows that cooperation in fact does
happen much more often than the standard economics textbooks predict, and
that under certain structural conditions non-price-based production is
extraordinarily robust. The same literature also suggests that there is
crowding-out, or displacement, between monetary and non-monetary motivations
as well as between different institutional sytems: social, as opposed to
market, as opposed to state. It just is not so easy to assume that because
people behave productively in one framework (the social process of peer
production that is Wikipedia, free and open source software, or Digg), that
you can take the same exact behavior, with the same exact set of people, and
harness them to your goals by attaching a price to what previously they were
doing in a social process. Anyone interested in the basic approach can look
at my articles Coase's Penguin, or Sharing Nicely, which include more of the
underlying literature than does the book The Wealth of Networks, although
some of the materials are there in chapter 4. The problem is not, in any
event, a simple or solved one, and I, among many others, continue to work on
it." (http://www.roughtype.com/archives/2006/07/benkler_on_cala.php)

 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=4>
] Explanations about Crowding-Out in General
[edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=5>
] Overview

Robert Kozinets:

"I’ve recently had a chance to formulate my contentions with a bit more
precision. I saw a terrific presentation in Munich by Florian Jodl, a
doctoral student at Ludwig-Maximillian University who is doing his thesis on
as topic that looks at the way that giving rewards to customers can actually
undermine a company’s relationship with them. (Florian is also working for
McKinsey). His basic proposition is that we give consumers a lot of rewards,
such as the various kinds of Frequency Programs, in order to inspire their
loyalty. But the net effect, according to solid psychological theory, can be
just the opposite. I had a “Murray Davis moment.” I thought, “That’s
interesting, and that’s really relevant to the stuff I’m trying to say about
sponsored communities.”

There is, in fact, a massive amount of research that supports the idea that
when you pay people to do something for you, they stop enjoying it, and
distrust their own motivations. The mysterious something that goes away, and
that “Factor X” even has a name: intrinsic motivation.

Intrinsic motivation is a person’s sense that they are doing something
because they want to do it, because the doing brings joy, it is rewarding by
itself, on its own as an activity. Extrinsic rewards suggest that there is
actually an instrumental relationship at work, that you do the activity in
order to get something else, and that something else (like a monthly check)
is actually the reward for doing it. We don’t need to be paid to play,
because it in itself is fun and enjoyable. If you pay me for it, it must be
work.

Some of the classic work in this area, by Mark Lepper at al in 1973 found
that if you took kids who loved to paint, and you started rewarding them for
painting, they actually started painting less.

Edward Deci in 1975 found that when you took adults who were playing with a
puzzle and trying to solve it, and you rewarded them for solving it, they
actually started playing less with the puzzle.

The results were replicated in a large number of different laboratory
studies and real-world contexts. For example, when you paid kids in a
classroom for doing math tasks, they stopped being engaged with the math
task (Greene et al 1976). When you paid students to read they stopped being
internally motivated to read and only did it when rewarded (Deci, Koestner,
and Ryan 2001). When you took adults who were trying to lose weight and you
introduced external rewards into the weight loss program, the program
stopped working (Kohn 1993). When you paid them for donating blood, they
started to refuse (Seabright 2002). There are, literally, ka-jillions of
such studies, meta-studies, and meta-analytic mega-studies of the
meta-studies.

It’s what we would call a robust effect. It shows up in many contexts. And
there’s been considerable testing to try to find out exactly why it works. A
major school of thought is that there is an “Overjustification
Effect<http://p2pfoundation.net/Overjustification_Effect>.”
(http://kozinets.net/archives/133)

 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=6>
] Empirical evidence of the crowding effect

>From the study by Tobias Assman at
https://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i296a-3/f06/wiki/index.php/Incentives_for_participation

"Offering financial rewards for contributions to online communities
basically means mixing external and intrinsic motivation. Since that is an
issue widely discussed in the academic world, I will present some
interesting examples of an effect called crowding occuring in this context.

