Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6AEB6412 for ; Thu, 15 Jun 2017 05:04:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wr0-f177.google.com (mail-wr0-f177.google.com [209.85.128.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4601C8E for ; Thu, 15 Jun 2017 05:04:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f177.google.com with SMTP id r103so4790532wrb.0 for ; Wed, 14 Jun 2017 22:04:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=voskuil-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=+afcrprfXuMs7rA9XZK3erSzRepxENa67d+VE/+Oq8M=; b=hP/oaxj1HQFUfddqhxiRHJibTgtYHa7Zca1zOrMl4h1nf6+ZDbuVpz7gao2JPfxplJ f3GBe3edbZ3IrFpnLaPeClQMDeEdmR34KyoZE3jAvmF6+Ukl+jYRxp+XRQpk4KmBWdU1 n15dzha+Vz0ssqjNIR8VKNlcKfmosywlzjQeWw020/pJODFzskw6t2eNuCgGeQEF8QaX tWxc729znEMAl03IcbnT6gwW7geOHp3rjKZz2rcyA4kJ6uEivvimtjL4KkftBuG5/1TB 7yWkCCrflfX01d7l51F1CWjG94+aPZSuW/S4bmpYrj6PvM7AavjCSg4DgdNmqacBoOSy F96g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=+afcrprfXuMs7rA9XZK3erSzRepxENa67d+VE/+Oq8M=; b=mSH6m+EujAUMqFt5gmoWwxPvCMYFNfT8qgsFgvR+CR2jSZ0AwH5tb9cPgJNTe4ZZaq fTwXciTk3kBMFOAe4SkVkJZfGM1cDuNoRXfCgJw2625b7/YR+U2B+JhmZkJpQlsMlBAi wVos1hLHeYBcMoG1ezD0cVWkz2PaQN7hjLm4cqy4OwPnwbDS7mTnnyTakJQbxVNxh0Cd 4Bb2s8RWYfy2KC5BP4YX4yoUtZGuDCwLOCwwtlt7lT50oo8x8EtVq8lk9jwoahLjUgU+ MkR2at5pXpyvTyQe0RGF7FM89bmmy7aKpbm9bIAWUgoQg12m3x8MDHhbUtGwBFxI/JNJ zl/g== X-Gm-Message-State: AKS2vOy1MQpca/zMRscQH4s+uDlFY05nzIJd3BcP1Wsrf53UuZP+zDT2 6qF6dro4k4ep21ZSl8hH/w== X-Received: by 10.223.169.120 with SMTP id u111mr2081464wrc.203.1497503077632; Wed, 14 Jun 2017 22:04:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.0.0.87] ([41.222.62.7]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id m40sm1223736wrm.4.2017.06.14.22.04.35 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 14 Jun 2017 22:04:36 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-E31AFB64-EE44-4905-BE99-10FDFC73E173 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Eric Voskuil X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (14F89) In-Reply-To: Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 08:04:30 +0300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <95BB8EA8-31F6-4131-B557-A35342FA17A1@voskuil.org> References: <31040BE1-64ED-4D05-BCBE-E80BC7B9A182@gmail.com> To: Jameson Lopp X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HTML_MESSAGE, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 10:51:50 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 05:04:43 -0000 --Apple-Mail-E31AFB64-EE44-4905-BE99-10FDFC73E173 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev wrote: >=20 >=20 >=20 >> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin wrote: >> Hi Jameson: >>=20 >>> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJames= on Lopp =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> > =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGr= egory Maxwell =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A >>>> > >>>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev >>>> > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just >>>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8, >>>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is >>>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current >>>> > degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security >>>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system. >>>> > >>>>=20 >>>> =E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=BD= =E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=E5=BC= =83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=B9= =B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E8= =BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=A2=AB= =E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB= =AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA=E4= =B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF= =E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=AD= =96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89 >>>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP= does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) tha= t=E2=80=99s passive, they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one= . >>>>=20 >>>> =E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4= =BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A= =EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8= =A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5= =85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C= =E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA= =9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82 >>>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit= 2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point. >>>>=20 >>>> =E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=AF= =E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F >>>> Did the users have any real choice? >>>>=20 >>>> =E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC= =E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5=B0= =B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86=E6= =8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF=B9= =E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=E6=9E= =9C=E3=80=82 >>>> I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they d= o today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade. >>>=20 >>> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the= term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a f= eature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they= are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive o= r lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose t= o circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readine= ss for enforcing the new rules. >>=20 >> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But w= hat remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork? >>=20 >> I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could y= ou kindly suggest an other word for that? >>=20 >> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agre= e with this or not? >>=20 > Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number o= f communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to s= ignal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that t= o date has been arguably flawed. There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the protoc= ol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequitable in th= e context of Bitcoin. The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a vo= ice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems in w= hich they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, and t= hey expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. This i= s the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more powe= rful voice than either their proportional existence or individual participat= ion would allow. Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a state.= The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are satisfied w= ith others participating in your stead, you have left the consensus - you ha= ve no say. Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never pa= rticipated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these peop= le now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say on= consensus, but you cannot take it away from others. To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received in= exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say regarding s= oft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot contr= ol miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control the economy's= determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must parti= cipate in the respective operation. e > Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossibl= e, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not v= oice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules. >=20 > Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described= as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actua= l power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node is f= ree to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules other= entities are enforcing.=20 >>> =20 >>>>=20 >>>> =E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9= =EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4= =9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4= =B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=87=E5=88=86= =E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82 >>>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% maj= ority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that get rid o= f miners. >>>>=20 >>>> =E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1= =E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=B8= =8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=E7= =9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82 >>>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for= upcoming protocol upgrade. >>>>=20 >>>> =E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=94= =E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=88= =B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90=E4= =BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF= =E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9= =A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7= =9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=82 >>>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service= provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as desi= gned in the white paper? >>>>=20 >>> =20 >>> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white pa= per refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determi= ning the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain for= ks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain am= ongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoi= n ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entit= y) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce. >>>=20 >>=20 >> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 tempora= rily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they dislike th= e idea, they can leave as always. >>=20 > =46rom my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirm= ing transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fo= rk, yes.=20 >>=20 >> Regards >>=20 >> LIN Zheming >>=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --Apple-Mail-E31AFB64-EE44-4905-BE99-10FDFC73E173 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Jun 1= 4, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org= > wrote:


