[p2p-research] labour, capital and p2p

[Stan Rhodes]

Michel,

I agree it's not classically Marxist, but I didn't say it was.  It
fits in what I think "evolved-to-modern-times" Marxism is, which I
tend to think Kleiner embodies.  I won't debate labeling any further
because I'm not sure it would add anything--if Kevin wants to clarify
whether or not copyfarleft is more mutualist than marxist, he can.  On
to the meat!

I partially agree that copyfarleft has the "problem" you identify, but
of course Kleiner would not call it a problem.  Obviously, it's quite
deliberate.  It creates an opt-in structure for the commons, which is
both closing it, but also not--it's a legal membrane that requires
agreeing to a particular perspective of commons management in order to
reap the benefits of the commons.  The GPL does this too. The
important difference with the GPL is the the high of the barrier to
entry--the options you give up to reap the rewards.*

Kleiner wants an opt-in system with strong pressure to opt-in for full
benefits, versus the opt-in GPL with very weak pressure to opt-in for
full benefits.  The GPL has a very low barrier to entry to get full
benefits, whereas the copyfarleft, if it could exist, has a high
barrier to entry.  Ironically, what Kleiner sees as copyleft's
weakness is also its strength, and why it has lasted and grown.  You
need all that capitalist free-riding to help propagate it.

*Of course, the other problem--and another important difference
between copyfarleft and copyleft--is monitoring and enforcement, much
like it is now with anything related to intellectual property.  That
problem is a result of a design, but not one of Kleiner's intention.
As a thought experiment, I find copyfarleft insightful, because it
couldn't work or restrict any better than copyright does now.

Opt-in structures with strong opt-in pressures shouldn't be abandoned
tactically, though.  The rule of thumb: strong exclusion attempts fail
miserably with easily-transmitted nonrival goods.  Kleiner was showing
precisely this recently with deadswap.  Strong exclusion works quite a
bit better with rival goods, although that still varies by
"exclusionability."  As always, see the work of Ostrom et al. on
common-pool resource management.  (If I had a sig, that should
probably be it.)

-- Stan

ps. Ryan, thanks for the reply, you mention a couple of concepts I'd
like to address. I'll try to reply to you soon.

On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 2:52 AM, Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Stan,
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 3:13 PM, Stan Rhodes <stanleyrhodes at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> I know you're not saying this, but I want to put this question out
>> there: if we don't have equitable ownership norms or standards or laws
>> or rights, why would we expect money or finance to be fair?  How could
>> we even tell if it was?
>>
>>
>> To get a modern Marxist take on intellectual property, read the
>> venture communist himself, Dmytri Kleiner:
>> http://www.telekommunisten.net/CopyjustrightCopyfarleft
>
> I personally don't think this is classically marxist at all, but it rather
> close to the mutualist tradition, though in a more 'antagonistic style' than
> Kevin's.
>
> The problem with copyfarleft is that it actually closes down the commons,
> since it wants to exclude non-venture business from using it.
>>
>>