*Circumstantial Evidence*

Basic intuition tells us that we are more willing to undertake a task if we
can expect a reward. But there are a number of specific situations where the
undermining effect of external incentives is also just as easily understood.
A good example is children who are paid by their parents for mowing the
family lawn. Once they expect to receive money for that task, they are only
willing to do it again if they indeed receive monetary compensation. The
induced unwillingness to do anything for free may also extend to other
household chores. The reward need not be monetary in the first place. Take
the case of a gifted child in violin class. Once ‘gold-stars’ were
introduced as a symbolic reward for a certain amount of time spent
practicing the instrument, the girl lost all interest in trying new,
difficult pieces. Instead of aiming at improving her skills, her goal
shifted towards spending time playing well-learned, easy pieces in order to
receive the award (Deci with Flaste 1995). This crowding effect may also
work the other way round. A patient found it difficult taking her medication
for hypertension regularly. Her doctor’s frequent reminders, admonishments,
or plain warnings concerning the possible dire consequences had no effect.
Despite ending up in the emergency room a couple of times, the patient only
managed to alter her behavior when a new doctor - instead of pressuring her
to take the medication - discussed with her what time of the day she
considered best for taking her pills. Suddenly, she managed to follow the
prescription, as her own (intrinsic) motivation was recognized and thereby
reinforced.

*Labor supply*

Frey and Götte (1999) use a unique data set from Switzerland to evaluate how
financial rewards to volunteers affect their intrinsic motivation. The
incidence of rewards is found to reduce the amount of volunteering. While
the size of the rewards induces individuals to provide more volunteer work,
the mere fact that they receive a payment significantly reduces their work
efforts by approximately four hours. The magnitude of these effects is
considerable. Evaluated at the median reward paid, volunteers indeed work
less, suggesting that the crowdingout effect dominates the relative price
effect. These results are immune to possible simultaneity bias or
differences in reward policies between types of organizations. These
findings have important implications for policy regarding voluntary work.
Direct incentives may backfire, leading to less volunteering.

*Services*

Daycare centers are confronted with the problem that parents sometimes
arrive late to pick up their children, which forces teachers to stay after
the official closing time. A typical economic approach (in line with the
economic theory of crime, initiated by Becker 1968) would suggest
introducing a fine for collecting children late. Such a punishment is
expected to induce parents to reduce the occurrence of belatedly picking up
their children. The effect of such a policy has been studied for a daycare
center in Israel (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). The number of late-coming
parents over a particular period of time was first recorded. In a second
period, extending over twelve weeks, a significant monetary fine for
collecting children late was introduced. After an initial learning phase,
the number of late-coming parents increases substantially, which is
consistent with the crowding-out effect. The introduction of a monetary fine
transforms the relationship between parents and teachers from a non-monetary
into a monetary one. As a result, the parents’ intrinsic motivation to keep
to the time schedules is reduced or is crowded-out altogether; the feeling
now is that the teachers are “paid” for the disamenity of having to stay
longer. That parents’ intrinsic motivation was crowded out for good by the
introduction of a penalty system is supported by the fact that the number of
late-coming parents remained stable at the level prevailing even after the
fine was cancelled in the third phase.' (
https://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i296a-3/f06/wiki/index.php/Incentives_for_participation)

 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=7>
] Theoretical Explanation

>From the study by Tobias Assman at
https://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i296a-3/f06/wiki/index.php/Incentives_for_participation

"The effects of external interventions on intrinsic motivation have been
attributed to two psychological processes:

(a) Impaired self-determination. When individuals perceive an external
intervention to reduce their self-determination, they substitute intrinsic
motivation by extrinsic control. Following Rotter (1966), the locus of
control shifts from the inside to the outside of the person affected.
Individuals who are forced to behave in a specific way by outside
intervention, feel overjustified if they maintained their intrinsic
motivation.

