[p2p-research] Fwd: online coverage of thai political crisis

[Michel Bauwens]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Facebook <notification+pjiidwm at facebookmail.com<notification%2Bpjiidwm at facebookmail.com>
>
Date: Apr 14, 2009 12:12 AM
Subject: Sunit Shrestha sent you a message on Facebook...
To: Michel Bauwens <michelsub2004 at gmail.com>

Sunit sent you a message.

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Subject: The Red Shirt Crisis Report

Dear all,

As there many international news agency might have limitations on news
sources on situation in Thailand as many news only concentrate on how the
military crack down the protesters as well as Thaksin's messages plus the
Prime minister replies.  Therefore, to bring more completeness to the
various news agencies and interested bloggers around the world, we had
compile a blog site at
http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http://redshirtreport.wordpress.com%2F  which
aggregate fact-base information from various sources on events from
yesterday 'til today on the Red Shirt Crisis, all sources are translated
from Thai to English. There are events information, pictures, videos.

We would love your feedback whether the information gathered quickly for the
site is inaccurate or not, please let us know if we need to edit or add more
info, pictures, videos. We really would like to aggregate more information
from the online citizen journalists.

Also please forward this web address so that more international news sources
and bloggers around the world will have access to more information to carry
on their reporting more comprehensively.  Again the site is
http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http://redshirtreport.wordpress.com%2F

Cheers,

Sunit
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Possible analysis of the situation, not by Sunit:


Thailand has been ruled by 100 families that descend mostly from the thai
nobility, or from powerfull thai-chinese business families. Typically, when
the nation state emerged, the nobility went into the state formations, while
business was done by Chinese families, and the serfs or former slaves became
farmers or workers. It is one of the most extreme unequal countries, leading
to perpetual social unrest after WW II, but greatly helped by sex-driven
tourism (at first, it’s now also a more traditional tourist destination),
export oriented agriculture, and manufacturing re-assembly, particularly
fuelled by the American investments to keep it away from the feared domino
effect induced by Vietnam. The state has never been very mature, and
typically elections were (and are still mostly) driven by canvassers who
could be bought (and gave money to voters), creating the result that the
investment needed to be recouped by corruption once elected. Parties were
often led by mafia-type dons (called 'influential figures' here).



Before Thaksin, the country was marked by a regular transition from military
vs. democratic governments, in the sense explained above, and when
democratic, by shifting alliances by the various party factions (most of
which, except the Democrats, never really parties in the western sense, but
temporary coalitions of powerful local politicians).



Into this volatile mix came modernizer Thaksin, who combined neoliberalism
with a keyneisan/social-democratic redistributive platform, his model being
Singapore. The problem is that though he created the first mass party and
marketing driven election, he was also very power-hungry and corrupt. This
antagonized the old ruling class; the middle class, the only to pay taxes,
became incensed by its taxes funding both corruption, but also his social
policies (they generally despise the poor). Factions of the elite, both in
business and government, were distraught by the prospect of being
permanently excluded from the spoils if the Thaksin regime became permanent,
and in particular, Thaksin’s personal popularity threatened to rival that of
the formal head of state, which was seen as very problematic.





When Thaksin decided to sell the telecom crown jewels to Singapore, this
gave the final push to create a coalition bent on ousting him. But because
his policies immensely benefited the poor (70% of the population), and they
supported him, they couldn't oust him, so resorted to a coup.



This coup was at first reluctantly accepted by the rural population, because
it was clearly seen as backed by the monarchy, and the population dearly
loves their King, both for the social policies expressed by the Royal
Foundations, and his positive role as arbiter in past crises.



But the military government proved particularly inept, and they froze most
of Thaksin’s social policies, if not outright dismantling them. But more
crucially, instead of using the moral high ground against the generally
agreed corruption, they used the legal system in clear political ways, to
outlaw the former parties on the ground of electoral violantions (instead of
just punishing the ones responsible for local failures).



When they attempted to legitimate that coup in elections, Thaksin's party
won again with an overwhelming majority. The first Thaksin-friendly
government, led by the corrupt right-wing politician Samak, did not show a
particularly population friendly policy either, but when he was legally
attacked and had to resign, and replaced by Thaksin’s brother in law, that
incensed the royalist-middle class PAD movement, which had provoked the
first coup. The opposition (called PAD, the yellow shirts) couldn't accept
it, so they launched a civil disobedience campaign, culminating in the
airport occupation, which brought the Thaksin-friendly government down.



This was done through a legal coup, backed by military threats against
dissenting parliamentarians, enough defecting from the majority to form an
alternative anti-thaksin government.



