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[2607:f8b0:4864:20::f31]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id co6-20020a056820238600b005aa1c0eb48asi692359oob.1.2024.04.15.11.58.24 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 15 Apr 2024 11:58:24 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of keagan.mcclelland@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::f31 as permitted sender) client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::f31; Received: by mail-qv1-xf31.google.com with SMTP id 6a1803df08f44-6964b1c529cso23306536d6.0 for ; Mon, 15 Apr 2024 11:58:24 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6214:11a2:b0:699:2df2:b106 with SMTP id u2-20020a05621411a200b006992df2b106mr10953237qvv.23.1713207504419; Mon, 15 Apr 2024 11:58:24 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Keagan McClelland Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 12:58:13 -0600 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Draft BIP for User-Defined Transaction Flags Policy & Strategy To: Bitcoin Error Log Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000ba46b006162734cf" X-Original-Sender: keagan.mcclelland@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20230601 header.b=fZpJA+Ab; spf=pass (google.com: domain of keagan.mcclelland@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::f31 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=keagan.mcclelland@gmail.com; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) --000000000000ba46b006162734cf Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Gaming this out a few iterations, I'm pretty sure a widely deployed DNR policy will result in a proliferation of direct-to-miner transaction submissions and will result in less network-wide visibility of the transaction set that is staged for confirmation. At first it seems reasonable to assume that users can help block the propagation of a hypothetical DNR replacement, but the miners ultimately are unlikely to make this choice in practice. The only argument you can fall back on here is that Miners openly defying user desires will ultimately result in stagnant or negative BTC growth which is bad for their long term, but I think that argument is pretty weak in this context. Relying on DNR type behavior in applications will definitely be insecure, but I think fighting to do it anyway has even more distortion effects that we are unlikely to want in the long run. Keags On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 9:16=E2=80=AFAM Bitcoin Error Log wrote: > *Posted here:* > https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/balls/blob/main/balls-00= 138.md > > *Full text here:* > > BIP: XXXX > Title: User-Defined Transaction Flags Policy & Strategy > Author: John Carvalho > Type: Standards Track > Created: Apr 15, 2024 > Status: Draft > Abstract > > This BIP introduces a utility-optimized strategy for Bitcoin mempool > policy with new transaction signaling mechanisms, including Do-Not-Replac= e > (DNR) and Replace-by-Fee (RBF), to enhance control over transaction > handling and improve the network's economic efficiency. > Motivation > > Enhancing user autonomy and network efficiency through precise, > user-defined transaction signals that integrate seamlessly with Bitcoin's > decentralized nature and existing economic models. > Specification Transaction Signals > > - > > Do-Not-Replace (DNR): Ensures transactions are not replaced once > broadcast. This flag is encoded using a specific bit in the transactio= n=E2=80=99s > version field, similar to RBF, but with inverse logic. > - > > Replace-by-Fee (RBF): Allows the sender to signal that the transaction > may be replaced by another transaction with a higher fee. This mechani= sm is > used to increase the likelihood of a transaction being picked up by mi= ners > in conditions of high network congestion, ensuring timely processing. > > Encoding > > The new flag signal, DNR, could be encoded similarly to existing RBF > flags, with complementary mempool handling and conflict-resolution logic > for default local enforcement. > > > Rationale > > Addresses the need for predictable transaction handling while respecting > the decentralized, incentive-driven nature of network participants. > > Note: This proposal only discusses subjective, arbitrary mempool policy > and handling. It is assumed that any local policy that enforces preferred > hardware limits is out of scope and remains separately necessary. > Strategic Options for Mempool Evolution > > There are three strategic options for evolving the Bitcoin mempool > management, where only one should be optimized: > > > - > > User-defined (The ideal, optimistic option): This approach involves > creating and default-obeying various transaction flags like RBF and DN= R to > facilitate specific goals of transactors. The primary tradeoff is that > these flags are suggestions and can be overridden by miners, which mea= ns > they are not enforceable but serve as strong hints to improve transact= ion > predictability and network efficiency. > - > - > > Node-defined (The chaotic, centralizing option): This strategy would > encourage third-party mempool providers to implement their subjective > preferences on transaction facilitation. The significant tradeoff here= is > the potential fracturing of the mempool and private, mining-pool-centr= ic > inclusion requirements, which could lead to increased centralization a= nd > censorship. > - > - > > Miner-defined (The rational, pessimistic option): The final strategy > involves removing all policies and flags, allowing miners to decide ba= sed > on transaction fees or other out-of-band terms. This approach simplifi= es > the network at the cost of significantly reducing the utility for user= s who > may need special handling for their transactions. > > Arguments for