(b) Impaired self-esteem. When an intervention from outside carries the
notion that the actor's motivation is not acknowledged, his or her intrinsic
motivation is effectively rejected. The person affected feels that his or
her involvement and competence is not appreciated which debases its value.
An intrinsically motivated person is taken away the chance to display his or
her own interest and involvement in an activity when someone else offers a
reward, or commands, to undertake it. As a result of impaired self-esteem,
individuals reduce effort.

The two processes identified allow us to derive the psychological conditions
under which the crowding-out effect appears:

(1) *External interventions crowd-out intrinsic motivation if the
individuals affected perceive them to be controlling. In that case, both
self-determination and self-esteem suffer, and the individuals react by
reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled.*

(2) *External interventions crowd-in intrinsic motivation if the individuals
concerned perceive it as supportive. In that case, self-esteem is fostered,
and individuals feel that they are given more freedom to act, thus enlarging
self-determination*

 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=8>
] Market Logics vs. Community Logics

Robert Kozinets:

"I believe that we have cultural categories that oppose marketplace modes of
behavior (or “market logics”) with the more family-like modes of behavior of
caring and sharing that we observe in close-knit communities (”community
logics”). When we start to pay people for a particular “transaction” then
that becomes culturally coded as a “market logic”–market logics are in
effect. This signifies to the person a set of meanings: this is labor, this
is work, just do it. When communal logics are in effect, all sorts of norms
of reciprocity, sacrifice, and gift-giving come into play: this is cool,
this is right, this is fun. I write about the interplay of these two forms
of logics explicitly in my article about Burning Man (Kozinets 2002), other
book chapters related to that topic, as well as in some of my work on online
communities (Kozinets 1999), and fan communities (Kozinets 2001). So think
about paying a kid to clean up their room, paying parishioners to go to
church, paying people in a neighborhood to attend a town hall meeting,
paying people to come out and vote. All these examples seem a little strange
or forced. Why? Because they mix and match the communal with the
market-oriented.

The two theories are actually quite compatible and look at the same
phenomenon from different levels of analysis." (
http://kozinets.net/archives/133)
[edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=9>
] Discussion [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=10>
] Why you should not pay for non-reciprocal peer production

A contribution by Evan Prodromou, who heads Wikitravel
[2]<http://evan.prodromou.name/Paying_wiki_contributors>:

"In the world of commercial wikis, the idea is often floated that all
contributors should be paid for their efforts. I think this is a bad idea
for a number of reasons. I've outlined them below.

1. Payment as disincentive. In his interesting book Freakonomics, economist
Steven Levitt describes some counterintuitive facts about payment. One of
the most interesting is that charging people who do the wrong thing often
causes them to do it more, and paying people to do the right thing causes
them to do it less.

The best wiki editing is done by people who believe in an important and
powerful cause. As so many Open Content wikis show, people will move
mountains to achieve a noble purpose. If you mix in money, you've instead
changed the main motivation to $$$. You direct people _away_ from any noble
purpose you have, and instead towards grubbing for dollars. What kind of
people, and work, will you get out of that?

2. Low payment a disincentive. When people work for a noble purpose, they
are told that their work is highly valued. When people work for $0.75/hour,
they are told that their work is very low-valued. Which kind of work do you
want to do?

3. Legalities. Speaking of payment: if you engage in an employment
relationship with unknown, self-selected people from any country in the
world, for any amount of money, you're going to have to fight your way
through labour laws and tax issues all the way to bankruptcy.

4. Market economics. If you have open content, I can copy your content to
another wiki, not pay people, and still make money. So by paying
contributors, you're pricing yourself out of the market.

You don't have to pay people to do what they want to do anyways. The labour
cost for leisure activities is $0. And nobody is going to work on a wiki
doing things they don't want to do.

5. No fair system. There's simply no fair, automated and auditable way to
divvy up the money. If you do it by character count, you leave out all the
people who engage in discussions, improve content by editing and thus
deleting characters, or make hugely important changes with just a few
characters. If you do it by number of edits (or non-rolled-back edits), you
judge tiny and insignificant edits equal to large, well-thought-out and very
productive edits.