The last government by Abhisit does clearly lacked enough democratic
legitimacy, and their blunders, such as a botched attempt to outlaw organic
agriculture, will not have endeared to the farming majority.



All of this was a clear sign to the poor supporters of Thaksin, that the
system was no longer democratic in any real sense, as their popular choice
was twice disqualified. If a democratic system no longer keeps it potential
promise of allowing alternance, it is no longer a democracy. The legal
system also had become suspect because of its clear political uses, and even
the central institution of thai life, the monarchy, no longer appears as a
neutral arbiter, as there have been too many signs of side taking. This is
very worrying to the Thai elite, as it is seen as the only way to keep this
fractious country united. It is often said that because the problematic
nature of the succession, anti-Thaksin efforts became even more crucial for
them.









The status quo thus became  in turn  unacceptable to the pro-thaksin forces.
I think that when Thaksin saw that he would be destroyed, his money taken,
but that the popular support would not die down, he decided to mobilize in
the same way as the PAD, but now in the other direction, showing that no
government can be formed without the consent of his side.



The result is a blocked situation, no side strong enough to defeat the
other, and with forces around the monarchy having sided with the
anti-thaksin forces, they have lost the usual way out which his royal
arbitrage. The latter is still possible though, given the enormous credit of
the King.



However, as disciplined as the royalist PAD is, consisting of better
educated middle class professionals and a large contingent of middle-aged
women, and with a well-trained militia and support from the disciplined
Santi Asoke movement (a kind of ‘Protestant’ Buddhist reformation movement
that forms an alternative to the mainstream Sangha), as indisciplined are
the popular forces of the UDD (United Front for Democracy and against
Dictatorship). Their violent outburst does not endear them to the local
population, and they are probably a too regional movement based on Isaan in
northeastern Thailand, the poorest region, and Chiang Mai, the northern
home-state of Thaksin.



Right now, in yesterday’s editorial, while the Nation calls for a
compromise, a sensible thing to do, the Bangkok Post called out for bloody
repression. The latter newspaper is a traditional mouthpiece of the elite,
supporting Thaksin when he was in power, and now the anti-Thaksin regime,
always suppressing internal journalistic dissent against the powers that be
(they removed journalists who would report on corruption in the Thaksin
era). So their stance reflects the rage of the elite and their willingness
to repress the movement in blood if necessary. The military, tarred by past
repression, only will move if clearly backed by some political leadership
willing to take the lead. A problem of course, is that all institutions of
the Thai state are divided themselves between pro and anti-Thaksin forces.



As a interesting side note. In the eighties, the then military regime made a
deal with the communist insurgency, and a sizeable amount of the returnees
were taken in by the royal foundations, which have very progressive
social aspects (organic farming, self-suffiency orientation, more
egalitarianism than usual in this very hierarchical society, and
participation in production, at least according to my sources). The other
half went to NGO organizing, and it is these people who were attracted by
Thaksin to organize his social policies. The result that some the left is
anti-thaksin, the other half pro, which is very confusing of course. A
secret document from the Thai military confirmed that part of the motivation
for the coup, lay in this cold war interpretation of the crisis, the
military seeing the dangerous Thaksin social policies as the continuation of
their struggle against the left in that period. In that context, was the
choice of red shirts innocuous?



The PAD therefore, has some progessive elements as well, though there policy
of invalidating the popular vote, marks it as an essentially anti-democratic
movement that wants to disenfranchise the unwashed/uneducated masses
(literally, hygienic class racism is very strong here).



On the other hand, the pro-thaksin red shirts are no angels either,
containing their part of former mafia dons, corrupt politicians, and people
marching to render the Gay Pride impossible in Chiang Mai a few weeks ago
...



It would seem that in any case, the prospects of democracy are dim.



A first scenario is that there is a bloody repression, but which can only
offer temporary reprieve, as none of the underlying social problems would be
solved, and Thaksin would still be popular. The danger of this approach, is
that the popular forces would be forced to become independent, a much worse
scenario for the Thai elite. This scenario is also rendered more complicated
by the current meltdown, which means that not just the democratic hopes of
the majority would be dashed, but also their economic hopes. This makes a
Chinese scenario, an authoritarian regime compensated by high growth and
entrepreneurial freedom, hard to imagine.



The second scenario is a historical compromise between both factions, new
general elections that pro-Thaksin forces would again win, and a necessary
amnesty for the corruption crimes of Thaksin. This would not sit well with
the PAD forces. The only person who could force this scenario would be the
Thai monarch.



I think the third scenario, an outright win of the red shirts at this stage,
is highly unlikely, and they do not have enough support in the capital city.
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