[p2p-research] Fwd: whoops - even digital and physical systems paired together fail

[Michel Bauwens]

This might be of interest:

http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance

Summary by Natalie Pang:

"Benkler argued that the commons can be divided into four types based on two
parameters.

The first parameter identified by Benkler 'is whether they are open to
anyone or only to a defined group'. Thus:

Commons type 1: If a commons is open to anyone, Benkler calls it an open
commons. Examples are the ocean, air, water, and highway systems.

Commons type 2: If a commons is open only to a defined group he calls it a
limited access commons. An example is a private golf course.

Benkler's second parameter Benkler is 'whether a commons system is regulated
or unregulated'. Thus:

Commons type 3: A commons without rules is an unregulated commons. Example:
unexplored outer space.

Commons type 4: A commons ordered by rules is a regulated commons. Examples:
Wikipedia or a library.

Benkler's typology it is clear that pairings types 1 or 2 must be paired
with types 3 or 4 in order to describe the design of a particular commons,
whether that design has emerged from tradition or whether it has been
deliberately created. So while an information commons may be manifested as a
repository of knowledge resources, its forms may differ (e.g. it may be open
to anyone/everyone and unregulated; or it may only be open to a defined
group but its use is unregulated within that group; or it may be open to
anyone/everyone but regulated in that anyone who uses it needs to adhere to
certain rules).

Source: Yochai Benchler in "The Political Economy of Commons", in Upgrade,
juin 2003, vol. IV, n° 3,
http://www.upgrade-cepis.org/issues/2003/3/up4-3Benkler.pdf
[edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance?title=Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance&action=edit&section=2>
]
Discussion [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance?title=Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance&action=edit&section=3>
]
Summary by Sam Rose:

Groups that are able to organize and govern their behavior successfully are
marked by the some basic design principles:

• Group boundaries are clearly defined. • Rules governing the use of
collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions. • Most
individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.
• The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by
external authorities. • A system for monitoring member's behavior exists;
the community members themselves undertake this monitoring. • A graduated
system of sanctions is used. • Community members have access to low-cost
conflict resolution mechanisms. • For Common Pool Resources that are parts
of larger systems: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple
layers of nested enterprises. (
http://www.communitywiki.org/en/CommunityWikiResourcePool#GoverningTheCommons)



 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance?title=Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance&action=edit&section=4>
]
Ostrom on the 9 principles of governance

Summary from Eleanor Ostrom in her book Governing the
Commons<http://p2pfoundation.net/Governing_the_Commons>at
http://www.cooperationcommons.com/Documents/EntryView?id=30

1. Group boundaries are clearly defined.

2. Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local
needs and conditions.

3. Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the
rules.

4. The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by
external authorities.

5. A system for monitoring member's behavior exists; the community members
themselves undertake this monitoring.

6. A graduated system of sanctions is used.

7. Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.


8. For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: appropriation, provision,
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. (
http://www.cooperationcommons.com/Documents/EntryView?id=30)


In chapter 4 of the book "*Inequality, Cooperation and Environmental
Sustainability*" edited by Baland, Bardhan & Bowles, Princeton University
Press, 2007., co-authored with Marco Janssen, entitled, "*Adoption of a new
regulation for the governance of common-pool resources by a heterogeneous
population*," she adds a 9th principle to the top of her list of, "crucial
foundations for self-governed resource use."

She writes:

9. Accurate information about the condition of the resource and the expected
flow of benefits and costs are available at low cost to the participants
leading to a common understanding of likely consequences of continuing the
status quo as contrasted with feasible changes in rules."


 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance?title=Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance&action=edit&section=5>
]
Against the Commons as a Resource Pool

Anthony McCann argues that seeing Commons as resources actually reinforces
their Enclosure <http://p2pfoundation.net/Enclosure>:

"discourses of "the commons" tend to be dominated by resource management
models of "the commons". It has also been suggested that a discursive
dominance of resource management models tends to be symptomatic and
constitutive of commodification and the process and practices of enclosure.
If this is the case, then it makes sense that any dominance of resource
management models in a particular discourse serves as an invitation to
further investigation. A dominance of resource management models may be
indicative not only of commodifying discourse, but of the extensions of
absolute authorities and the presence of doctrine, and of the accelerative
and intensifying impetus of enclosing dynamics. This is not necessarily so,
but is worth checking for. It is also worth checking whether the discursive
dominance of resource management notions foster and facilitate the
profoundly impactful structural blindnesses to the implications of our own
participation that also tend to be symptomatic of enclosure.

It is not inevitable that resource management models be used to speak of
"the commons". My critique of commodification and enclosure is also, then, a
critique of the use of resource management discourse as an analytic
framework for the study and critique of enclosure. This brings me to an
interesting place, for, as it happens, resource management models have
become the dominant models both for the study of enclosure and for the
promotion of notions of "the commons" or "the commons". I would suggest that
this is not a coincidence, but rather a deepening of the enclosing dynamics
that are and have been at work in these discourses, as new orthodoxies take
root and old ones are given new life through the novelties of renaming.
Foucault (1972) cautioned against academic circularity, noting that our
scholarly discourses and practices may well be systematically forming the
objects of which we speak. In and through the "discursive feedback"
identified here, I would suggest that we may, through the current
orthodoxies of "commons" discourse, systematically participate in the
dynamics that we critique." (
http://www.beyondthecommons.com/understandingenclosure.html)


 [edit<http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance?title=Commons_%E2%80%93_Governance&action=edit&section=6>
]
More Information

   1. Our general article about the
Commons<http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons>and
   Enclosure <http://p2pfoundation.net/Enclosure>
   2. Governing The Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
   Action Ostrom, Elinor http://cooperationcommons.com/node/361
   3. Hess, Charlotte http://research.iftf.net/aboutnewcommons



On Fri, Feb 13, 2009 at 6:31 AM, Kevin Carson <
free.market.anticapitalist at gmail.com> wrote:

> On 2/10/09, Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > I'm wondering if anyone care to comment on the problems with bike-sharing
> in
> > Paris, an issue relevant to commons governance,
>
> Most likely commons governance is unsuited to a group without some
> organic social cohesion, face to face acquaintance, etc.  And its
> unsuited to a situation in which the group lacks credible means of
> enforcing rules.  The classic example of common property, a village
> common, had both these things.  I vaguely recall game theory
> experiments that showed people had tendencies toward cooperation and
> altruism at least as strong as their tendencies toward competition,
> but that a society based on them could only be stable when there was
> some mechanism for enforcing reciprocity, and the members had reason
> to anticipate ongoing interactions with the same community.
>
> --
> Kevin Carson
> Mutualist Blog:  Free Market Anti-Capitalism
> http://mutualist.blogspot.com
> Studies in Mutualist Political Economy
> http://www.mutualist.org/id47.html
> Anarchist Organization Theory Project
> http://mutualist.blogspot.com/2005/12/studies-in-anarchist-theory-of.html
>
> _______________________________________________
> p2presearch mailing list
> p2presearch at listcultures.org
> http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org
>



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