Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YsC5F-00078j-Ln for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 12 May 2015 15:27:01 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.192.181 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.192.181; envelope-from=gappleto97@gmail.com; helo=mail-pd0-f181.google.com; Received: from mail-pd0-f181.google.com ([209.85.192.181]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YsC5E-0005gz-OA for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 12 May 2015 15:27:01 +0000 Received: by pdbnk13 with SMTP id nk13so16695956pdb.0 for ; Tue, 12 May 2015 08:26:55 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.70.100.230 with SMTP id fb6mr29244323pdb.29.1431444415068; Tue, 12 May 2015 08:26:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.66.85.165 with HTTP; Tue, 12 May 2015 08:26:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.66.85.165 with HTTP; Tue, 12 May 2015 08:26:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 11:26:55 -0400 Message-ID: From: gabe appleton To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c1fb08e03f4a0515e41f78 X-Spam-Score: -0.3 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (gappleto97[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.2 FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT Envelope-from freemail username ends in digit (gappleto97[at]gmail.com) 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YsC5E-0005gz-OA Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed additional options for pruned nodes X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 15:27:01 -0000 --001a11c1fb08e03f4a0515e41f78 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hi, There's been a lot of talk in the rest of the community about how the 20MB step would increase storage needs, and that switching to pruned nodes (partially) would reduce network security. I think I may have a solution. There could be a hybrid option in nodes. Selecting this would do the following: Flip the --no-wallet toggle Select a section of the blockchain to store fully (percentage based, possibly on hash % sections?) Begin pruning all sections not included in 2 The idea is that you can implement it similar to how a Koorde is done, in that the network will decide which sections it retrieves. So if the user prompts it to store 50% of the blockchain, it would look at its peers, and at their peers (if secure), and choose the least-occurring options from them. This would allow them to continue validating all transactions, and still store a full copy, just distributed among many nodes. It should overall have little impact on security (unless I'm mistaken), and it would significantly reduce storage needs on a node. It would also allow for a retroactive --max-size flag, where it will prune until it is at the specified size, and continue to prune over time, while keeping to the sections defined by the network. What sort of side effects or network vulnerabilities would this introduce? I know some said it wouldn't be Sybil resistant, but how would this be less so than a fully pruned node? --001a11c1fb08e03f4a0515e41f78 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,

There's been a lot of talk in the rest of the community = about how the 20MB step would increase storage needs, and that switching to= pruned nodes (partially) would reduce network security. I think I may have= a solution.

There could be a hybrid option in nodes. Selecting this woul= d do the following:
Flip the --no-wallet toggle
Select a section of the blockchain to store fully (percentage based, possib= ly on hash % sections?)
Begin pruning all sections not included in 2
The idea is that you can implement it similar to how a Koorde is done, in t= hat the network will decide which sections it retrieves. So if the user pro= mpts it to store 50% of the blockchain, it would look at its peers, and at = their peers (if secure), and choose the least-occurring options from them.<= /p>

This would allow them to continue validating all transaction= s, and still store a full copy, just distributed among many nodes. It shoul= d overall have little impact on security (unless I'm mistaken), and it = would significantly reduce storage needs on a node.

It would also allow for a retroactive --max-size flag, where= it will prune until it is at the specified size, and continue to prune ove= r time, while keeping to the sections defined by the network.

What sort of side effects or network vulnerabilities would t= his introduce? I know some said it wouldn't be Sybil resistant, but how= would this be less so than a fully pruned node?

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