Decisions about the relative value of different contributors to an article
is too complicated to do automatically. But if you have a subjective system
-- have a human being evaluate contributions to an article and portion out
payments -- it will be subject to constant challenges, endless debates, and
a lot of community frustration.

6. Gaming the system. People are really smart. If there's money to be made,
they'll figure out how to game your payment system to get more money than
they actually deserve. They'll use long -- no, lengthogonous -- words
pointlessly to jack up their word count. They'll set up robots to twiddle
out-of-the-way pages. They'll work on "hot" pages to get more share of the
higher profits, ignoring low-volume pages that need a lot of work.

You'll end up in an antagonistic relationship with your users, rather than a
cooperative one. They'll be trying to get as much money out of you as
possible, and you'll be trying to give as little as you can to them -- or at
least only get them to work on what you want.

7. Paying for friends. If you can't convince people that working on your
project is worth their unpaid time, then there's probably something wrong
with your project. People are going to be able to sense that -- it's going
to look like a cover-up, something sleazy.

If you think you need to pay people to work on your wiki, then you're doing
something wrong. Instead of trying to force your users to align with your
business interests, by paying them, you should re-align your business
interests to be more in tune with what potential contributors want and need.
You shouldn't have to pay for friends, and you shouldn't have to pay for
wiki contributors." (http://evan.prodromou.name/Paying_wiki_contributors)
[edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=11>
] Alternative Options to direct payment

Evan Prodromou:

"Why should we work on this wiki if you make money off of it?" The facile
answer, "We'll pay you to work on the wiki," is unworkable. So what other
options are there?

The important thing to remember about this question is that it's not really
what people want to know. They want to know, "Why should we trust you to be
the steward of our work?" and "Aren't your motivations different from ours?"
and "Are we being duped into working for free by an evil, manipulative
entity?" There are a lot of other ways to answer these questions and
reassure your contributors of your company's good faith.

   - Be Open. If you have an Open Content wiki, then anyone can make money
   off of the work there. Let your users know that they're welcome to use the
   content, just like anyone else, to make extra dough. Encourage creative
   re-use of the work, for commercial or non-commercial purposes. The more that
   contributors understand that the work they do belongs to the whole of
   humanity, and not just your company, the more likely they are to
   participate.

   - Donate. Set aside a good part of the profits from the site (if there
   are any...) to donations to related charities. Donations to Creative
   Commons, the Free Software Foundation, and Wikimedia Foundation are probably
   all good candidates. There may also be domain-specific charities you can
   contribute to; if you have a site about pets, say, you could contribute to
   the Animal Rescue Network.

   - Sponsor. There are a number of wiki-related events that happen each
   year: RecentChangesCamp, Wikimania, and WikiSym. They could all use
   sponsorship. Your users will appreciate your association with these events.
   wikiHow has done a great job with this.

   - Thank-you gifts. If you'd like to reward contributors for work on the
   wiki, consider giving thank-you gifts instead. "You've done a great job over
   the last few months -- can I send you a WikiWhatever T-shirt?" Other
   possible gifts would be gift-certificates for online bookstores or sponsored
   (or partially-sponsored) trips to wiki conferences. It's important not to
   make the gifts seem like payment : "You have reached level 4 of WikiWhatever
   contributor status after 1000 hours of work, and we are sending you a coffee
   mug." Thank-you gifts should be in the spirit of the BarnStar.

   - Hire from the community. If you've got really, really good people
   working on your site, and you want them to continue, hire them. Wikia does a
   really good job of hiring active users.

   - Pay bounties. This is an option that's worked well in the Open Source
   community. Companies will often pay a developer to implement a feature, fix
   a bug or build a plugin in an open source project that wouldn't otherwise be
   a priority. If there's a job that needs to be done on your wiki, and the
   community isn't interested in doing it, offer a bounty to get it done.
   (Wikipedia has a loose system for third-party bounties that end up as
   donations to the Wikimedia Foundation, or rewards that go directly to the
   contributor.)"

