[p2p-research] p2presearch Digest, Vol 19, Issue 150

[Franz Nahrada]

Ryan Lanham <rlanham1963 at gmail.com> writes:
>Franz:
>
>Based on your response, I am not sure I am any less in misunderstanding
>of what you are trying to say.  

lets give it a try
>
>
>I trust you are interested in social justice.  I trust you see the
>current system as unfair and believe that a fairer system is possible.  

well, yes. But even the perspective of fairness deserves some attention.
Its an ideal build on conflicting interests. I try to avoid such ideals
which are like Fata Morganas, only there to keep us going and justify the
setting. But, yes. Thank you for acknowledging that.
>
>
>Your approach to describing value, money and even labour are non-standard
>and, for me, esoteric in a quasi-theological sense of the term--they seem
>to be highly influenced by Marxian lines of thought.  I am reminded of
>the Frankfurt Schoo, Zizek, etc, who I will admit I find of little
>value.  

Well, yes. This way to describe labour, value and money is not standard in
the world, but its pretty strong in the german - speaking world. I would
not call it theorlogical, but just logical. In fact the ones who talk
about value like a physical quality (and most followers of Marx did) are a
highly metaphysical breed.

The buzzword is "value-form". in German "Wertformanalyse". One of the
theorists who did a good and acceptable comment on "the Kapital" is Mike
Roth, and he describes both the method and the content here:

http://marx101.blogspot.com/2008/03/eldredroth-guide-to-marxs-capital-1978.html

"The response of German Marxist intellectuals in the de-Stalinisation era
has been somewhat different from the French. With the bitter historical
experience of a failed revolution, Fascism and the taking over of East
Germany by a party bureaucracy, West German intellectuals have been much
more radical in their reappraisal of Marx's theory and have turned to
systematically re-evaluating the roots of marxism - Capital. Stimulated by
the work of Hans Georg Backhaus (1965), Hans-Jürgen Krahl (1965), Helmut
Reichelt (1970), Alfred Schmidt (1962, 1969) and the publication of Roman
Rosdolsky's book (1968) together with the political conjuncture of the
'students movement' - a reconstruction of Capital has been worked on,
under the banner of value-form analysis (Wertformanalyse). The long term
aim of this work has been to continue the project begun by Marx with
Capital, with a theory of the bourgeois state, as Marx had initially
planned. Capital has been treated as a raw material to be worked over in
the attempt to give an adequate account of capitalist economy. Following
Marx, this comes down to an analysis of the forms and movement of
objectified social labour – value-form analysis."

"Dialectical thinking.... overcomes this limitation (finite-ness) of
ordinary reasoning by making the claim of determining the sequence in
which the elements of everyday knowledge can be brought into play. This
does not mean that dialectical thinking seeks to deny elements of everyday
knowledge, but rather it asserts the claim to determine the place where
they can be introduced into the argument. The presentation thereby opens
itself to being tested by everyday knowledge and in the course of the
dialectic the totality of everyday knowledge comes to be asserted. This
claim means nothing other than introducing a systematic order into the
dialectic between the presentation and everyday knowledge. The dialectic
can pick up an element of knowledge and temporarily exclude others by
means of assumptions of presentation, i.e. assumptions are made at certain
points in the presentation which recognise an aspect of bourgeois society
under simplifying conditions. For example, at the beginning of Capital,
the everyday knowledge that the form that wealth takes in our society is
the commodity form is admitted, while at the same time excluding those
commodities, such as land, which are not the product of labour. The
everyday knowledge excluded at a particular point in the presentation is
admitted later on through the relaxation of the assumption of
presentation. With regard to the example, the exclusion of land as a
commodity from the presentation is relaxed in Part VI of Volume III where
ground-rent is systematically taken into account."

>
>I remember little of my own reading of lengthy sections of Das Kapital,
>but I do remember the extensive reliance on a labor theory of value which
>is, to most who now review it in broader contexts, inaccurate as
>economics or sociology.  

Marx tries to avoid any dogmatic introduction of the labor theory of
value; as stated above, he tries to take up everyday experience and derive
some conclusions from it. The everyday experience is that value is
seemingly a quality of things, but also is no physical quality in broadest
sense. Its not just lip-service to LTV what he is doi8ng here; in fact he
is revolutionizing LTV because he denies anything like a "natural price". 

When a commodity has value and has use-value, the latter being related to
physical qualities, what is value? Why does it appear to be a objective
and seemingly even physical quality? This can only be expressed by the
relation of thwo things, which Marx calls the "simple value form". In this
relation, the two commodities are compared but the comparison is a weird
one: Commodity B in its physical quantity serves to represent the Value of
Commodity A. if you look closewr on this relation you understand the
nature of value and even the roots of all crisis.
>
>
>Commodity fetishism is a social critique by Marx I have less familiarity
>with.  As I understand the point, Marx did not believe people were
>logical in their assignment of monetary values. Rather, he believed
>people were effectively blinded by social constructions of value.  I have
>not doubt both of those things are true.  Whether he could see past these
>things more than most, I have no idea.

Many mistook commodity fetishism as a strange addition to theory of value.
The assertion of the German marxist re-appraisal is that theory of value
is totally misunderstood if it is not based on the understanding of the
value form. Commodity fetishism is simply a logical consequence of the
value form; people have to live their social relation as a relastion of
things; things that govern them instead of being governed. 

see more here

http://marx101.blogspot.com/2008/03/1-introduction-to-analysis-of.html
>
>
>Different values and yet a relatively standard economic value (price) is
>inherently true and part of any economic analysis. 

Which should make it clear that values and (economic) value are not the
same. Whilst price can only be the Form of value, not value itself. But
value cannot be itself without taking that form. Thats no crazyness of
mine, thats the real absurdity of value. Value Forms are based on value
but they get life of their own. The most important value Form is capital,
and capital is like a living creature born of value-substance, doomed to
suck value into value.


> We all make different choices.  I believe Marx was of the opinion that
>choices could be logical and standard--along lines of the classical
>economists who followed him like Marshall.  As I read him once, Marx
>perhaps seemed headed toward a utility theory, but he did not have that
>insight. 

Marx showed that choices are laregely predetermined by the economic means
we have. The whole plausibility of Marshalls choice theory is based on the
restriction that you have a budget - a given amount of money - and you are
restricted to the value in your budget. It does not prove the general
concept of "utility". Whilst there is needs, there is no inherent reason
to put one need against the orther except an external constraint.

> He was obviously not a quantitative thinker given to insights of that
>sort.  Marginal utility theory followed relatively soon after his own
>work historically, though I do not think his work contributed to the
>development of marginal utility theory directly.     

Well Quantity is always quantity of something. Sometimes quantity is very
important, but to become a "quantitaive thinker" sounds strange to me.
>
>
>At the level of literary criticism or Frankfurt School-styled philosophy,
>I find them best suited to discussions of texts rather than any practical
>application, but that may well be ignorance on my part.  

We could do a follow up on this but maybe not here.

Franz