User-Definition > > Option 1 is favored here because it provides a balanced approach that > enhances user experience and network functionality without overly > complicating the Bitcoin protocol or risking centralization. By > standardizing flags that indicate user preferences, we can achieve greate= r > harmony and utility within the Bitcoin network, supporting diverse user > needs while maintaining decentralization. > > More importantly, we may be able to prevent mempool fragmentation and > privatization to miners and pools for direct transaction inclusion by > intentionally supporting flags that better compete and match transaction > use cases within the open mempool network instead of censoring them > arbitrarily. > > > Economic Implications > > The introduction of these signals could influence transaction fee markets > and network congestion patterns: > > - > > DNR potentially improves next-block fee competition and improves > network throughput by providing clearer signals about transaction > permanence and relevance. > - > > RBF allows for dynamic fee adjustments that can enhance the certainty > of transaction confirmations during peak times, benefiting users who n= eed > timely processing. > > Do-Not-Replace (DNR) Use Cases > > DNR is valuable in scenarios where transaction finality is crucial upon > submission, without the risk of later alterations due to increased fees. > Here are some specific use cases: > > - > > Point-of-Sale Transactions: > - > > Example: Retailers or service providers accepting Bitcoin in a > face-to-face setting need transactions to be final immediately to p= revent > fraud. > - > > Usage: By using the DNR flag, merchants can ensure that once a > transaction is broadcast, it cannot be replaced, thereby securing t= he > payment process at the point of sale. > - > > Wage Payments: > - > > Example: Employers paying salaries in Bitcoin require certainty > that the transaction amounts cannot be altered once sent. > - > > Usage: DNR provides employers the confidence to execute payroll > transactions knowing that the payments cannot be replaced or cancel= ed, > ensuring employees receive the exact intended amounts. > - > > Automated Payments for Services: > - > > Example: Subscription services where automated payments are > scheduled and should not be subject to change once initiated. > - > > Usage: DNR can be applied to ensure that automated recurring > payments are processed without the risk of being replaced, thus sim= plifying > financial planning and contract enforcement. > > Replace-by-Fee (RBF) Use Cases > > RBF is essential for transactions where timing and confirmation speed are > more critical than the immediacy of finality. Here are applicable scenari= os: > > - > > High-Frequency Trading: > - > > Example: Traders on cryptocurrency exchanges who need to rapidly > adjust their positions based on market conditions. > - > > Usage: RBF allows traders to increase the fee on a transaction if > it's not getting confirmed quickly enough, enabling them to ensure = timely > executions in response to market movements. > - > > Emergency Service Payments: > - > > Example: Payments for time-sensitive services, such as premium fast > delivery or emergency technical services. > - > > Usage: When quick service delivery is critical, RBF enables the > sender to increase the transaction fee to speed up the confirmation > process, ensuring that the transaction is prioritized by miners. > - > > Bidding in Auctions: > - > > Example: Participants in online auctions who need to ensure their > payments go through before the auction closes. > - > > Usage: Auction participants can use RBF to adjust their transaction > fees to outpace other transactions in times of network congestion, = securing > their winning bids. > - > > Dynamic Fee Management for Wallets: > - > > Example: Users sending non-urgent transactions who want to minimize > fees but are willing to increase them if network conditions change. > - > > Usage: RBF provides flexibility, allowing users to start with a > lower fee and only increase it if the transaction confirmation is d= elayed, > optimizing their transaction fee expenditures. > > Adoption and Transition Strategy & Requirements > > It is implicit, until now, that within this strategy is a requirement for > Core and other implementations to abandon strategies within Option 2, by > specifically removing and rejecting policy tools like mempoolfullrbf, or > other attempts to overrule, filter, or otherwise filter and hamper the > propagation of valid, non-destructive transactions. > > This proposal is presented to the community for feedback, focusing on > gathering input from wallet developers, miners, and node operators to > ensure broad support and understanding of the benefits and implications o= f > these new transaction signals. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/cc812488-9da0-4595-be3b-bcfd= 7ab41106n%40googlegroups.com > > . > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/= bitcoindev/CALeFGL3Vu_RLvUjfHUec3M6aYdBND0Nf4%3DDdm2zEn%3D20DtZxqg%40mail.g= mail.com. --000000000000ba46b006162734cf Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Gaming this out a few iterations, I'm pretty sure a wi= dely deployed DNR policy will result in a proliferation of direct-to-miner = transaction submissions and will result in less network-wide visibility of = the transaction set that is staged for confirmation. At first it seems reas= onable to assume that users can help block the propagation of a hypothetica= l DNR replacement, but the miners ultimately are unlikely to make this choi= ce in practice. The only argument you can fall back on here is that Miners = openly defying user desires will ultimately result in stagnant or negative = BTC growth which is bad for their long term, but I think that argument is p= retty weak in this context.

