Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Vy0Ej-0002tL-OH for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 31 Dec 2013 14:24:01 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.219.41 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.219.41; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com; helo=mail-oa0-f41.google.com; Received: from mail-oa0-f41.google.com ([209.85.219.41]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Vy0Ei-00077C-U4 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 31 Dec 2013 14:24:01 +0000 Received: by mail-oa0-f41.google.com with SMTP id j17so13226853oag.28 for ; Tue, 31 Dec 2013 06:23:55 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.60.165.36 with SMTP id yv4mr19723503oeb.55.1388499835491; Tue, 31 Dec 2013 06:23:55 -0800 (PST) Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com Received: by 10.76.95.200 with HTTP; Tue, 31 Dec 2013 06:23:55 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <52A3C8A5.7010606@gmail.com> <1795f3067ba3fcdd0caf978cc59ff024.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <52A435EA.7090405@gmail.com> <201312081237.24473.luke@dashjr.org> <20131212205106.GA4572@netbook.cypherspace.org> Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2013 14:23:55 +0000 X-Google-Sender-Auth: ErUE3b7dcDDKZdO45Oey4At73BY Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: Gregory Maxwell Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3a8674771f9e04eed54fe2 X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (mh.in.england[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Vy0Ei-00077C-U4 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Dedicated server for bitcoin.org, your thoughts? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2013 14:24:01 -0000 --047d7b3a8674771f9e04eed54fe2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > The site was actually moved onto a dedicated server temporarily and it > melted down under the load. I wouldn't call that no progress. > Oh, it did? When was that? I must have missed this excitement :) Any idea how much load it had? Perhaps I wasn't clear on the point I was making Drak's threat model > is not improved in the slightest by SSL. It would be improved by > increasing the use of signature checking, e.g. by making it easier. > Well, that depends. If you watch Applebaums talk he is pushing TLS pretty hard, and saying that based on the access to the source docs some of their MITM attacks can't beat TLS. It appears that they have the capability to do bulk MITM and rewrite of downloads as Drak says but *not* when TLS is present, that would force more targeted attacks. So to me that implies that TLS does raise the bar and is worth doing. However if we can't find a server that won't melt under the load, then that'd be an issue. We could consider hosting downloads on AppEngine or something else that can handle both high load and TLS. --047d7b3a8674771f9e04eed54fe2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The site was actually moved onto a dedicated ser= ver temporarily and it
melted down under the load. I wouldn't call that no progress.

Oh, it did? When was that? I must have missed th= is excitement :)
=C2=A0
Any idea how much load it had?<= br>

Perhaps I wasn't cl= ear on the point I was making Drak's threat model
is not improved in the slightest by SSL. It would be improved by
increasing the use of signature checking, e.g. by making it easier.

Well, that depends. If you watch Applebaums ta= lk he is pushing TLS pretty hard, and saying that based on the access to th= e source docs some of their MITM attacks can't beat TLS. It appears tha= t they have the capability to do bulk MITM and rewrite of downloads as Drak= says but *not* when TLS is present, that would force more targeted attacks= . So to me that implies that TLS does raise the bar and is worth doing.

However if we can't find a server that won't me= lt under the load, then that'd be an issue. We could consider hosting d= ownloads on AppEngine or something else that can handle both high load and = TLS.
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