Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6496C000E for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 09:17:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 84154403AA for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 09:17:10 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.899 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=voskuil-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id l-wo4H6gNXPg for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 09:17:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-pl1-x62e.google.com (mail-pl1-x62e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::62e]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5412440137 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 09:17:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pl1-x62e.google.com with SMTP id b1so1108029pls.5 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 02:17:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=voskuil-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:thread-index:content-language; bh=0ixi8VhIeXmgQGLlccnxWMU1tDJuodTqYUy4VvSDHvU=; b=V7qwbsPaAADOZ+H5//07t8wKNv1RN+Ri7lHYTHS/tjYPlb8lp+biyAvLX0hhxeOM5q 6c0TuT+7NZsD0OwyWPDXirvfJhaSsgU6IEErFBegyBs12YtXAg5XNNKbwHLyrwkHkGLt 4aSvrwO3cBkpPoDGiv/6qDzNfrEU435PDgHFbvSsBBGOkaD4nvpo9PPTuRiuXIuETlIu Z/DY7keVDU26NTBA4c+tD4z+l+1AL9ojlOwr3/VUOWswDDX1vJiyANxuefzgTPSu9m5p IarOQ8NNUs3nzwnXXS0140prT45Br2j6sQ1CkmBLaPz7g8vx8eOIc5lvHVwT+NgAGOlu +BjQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date :message-id:mime-version:thread-index:content-language; bh=0ixi8VhIeXmgQGLlccnxWMU1tDJuodTqYUy4VvSDHvU=; b=uKjuj7lUFBoFWUbyGoeZaPyVwiEvMolCci3VKs7N/meue8CWZazFX21s66iBFMPR8h nmnE3lTKjNDxP3M8C55PqDOTlqRnaBNWsnvqBS5epy0MQs4GbeqGrVmR7S6ei+BDCN37 13BJLxQosoMvVOHI+bjwgmXsTrsIqBybm8mcaS1ElHLnlAH711j/LmyHLSzj8Nv1v16e T0Tou7KgXHR9Y5GFYKKxQMCns2CJSyQBg53FugjSxYQb+7p3Y1AsQ+zEbRuZYg9paBBt xV5arLG4NcZBe7Tp4bL40vHCrgnaLF30evM5PRp36n0bVgpxpJlGOHj8Kryg8KhS/v0x 3NIw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530XwxX0Wtl554IJVQ716HuVSlw6LoQr+hBSS5T4Ago5tjHGmB3j KjNFVX1dMRS1Pddn7zGW1vZ7iIOyka7ggW1W X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwEsMwylbgEjg35T6Re3Q3ZAQSwn4Y50QWae+6VkHuEHaYo/yjQU9dmI6vU9GvwB1cK+L07Jw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:3756:: with SMTP id ne22mr3572106pjb.197.1625044628546; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 02:17:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ERICDESKTOP ([2601:600:9c00:1d0::9d25]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d13sm6177748pjr.49.2021.06.30.02.17.08 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 30 Jun 2021 02:17:08 -0700 (PDT) From: To: "'Prayank'" References: In-Reply-To: Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 02:17:08 -0700 Message-ID: <026701d76d90$b4095e30$1c1c1a90$@voskuil.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0268_01D76D56.07AC5AF0" X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 16.0 Thread-Index: AQN841F/5R39lyQc4p184su8UE1c+KfhVP1Q Content-Language: en-us Cc: 'Bitcoin Dev' Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 09:17:10 -0000 This is a multipart message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0268_01D76D56.07AC5AF0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Prayank, =20 > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in = chain split? =20 Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s = presumably why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept = of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set of rules or another. =20 > Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants = to use? =20 I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over = another, or what people want to use, nor does economics. =20 > What are different things possible in this case based on game theory? =20 I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game = theory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I = can=E2=80=99t give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a = valid game theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a = game, it=E2=80=99s a market. =20 > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling = for a soft fork begins? =20 Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings. =20 > Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling = readiness for soft fork?=20 =20 A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner = to enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the = signals of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume = that others will enforce. =20 > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or = Miners? =20 A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce = consensus rules when they reject trading for something that they = don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time two people trade both party = validates what they receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving = Bitcoin are economically relevant and their power is a function of how = much they are doing so. =20 Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners = can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring = blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is. =20 > Is soft fork signaling same as voting? =20 I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There = are many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any = of them. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given = block miner intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all. =20 > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules = enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. =20 Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn = the block reward. =20 > Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting = including some mining pools and exchanges. =20 What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined = behavior. =20 e =20 From: Prayank =20 Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM To: eric@voskuil.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork =20 Hello Eric, =20 I have few questions: =20 > Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are = off on a chain split.=20 =20 So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in = chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that = nobody wants to use? What are different things possible in this case = based on game theory?=20 =20 > And activation without majority hash power certainly does not = =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this. =20 Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling = for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post = activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork?=20 =20 > If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is = accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so = everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If = enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. = It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. = Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your vote. =20 Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or = Miners? =20 Is soft fork signaling same as voting? =20 According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules = enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. = Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting = including some mining pools and exchanges. =20 =20 --=20 Prayank ------=_NextPart_000_0268_01D76D56.07AC5AF0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi Prayank,

 

> So = majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in = chain split?

 

Any two people on different rules implies a chain = split. That=E2=80=99s presumably why rule changes are called forks. = There is no actual concept of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set = of rules or another.

 

> Why = would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to = use?

 

I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one = thing over another, or what people want to use, nor does = economics.

 

> What are different things possible in this case = based on game theory?

 

I=E2=80=99ve = seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. = People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t give you = an answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic = model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a = market.

 

> Do miners and mining pools participate in = discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins?

 

Who knows, I = don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.

 

> Can = they still mine something else post activation even if signaling = readiness for soft fork? 

 

A person can = mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner to enforce. = Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals of = others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that = others will enforce.

 

> Who = enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or = Miners?

 

A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. = Merchants enforce consensus rules when they reject trading for something = that they don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time two people trade both = party validates what they receive (not what they trade away). Those = receiving Bitcoin are economically relevant and their power is a = function of how much they are doing so.

 

Miners = censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners can = enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks. = This is what soft fork enforcement is.

 

> Is soft = fork signaling same as voting?

 

I = don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are = many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of = them. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given = block miner intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all.

 

> = According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules = enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their = work.

 

Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There = are many. They earn the block reward.

 

> = Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting = including some mining pools and exchanges.

 

What people = consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined = behavior.

 

e

 

From: Prayank = <prayank@tutanota.de>
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 = AM
To: eric@voskuil.org
Cc: Bitcoin Dev = <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: = [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for = softfork

 

Hello = Eric,

 

I = have few questions:

 

> Without majority hash power support, = activation simply means you are off on a chain split. =

 

So majority hash power not following the consensus = rules can result in chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to = mine a chain that nobody wants to use? What are different things = possible in this case based on game = theory? 

 

> And activation without majority hash power = certainly does not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D = this.

 

Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions = before signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something = else post activation even if signaling readiness for soft = fork? 

 

> If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or = otherwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to do = so). Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital = now for more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a = soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other = people. Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your = vote.

 

Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? = Full nodes or Miners?

 

Is soft fork signaling same as = voting?

 

According to my understanding, miners follow the = consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for = their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it = voting including some mining pools and = exchanges.

 

 

--

Prayank

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