Relying on DNR type behavior= in applications will definitely be insecure, but I think fighting to do it= anyway has even more distortion effects that we are unlikely to want in th= e long run.

Keags

On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 9:1= 6=E2=80=AFAM Bitcoin Error Log <bitcoinerrorlog@gmail.com> wrote:
Posted here: https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/balls/blob/mai= n/balls-00138.md

Full text here:

BIP: XXXX
Title: User-Defined Transaction Flags Policy &= amp; Strategy
Author: John Carvalho
Type: Standards TrackCreated: Apr 15, 2024
Status: Draft

Abstract

This BIP introduces a utility= -optimized strategy for Bitcoin mempool policy with new transaction signali= ng mechanisms, including Do-Not-Replace (DNR) and Replace-by-Fee (RBF), to = enhance control over transaction handling and improve the network's eco= nomic efficiency.

Motivation

Enhancing user autonomy a= nd network efficiency through precise, user-defined transaction signals tha= t integrate seamlessly with Bitcoin's decentralized nature and existing= economic models.

Specification Transaction Signals

  • Do-Not-Replace (D= NR): Ensures transactions are not replaced o= nce broadcast. This flag is encoded using a specific bit in the transaction= =E2=80=99s version field, similar to RBF, but with inverse logic.

  • Replace-by-Fee (RBF): Allows the sender to signal that the transaction may be= replaced by another transaction with a higher fee. This mechanism is used = to increase the likelihood of a transaction being picked up by miners in co= nditions of high network congestion, ensuring timely processing.

Encoding

The new flag signal, DNR, could = be encoded similarly to existing RBF flags, with complementary mempool hand= ling and conflict-resolution logic for default local enforcement.


=

Rationale

Addresses the need for predi= ctable transaction handling while respecting the decentralized, incentive-d= riven nature of network participants.


Note: This= proposal only discusses subjective, arbitrary mempool policy and handling.= It is assumed that any local policy that enforces preferred hardware limit= s is out of scope and remains separately necessary.

Strategic Options for Mempool Evolution

There are t= hree strategic options for evolving the Bitcoin mempool management, where o= nly one should be optimized:


  • User-defined (The ideal, o= ptimistic option): This approach involves cr= eating and default-obeying various transaction flags like RBF and DNR to fa= cilitate specific goals of transactors. The primary tradeoff is that these = flags are suggestions and can be overridden by miners, which means they are= not enforceable but serve as strong hints to improve transaction predictab= ility and network efficiency.


  • Node-defined (T= he chaotic, centralizing option): This strat= egy would encourage third-party mempool providers to implement their subjec= tive preferences on transaction facilitation. The significant tradeoff here= is the potential fracturing of the mempool and private, mining-pool-centri= c inclusion requirements, which could lead to increased centralization and = censorship.

  • <= br>

  • Miner-defined (The rational, pess= imistic option): The final strategy involves= removing all policies and flags, allowing miners to decide based on transa= ction fees or other out-of-band terms. This approach simplifies the network= at the cost of significantly reducing the utility for users who may need s= pecial handling for their transactions.