On Wed, Jun 14, 2= 017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Jameson:

=E5= =9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJameson Lopp= <jameson.lop= p@gmail.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A



On Wed, J= un 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-= dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=881= 4=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A=
>
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-de= v
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> The enforcement of the system's r= ules by users broadly, and not just
> miners, is specifically describe= d in the white paper (section 8,
> paragraph 2, it especially clear in= the last sentence).  This is
> critical for the security of Bitc= oin especially with the current
> degree of centralization in pools.&n= bsp; Without it, Bitcoin's security
> would look a lot more like the R= ipple system.
>

=E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88= =B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5= =8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=E5=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82= =E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99= =E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C= =89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6= =88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5=E9=81=93=E5= =BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82= =EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A= =8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89
Yes, users alwa= ys have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does=E2=80=99t go a= gainst them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that=E2=80=99s passive,= they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one.

=E8=BF=99=E4= =B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4= =B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85= =E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A= =84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E6=89= =A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=85=AB=E5= =85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=8D=87= =E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82
This BIP c= an be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2= =80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point.

=E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88= =91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6= =8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F
Did the users have any real ch= oice?

=E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96= =E4=BB=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC= =88=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4= =BD=86=E6=8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5= =B7=A5=E5=AF=B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8= =E7=BB=93=E6=9E=9C=E3=80=82
I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the= majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol= upgrade.

To be c= lear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term "voti= ng" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has= been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready= to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passive or lazy" o= r wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circum= vent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for e= nforcing the new rules.

=
How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. Bu= t what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the for= k?

I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D= is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?

I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not= . Do you agree with this or not?

Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their= opinion on any number of communication platforms. Though if you're looking f= or a way for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every p= roposal for doing that to date has been arguably flawed.

There is exactly one way to expre= ss one's opinion on consensus at the protocol level - participation. The met= hod is neither flawed nor inequitable in the context of Bitcoin.
<= br>
The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied wi= th having a voice limited to their participation. People are used to politic= al systems in which they vote using their existence as power, not their part= icipation, and they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control a= ll others. This is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the r= ulers a more powerful voice than either their proportional existence or indi= vidual participation would allow.

Bitcoin exists in= defiance of political models. It is a market, not a state. The only choice y= ou have is to participate or leave. If you are satisfied with others partici= pating in your stead, you have left the consensus - you have no say.

Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin ha= ve either never participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrende= red it, these people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always r= eclaim your say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.
=

To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate= Bitcoin received in exchange for something else of economic value. To have y= our say regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard= forks cannot control miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot co= ntrol the economy's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in ei= ther one must participate in the respective operation.

<= div>e
Measuring meatspace consensus i= s pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that= the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter o= f consensus rules.

Most attempts at measuring user c= onsensus would probably be best described as signaling rather than voting gi= ven that the act of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every u= ser who runs a fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which= the agree regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing. 
 

=E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8= =E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98= =AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5= =A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF= =E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4= =E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82
This choice for wallet users right n= ow, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they= can have their fork that get rid of miners.

=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB= =96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9= =82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F= =E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94= =B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82
If they do trust the majority miners, they sta= y and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.

=E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5= =E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A= =84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6= =9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81= =E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88= =E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F= =8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6= =8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=82
So the questions is: Do the bi= tcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, (still) hav= e faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white paper?
<= br>
 
There is a fundamental misconce= ption regarding this point - the white paper refers to majority hashpower ne= eding to be honest with regard to determining the correct chain within the c= ontext of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using ha= shpower to determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number= of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not= have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the co= nsensus rules they wish to enforce.


Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just i= nvalids tx version 1 temporarily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D= right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as always.

=46rom my understanding, if the only= change miners make is to stop confirming transactions that have a version l= ess than X then it should be a soft fork, yes. 
<= div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space">

Regards

LIN Zheming
=


____________________= ___________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list<= br>bitcoin-de= v@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation= .org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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