Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0C138BC3 for ; Mon, 13 Jul 2015 17:33:36 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f180.google.com (mail-lb0-f180.google.com [209.85.217.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD380110 for ; Mon, 13 Jul 2015 17:33:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lblf12 with SMTP id f12so59585143lbl.2 for ; Mon, 13 Jul 2015 10:33:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=ZXq250qsIimZcVztK4yAHgQrcDqjAWoFArsl8Fkc6WU=; b=PXqRiUKFD4ItcPWuNMBkE81PGKC5xkht+gPlFfM2laW5x8R2NClv6e8xxPWJ2+0/wP wHoRzqCIRuHflS5t6tO72f4fcyDwhksact1ElWLZSJU1B6LZ5+jYmxO5Ls/N3lpS2Hc3 CZXx/Fl/d+qlAJz69s9uJN1biDoXkFG9e2Tg2ZF6RvsCa3neqvpe/taaxT1ag0VZbQwk 4YC8Bt4SpplJHPuYqw4XJW6dsRvQ6cEAvYHK7Q4ZwJioQ+uE+y7tczD9JTICjWG9tfp6 xJjvKtQ/9PDVhTmRBhNHvyxiU1u8ZySWvCZYPS86faZgp7oxs1mgXDOXBoo7rBdSZG/p l9Sw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.63.201 with SMTP id i9mr33263167lbs.93.1436808811705; Mon, 13 Jul 2015 10:33:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.112.53.5 with HTTP; Mon, 13 Jul 2015 10:33:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.112.53.5 with HTTP; Mon, 13 Jul 2015 10:33:31 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150713160453.GB19337@savin.petertodd.org> References: <20150713160453.GB19337@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 10:33:31 -0700 Message-ID: From: Eric Lombrozo To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c3f386d501a6051ac51e5f X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] SPV Mining reveals a problematic incentive issue. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 17:33:36 -0000 --001a11c3f386d501a6051ac51e5f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 11:24:48AM +0200, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > > All miners should validate transactions precisely because of the latest > > attack you've described. Full miners can gain a lot from this attack to > > leverage their full validation against spv miners who blindly spend > energy > > hashing on top of something that may be worthless crap. SPV mining make= s > no > > sense, but some miners claim they're doind it for very short periods of > > time, which shouldn't be as bad as doing it all the time. > > > > I think it would be more rational for them to keep mining on top of the > old > > block until they've fully validated the new block (which shouldn't take > so > > long anyway), even if this slightly increases the orphan rate. > > You're missing something really critical about what F2Pool/AntPool were > (are?) doing: They're finding out about new blocks not by getting block > headers from just anywhere, but by connecting to other pools' via > stratum anonymously and determining what block hash they're telling the > hashers at the pool to work on. (e.g. what prevblockhash is in the block > header of shares being generated) > > If other pools try to fake this information they're immediately and > directly losing money, because they're telling their own hashers to make > invalid blocks. This of course has a high chance of being detected, and > can easily be FUDed into "STOP MINING AT FOO POOL!" reardless of what > the ivory tower game theory might say. The only hope the pools have is > to somehow identify which connections correspond to other pools with > high reliability and target just those connections - good luck on that. > > > Anyway, all this concern about SPV mining is misguided: relying purely > on SPV w/ low #'s of confirmations just isn't very smart. What SPV can > do - at least while the inflation subsidy is still high - is give > reasonable protection against your third-party-run trusted full nodes > from lying to you, simply because doing so has well-defined costs in > terms of energy to create fake blocks. Targetting enough people at once > to make a fake block a worthwhile investment is difficult, particularly > when you take into account how timing works in the defenders favor - the > attacker probably only has a small % of hashing power, so they're going > to wait a long time to find their fake block. Between that and a trusted > third party-run full node you're probably reasonably safe, for now. > > -- > 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > 0000000000000000086007e31decd6eb80e07f77271ef50c69e1e6342161f4e5 > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11c3f386d501a6051ac51e5f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 11:24:48AM +0200, Jo= rge Tim=C3=B3n wrote:
> All miners should validate transactions precisely because of the lates= t
> attack you've described. Full miners can gain a lot from this atta= ck to
> leverage their full validation against spv miners who blindly spend en= ergy
> hashing on top of something that may be worthless crap. SPV mining mak= es no
> sense, but some miners claim they're doind it for very short perio= ds of
> time, which shouldn't be as bad as doing it all the time.
>
> I think it would be more rational for them to keep mining on top of th= e old
> block until they've fully validated the new block (which shouldn&#= 39;t take so
> long anyway), even if this slightly increases the orphan rate.

You're missing something really critical about what F2Pool/AntPool were=
(are?) doing: They're finding out about new blocks not by getting block=
headers from just anywhere, but by connecting to other pools' via
stratum anonymously and determining what block hash they're telling the=
hashers at the pool to work on. (e.g. what prevblockhash is in the block header of shares being generated)

If other pools try to fake this information they're immediately and
directly losing money, because they're telling their own hashers to mak= e
invalid blocks. This of course has a high chance of being detected, and
can easily be FUDed into "STOP MINING AT FOO POOL!" reardless of = what
the ivory tower game theory might say. The only hope the pools have is
to somehow identify which connections correspond to other pools with
high reliability and target just those connections - good luck on that.


Anyway, all this concern about SPV mining is misguided: relying purely
on SPV w/ low #'s of confirmations just isn't very smart. What SPV = can
do - at least while the inflation subsidy is still high - is give
reasonable protection against your third-party-run trusted full nodes
from lying to you, simply because doing so has well-defined costs in
terms of energy to create fake blocks. Targetting enough people at once
to make a fake block a worthwhile investment is difficult, particularly
when you take into account how timing works in the defenders favor - the attacker probably only has a small % of hashing power, so they're going=
to wait a long time to find their fake block. Between that and a trusted third party-run full node you're probably reasonably safe, for now.

--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
0000000000000000086007e31decd6eb80e07f77271ef50c69e1e6342161f4e5

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