(http://evan.prodromou.name/Paying_wiki_contributors)
[edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Crowding_Out?title=Crowding_Out&action=edit&section=12>
] More Information

   1. Comprehensive overview of the Crowding Out effect, at
   http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp049.pdf
   2. Money Ruins Everything<http://p2pfoundation.net/Money_Ruins_Everything>:
   non-monetary motivation and its policy implications
   3. Presentation of research by Matthias Stuermer, at
   http://stuermer.ch/blog/documents/ethz_LinuxTag2007_CrowdingEffects.pdf
   4. Good summary discussion at the bottom of this "Incentives for
   Participation" text at
   https://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i296a-3/f06/wiki/index.php/Incentives_for_participation
   5. This study says that monetary incentives can work for Open Source
   Software <http://p2pfoundation.net/Open_Source_Software> development,
   under specific circumstances, see
   http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/Alexy_Leitner_-_Norms_Rewards_and_Their_Effect_on_the_Motivation_of_OSS_Developers.pdf
   6. Benefit Sharing <http://p2pfoundation.net/Benefit_Sharing> vs. Revenue
   Sharing <http://p2pfoundation.net/Revenue_Sharing>
   7. The Overjustification
Effect<http://p2pfoundation.net/Overjustification_Effect>:
   synonym for crowding out?

On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 10:04 PM, Ryan Lanham <rlanham1963 at gmail.com> wrote:

> I call this, in general, capturing the commons.  It as if a utility becomes
> a shareholder focused company rather than a public service.  We do not have
> a sophisticated theory describing this phenomenon (if we did I'd guess
> Elinor Ostrom would have been involved) and we do not have sophisticated
> defenses against the phenomenon.
>
> Ryan
>
> On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 9:58 AM, Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> one big danger is this, and it was very obvious with the similar karma
>> point system at o-net : people start behaving strategically, to obtain the
>> points, and making them conditional ... it's no longer unconditional
>> contributions ... so the crowding out phenomena has to be guarded against
>> ...
>>
>> I favour systems that measure objectively, to avoid gaming,
>>
>> Michel
>>
>>   On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 9:54 PM, Ryan Lanham <rlanham1963 at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>>   A person twitters something to a list (or equiv) that has
>>> subscribers.  Subscribers can then acknowledge by awarding points.
>>>
>>> Awards are given based on the perceived value of a gift to a commons.
>>>
>>> Question: How does one get points to award?
>>>
>>> Question: How does one use points?
>>>
>>> Question: What is the difference between points and reputation?
>>>
>>> Question: Is there a way to convert other currencies including national
>>> cash money tokens to points?
>>>
>>> Question: What is the benefit of points being not scarce?  Scarce?
>>>
>>> Question: Who loses with such a system?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Ryan Lanham
>>> rlanham1963 at gmail.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> p2presearch mailing list
>>> p2presearch at listcultures.org
>>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University - Research:
>> http://www.dpu.ac.th/dpuic/info/Research.html - Think thank:
>> http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI
>>
>> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net
>>
>> Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
>> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>>
>> Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
>> http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Ryan Lanham
> rlanham1963 at gmail.com
> Facebook: Ryan_Lanham
> P.O. Box 633
> Grand Cayman, KY1-1303
> Cayman Islands
> (345) 916-1712
>
>
>
>

-- 
Work: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhurakij_Pundit_University - Research:
http://www.dpu.ac.th/dpuic/info/Research.html - Think thank:
http://www.asianforesightinstitute.org/index.php/eng/The-AFI

P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net

Connect: http://p2pfoundation.ning.com; Discuss:
http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org

Updates: http://del.icio.us/mbauwens; http://friendfeed.com/mbauwens;
http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens
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