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From: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 13:35:28 -0400
Message-ID: <CAFp6fsHVdyK1xROa8jgq-cZFMrrXX-uZqkoNsS-C0B5AqG4KcA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] On mempool policy consistency
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I have more to say on this broader topic, but since you've brought up this
particular example I think it's worth commenting:

On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:23 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Is that true? Antoine claims [1] that opt-in RBF isn't enough to avoid
> a DoS issue when utxos are jointly funded by untrusting partners, and,
> aiui, that's the main motivation for addressing this now.
>
> [1]
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html
>
> The scenario he describes is: A, B, C create a tx:
>
>   inputs: A1, B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]
>   fees: normal
>   outputs:
>     [lightning channel, DLC, etc, who knows]
>
> they all analyse the tx, and agree it looks great; however just before
> publishing it, A spams the network with an alternative tx, double
> spending her input:
>
>   inputs: A1 [does not opt in to RBF]
>   fees: low
>   outputs: A
>
> If A gets the timing right, that's bad for B and C because they've
> populated their mempool with the 1st transaction, while everyone else
> sees the 2nd one instead; and neither tx will replace the other. B and
> C can't know that they should just cancel their transaction, eg:
>
>   inputs: B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]
>   fees: 50% above normal
>   outputs:
>     [smaller channel, refund, whatever]
>
> and might instead waste time trying to fee bump the tx to get it mined,
> or similar.
>
> What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to
> solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available?
>

I think this is not a real example of a DoS vector that is available
because we support non-rbf signaling transactions. Even in a world where
all transactions are replaceable, person A could double-spend their input
in a way that is annoying for B and C.  For instance, the double-spend
could be low-feerate and large, and effectively pin any attempt to replace
it.  Or it could be higher feerate and confirm and B/C have to start all
over.  Or, A could stall things in the signing phase and B/C have to figure
out when to give up on the channel with A.

So I find this example to be unconvincing.  Are there any other examples
where having a non-replacement policy for some transactions causes problems
for protocols people are trying to build?

Thanks,
Suhas

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I have more to say on this broader topic,=
 but since you&#39;ve brought up this particular example I think it&#39;s w=
orth commenting:=C2=A0</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 1:23 PM Anthony Towns via bit=
coin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitco=
in-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Is that true? Antoine claims [1] that opt-=
in RBF isn&#39;t enough to avoid<br>
a DoS issue when utxos are jointly funded by untrusting partners, and,<br>
aiui, that&#39;s the main motivation for addressing this now.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/20=
21-May/003033.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linu=
xfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html</a><br>
<br>
The scenario he describes is: A, B, C create a tx:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 inputs: A1, B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]<br>
=C2=A0 fees: normal<br>
=C2=A0 outputs:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [lightning channel, DLC, etc, who knows]<br>
<br>
they all analyse the tx, and agree it looks great; however just before<br>
publishing it, A spams the network with an alternative tx, double<br>
spending her input:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 inputs: A1 [does not opt in to RBF]<br>
=C2=A0 fees: low<br>
=C2=A0 outputs: A<br>
<br>
If A gets the timing right, that&#39;s bad for B and C because they&#39;ve<=
br>
populated their mempool with the 1st transaction, while everyone else<br>
sees the 2nd one instead; and neither tx will replace the other. B and<br>
C can&#39;t know that they should just cancel their transaction, eg:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 inputs: B1, C1 [opts in to RBF]<br>
=C2=A0 fees: 50% above normal<br>
=C2=A0 outputs:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [smaller channel, refund, whatever]<br>
<br>
and might instead waste time trying to fee bump the tx to get it mined,<br>
or similar.<br>
<br>
What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to<br>
solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available?<br></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>I think this is not a real example of a DoS vector that=
 is available because we support non-rbf signaling transactions. Even in a =
world where all transactions are replaceable, person A could double-spend t=
heir input in a way that is annoying for B and C.=C2=A0 For instance, the d=
ouble-spend could be low-feerate and large, and effectively pin any attempt=
 to replace it.=C2=A0 Or it could be higher feerate and confirm and B/C hav=
e to start all over.=C2=A0 Or, A could stall things in the signing phase an=
d B/C have to figure out when to give up on the channel with A.</div><div><=
br></div><div>So I find this example to be unconvincing.=C2=A0 Are there an=
y other examples where having a non-replacement policy for some transaction=
s causes problems for protocols people are trying to build?</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Suhas</div></div></div>

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