[p2p-research] [Open Manufacturing] Addressing Post-Scarcity Pitfalls

[Stan Rhodes]

Vinay,

I don't see much support for calling proliferation from power generation a
"significant risk," particularly if you mean someone actually blowing
something up. Since you mention dirty bombs, you don't seem to be referring
to States so much as non-State actors, but I'll cover both.

Dismantled weapons should be an increasingly bigger concern than spent
fuel.  Keep in mind the US has thousands of nukes, and the former USSR,
thousands more. Most governments now seem to know that they only need a few
nukes on hand for an effective deterrence strategy. Just the technology and
know-how is probably enough. The US will (supposedly) dismantle thousands of
nukes in the next couple decades, generating a lot of weapons waste.

Nuclear fuel is closely monitored by the IAEA in Non-proliferation Treaty
countries. For those countries not in the NPT, it's a long, hard,
highly-visible road to separating plutonium from spent fuel. We knew when N
Korea created a weaponization facility in 1990. It's hard to be sneaky about
it, even in the most secretive country in the world. N Korea continues to
rattle its saber for concessions, and currently, to distract from a major
power shift in the country. That's all a nuclear weapon is good for
nowadays.

Since States have no incentive to fire the weapons, our worry should be
non-State actors, but I don't see how they are a significant risk either.
Terrorist groups use cheap and effective tactics: assassinations,
hijackings, hostage-takings, truck and car-bombs, and coordinated shootings.
Making a nuclear weapon is high-profile (both the footprint and the
specialization needed), incredibly expensive, time-consuming, and
centralized--the last scheme a terrorist org would want.  Acquiring a
warhead is the not-much-better alternative, but every nuke-possessing
country is watching out for precisely that.

"Dirty bombs" aren't much of a concern, either. A terrorist would be better
off using a different contaminant in their bomb--something toxic, cheap, and
easily available. I suggest this short and concise article about dirty bombs
from the Federation of American Scientists:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/non-proliferation_and_arms_control/uraniumdirtybombs.html

How much medical equipment with radioactive material goes missing each year
in the world?  Would you say it's easier to get ahold of that, or spent
fuel?  Which is a more significant risk?  Consider the cobalt 60-enriched
steel coming from India this year.  Terrorists would be better off using
geiger counters in scrap yards than bothering with spent fuel.  Contaminated
steel worries me more as a general risk, not because of an attack, but
because cheap steel is everywhere and geiger counters aren't.  We're finding
it all over.

In the rest of the world, nuclear power is expanding both horizontally and
vertically: the genie can't be put back in the bottle, so we must be
reasonable in assessing risks. I'm undecided if weaponization is a bigger
risk than waste.  I thought about it a little, and considered China's poor
environmental record as a counter-example. A country with poor internal
regulation and monitoring doing something stupid with waste seems far more
likely than an attack, but the impact of an attack would probably be worse.
I need some evidence before being persuaded either way. I'm still more
worried about where China's used medical equipment goes.

-- Stan


On Sat, Jun 13, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Vinay Gupta <hexayurt at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> It's also worth keeping in mind the proliferation risk from nuclear power -
> best case is dirty bombs, using waste or fuel as a radiological contaminant.
> Worst case is real nukes.
> That's a more significant risk than waste, and it's very significant when
> we start talking about global solutions rather than, say, just America or
> Europe.
>
> Vinay
>
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