Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1VyIdM-00072t-7L for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 01 Jan 2014 10:02:40 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of taplink.co designates 50.117.27.232 as permitted sender) client-ip=50.117.27.232; envelope-from=jeremy@taplink.co; helo=mail.taplink.co; Received: from mail.taplink.co ([50.117.27.232]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with smtp (Exim 4.76) id 1VyIdL-0000Ra-7O for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 01 Jan 2014 10:02:40 +0000 Received: from laptop-air.hsd1.ca.comcast.net ([192.168.168.135]) by mail.taplink.co ; Wed, 1 Jan 2014 02:06:00 -0800 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15; format=flowed; delsp=yes To: "Gregory Maxwell" , "Mike Hearn" , "Matt Corallo" References: <52A3C8A5.7010606@gmail.com> <1795f3067ba3fcdd0caf978cc59ff024.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <52A435EA.7090405@gmail.com> <201312081237.24473.luke@dashjr.org> <20131212205106.GA4572@netbook.cypherspace.org> <4264e886-48de-40ac-921a-a60502595060@email.android.com> Date: Wed, 01 Jan 2014 02:02:02 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: "Jeremy Spilman" Organization: TapLink Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <4264e886-48de-40ac-921a-a60502595060@email.android.com> User-Agent: Opera Mail/1.0 (Win32) oclient: 192.168.168.135#jeremy@taplink.co#465 X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid 0.0 T_DKIM_INVALID DKIM-Signature header exists but is not valid X-Headers-End: 1VyIdL-0000Ra-7O Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Dedicated server for bitcoin.org, your thoughts? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 01 Jan 2014 10:02:40 -0000 So I looked into gitian, the first thing I noticed was the hashes that people were signing, for example: https://github.com/bitcoin/gitian.sigs/blob/master/0.8.6-win32/gavinandresen/bitcoin-build.assert don't match the hash of the file 'bitcoin-0.8.6-win32-setup.exe' actually hosted by sourceforce. That was a bit alarming at first, but I talked to BlueMatt and maaku on IRC and the difference is due to Gavin Authenticode signing the executable for windows. BlueMatt asked if someone could implement in gitian-downloader a way to strip off the signature so that we could get back to the raw binary with a hash that matches what everyone is producing from gitian. I found: http://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/disitool/ which is a Python script which can strip the signature nicely, but the hashes still don't match. I couldn't find a gitian build of 0.8.6 so I built my own, and after verifying the hash for v0.8.6 was '49547ff9...' as expected I looked at the hex diff between that and the sig-stripped .exe from sourceforge, and the only two differences are: - At offset D8 the stripped file has '5D E2 B2' versus 'F9 F4 00' in the gitian build - The sig-stripped file has an extra byte '00' at the end I started to look at the file spec for windows PE files and quickly thought better of it. Maybe someone better informed can chime in on what those three bytes at offset D8 specify. I'm not sure if we want to patch the signature onto the gitian build, or strip the signature off of the Gavin-signed build, but something of the sort is necessary if you want get gitian-downloader to match the official distro (for Windows at least). In any case, I think wallet users want to know when an upgrade is available, and ability to click an 'update' button get a binary they can trust. It's not a problem unique to bitcoind, deterministic builds are awesome, but I don't think fully solve it. Thanks, Jeremy On Tue, 31 Dec 2013 13:33:54 -0800, Matt Corallo wrote: > We already have a wonderful system for secure updating - > gitian-downloader. We just neither use it >not bother making actual > gitian releases so anyone can use it to verify signatures of downloads.