Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [140.211.166.137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1774C0001 for ; Sat, 27 Feb 2021 19:20:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBA134F0DB for ; Sat, 27 Feb 2021 19:20:34 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 2.299 X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_DBL_SPAM=2.5] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=dtrt.org Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NdlhDl1CiI2Q for ; Sat, 27 Feb 2021 19:20:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from newmail.dtrt.org (newmail.dtrt.org [45.79.129.87]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 68DFC4F0D3 for ; Sat, 27 Feb 2021 19:20:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=dtrt.org; s=20201208; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version:References:Message-ID: Subject:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To:Cc:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID: Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc :Resent-Message-ID:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe: List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=r9d2WNO2JQ1giGWnvZt9IVzwGCgDGeOMVVg6qGDcSxQ=; b=coGdsyEW63L20+vGnxQpkVLG3f 4+DAKwZ72inUhPahZaeU4OgCirNoDnIYdusngP74Wdz6dy7vl+nipaDqiJxW6TQawBbfiQ8qxvHjF ylEGpkM0zzmdgdqU9mV74HqWxT8PTVldDmvPjEpfXoRHxyN2lSTDOhv9nPsf+sN+E2QI=; Received: from harding by newmail.dtrt.org with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lG58h-00006h-91; Sat, 27 Feb 2021 09:20:31 -1000 Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 09:19:34 -1000 From: "David A. Harding" To: Keagan McClelland , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Message-ID: <20210227191934.phk4z6k2chaefxwt@ganymede> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="dmbiwa3u2dvgu5er" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: NeoMutt/20180716 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] A design for Probabilistic Partial Pruning X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 19:20:35 -0000 --dmbiwa3u2dvgu5er Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 11:40:35AM -0700, Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev= wrote: > Hi all, Hi Keagan, > 4. Once the node's IBD is complete it would advertise this as a peer > service, advertising its seed and threshold, so that nodes could > deterministically deduce which of its peers had which blocks. Although some of the details differed, I believe this general idea of sharded block storage was previously discussed in the context of BIP159, which warns: "Peers may have different prune depths (depending on the peers configuration, disk space, etc.) which can result in a fingerprinting weakness (finding the prune depth through getdata requests). NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED supporting peers SHOULD avoid leaking the prune depth and therefore not serve blocks deeper than the signaled NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold (288 blocks)." - BIP: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0159.mediawiki#count= er-measures-for-peer-fingerprinting - Discussion thread 1: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-= dev/2017-April/014186.html - Discussion thread 2: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-= dev/2017-May/014314.html - Discussion thread 2, continued: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/piperma= il/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014186.html - BIP159-related PR, review comments: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pu= ll/10387 > If you have thoughts on >=20 > A. The protocol design itself > B. The barriers to put this kind of functionality into Core >=20 > I would love to hear from you, I think it would be unlikely for any popular node software to adopt a technique that could make specific nodes easily fingerprintable on an ongoing basis unless it solved some other urgent problem. Luke Dashjr's rough data collection currently shows 5,629 archival listening nodes,[1] which is a substantial fraction of the roughly 10,000 listening nodes reported by Addy Yeow,[2] so I don't think we're near the point of needing to worry about the unavailability of historic blocks. [1] https://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/services.html [2] https://bitnodes.io/dashboard/ However, if there's a reasonable solution to the fingerprinting problem, I do think node developers would find that very interesting. -Dave --dmbiwa3u2dvgu5er Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEgxUkqkMp0LnoXjCr2dtBqWwiadMFAmA6m0YACgkQ2dtBqWwi adMHNRAAsUgMWNimFvcTX+8kqT9htSnQ9GG/4Ie9T/MpDuNBAOcWKwFM2K3xZ4v4 BLmT8z3kUx2OrJidMxpSk52ODeqIRmExlXs0Tazq9Mae2/xrw4/y2UEtsy6+R77U 35OWQ5EaSecV7PDFQa8rqwyAyeADuIWlr+Vyt9RlFxe2FgWv15WXx5KZ73r140lH aY2L5xQnQ2s5AnhMd6NcaU3QICU/bNkORKmgTyGby84QcLVBWEw6Lq2DuzYP2DsB aafs2p40+cF/XGznAJxDBF0Nw5Iq475sHJ1r8oyGCdFCsbP7K+PYQ5aWqucPnIy8 jmL97VyBpvOxAG9ITBWnESuUnHTjbNrkARTe+CCseryf4VIvPlVKhstWpYo/ai+T LlZaEIMkc4/tEuhSnZ9tmH4vwXeJPMt95+YWdpXXb6+MBtMFioeIXZj+aSrT3TPN g5A8c9cRmQvRcMmxRyd3Z6PF/m4y7FUwf1psprlorE+TXKCXUXneyseISTce+iZ3 uRH8Ltyv2kntzrfqRx9XcVbFdOjxHpdu/wUFxS4UgNZ6+x+KxQdC+1KwQsK6ysM5 1dUfjSDzO1onowElvDc4PbPj7Z9BGvmy/jcjA6/L37wvV8WHmNw7Hd65NxDthiVC 3FHnOY5TS7B4lii2cDUaAy875NP3X2wrL0SOf8gGaKeTDeA7v9U= =aU5j -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --dmbiwa3u2dvgu5er--