Arguments for User-Definition

Option 1 is= favored here because it provides a balanced approach that enhances user ex= perience and network functionality without overly complicating the Bitcoin = protocol or risking centralization. By standardizing flags that indicate us= er preferences, we can achieve greater harmony and utility within the Bitco= in network, supporting diverse user needs while maintaining decentralizatio= n.=C2=A0


More importantly, we may be able to prevent mempool fragm= entation and privatization to miners and pools for direct transaction inclu= sion by intentionally supporting flags that better compete and match transa= ction use cases within the open mempool network instead of censoring them a= rbitrarily.


Economic Implications

The intr= oduction of these signals could influence transaction fee markets and netwo= rk congestion patterns:

  • DNR potentially improves next-block fee competiti= on and improves network throughput by providing clearer signals about trans= action permanence and relevance.

  • RBF allow= s for dynamic fee adjustments that can enhance the certainty of transaction= confirmations during peak times, benefiting users who need timely processi= ng.

Do-Not-Replace (DNR) Use Cases

DNR is valuable in scenarios where transaction finality is crucial upon = submission, without the risk of later alterations due to increased fees. He= re are some specific use cases:

  • Point-of-Sale Transactions:

    • Example: Retailers or service providers accept= ing Bitcoin in a face-to-face setting need transactions to be final immedia= tely to prevent fraud.

    • Usage: By using the= DNR flag, merchants can ensure that once a transaction is broadcast, it ca= nnot be replaced, thereby securing the payment process at the point of sale= .

  • <= p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" r= ole=3D"presentation">Wage Payments:

    • Example: Employ= ers paying salaries in Bitcoin require certainty that the transaction amoun= ts cannot be altered once sent.

    • Usage: DNR= provides employers the confidence to execute payroll transactions knowing = that the payments cannot be replaced or canceled, ensuring employees receiv= e the exact intended amounts.

  • Au= tomated Payments for Services:

    • Example: Subscription services where automat= ed payments are scheduled and should not be subject to change once initiate= d.

    • Usage: DNR can be applied to ensure tha= t automated recurring payments are processed without the risk of being repl= aced, thus simplifying financial planning and contract enforcement.

Replace-by-Fee (RBF) Use C= ases

RBF is essential for transactions where timing and confirmatio= n speed are more critical than the immediacy of finality. Here are applicab= le scenarios:

  • High-Frequency Trading:

    • Example: Traders on cryptocurrenc= y exchanges who need to rapidly adjust their positions based on market cond= itions.

    • Usage: RBF allows traders to incr= ease the fee on a transaction if it's not getting confirmed quickly eno= ugh, enabling them to ensure timely executions in response to market moveme= nts.

  • Emergency Service Payments:=

    • Example: Payments for time-sensitive services, such as premium fast delive= ry or emergency technical services.

    • Usage:= When quick service delivery is critical, RBF enables the sender to increas= e the transaction fee to speed up the confirmation process, ensuring that t= he transaction is prioritized by miners.

  • Bidding in Auctions:

    • Example: Participants in online auctions = who need to ensure their payments go through before the auction closes.

    • Usage: Auction participants can use RBF to ad= just their transaction fees to outpace other transactions in times of netwo= rk congestion, securing their winning bids.

  • Dynamic Fee Management for Wallets:

    • Example: Users sending non= -urgent transactions who want to minimize fees but are willing to increase = them if network conditions change.

    • Usage: = RBF provides flexibility, allowing users to start with a lower fee and only= increase it if the transaction confirmation is delayed, optimizing their t= ransaction fee expenditures.

Adoption and Transition Strategy & Req= uirements

It is implicit, until now,= that within this strategy is a requirement for Core and other implementati= ons to abandon strategies within Option 2, by specifically removing and rej= ecting policy tools like m= empoolfullrbf, or other attempts to overru= le, filter, or otherwise filter and hamper the propagation of valid, non-de= structive transactions.


This proposal is presented to the communit= y for feedback, focusing on gathering input from wallet developers, miners,= and node operators to ensure broad support and understanding of the benefi= ts and implications of these new transaction signals.


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