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From: Jeremy <jlrubin@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 10:34:15 -0700
Message-ID: <CAD5xwhgb8xoZXue=R4ktENGLffvBQOKNBUsfZS+DZXBSK4NezA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dmitry Petukhov <dp@simplexum.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000f0ecd305ae6c297c"
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
Precedence: list

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CTV does not enable this afaiu because it does not commit to the inputs
(otherwise there's a hash cycle for predicting the output's TXID.


--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>


On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 7:39 AM Dmitry Petukhov <dp@simplexum.com> wrote:

> Just had an idea that an an "inverse timelock" can be made
> almost-certainly automatic: a revocation UTXO shall become
> anyone-can-spend after a timeout, and bear some non-dust amount.
>
> Before the timelock expiration, it shall be spendable only along with
> the covenant-locked 'main' UTXO (via a signature or mutual covenant)
>
> This way, after a timeout expires, a multitude of entities will be
> incentivized to spend this UTXO, because this would be free money for
> them. It will probably be spend by a miner, as they can always replace
> the spending transaction with their own and claim the amount.
>
> After the revocation UTXO is spent, the covenant path that commits to
> having it in the inputs will be unspendable, and this would effectively
> constitute an "inverse timelock".
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000">CTV does=
 not enable this afaiu because it does not commit to the inputs (otherwise =
there&#39;s a hash cycle for predicting the output&#39;s TXID.</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-=
size:small;color:#000000"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000"><br cl=
ear=3D"all"></div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smar=
tmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">--<br><a href=3D"https://twitter=
.com/JeremyRubin" target=3D"_blank">@JeremyRubin</a><a href=3D"https://twit=
ter.com/JeremyRubin" target=3D"_blank"></a></div></div></div><br></div><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Se=
p 3, 2020 at 7:39 AM Dmitry Petukhov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dp@simplexum.com=
">dp@simplexum.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex">Just had an idea that an an &quot;inverse timelock&quot; =
can be made<br>
almost-certainly automatic: a revocation UTXO shall become<br>
anyone-can-spend after a timeout, and bear some non-dust amount.<br>
<br>
Before the timelock expiration, it shall be spendable only along with<br>
the covenant-locked &#39;main&#39; UTXO (via a signature or mutual covenant=
)<br>
<br>
This way, after a timeout expires, a multitude of entities will be<br>
incentivized to spend this UTXO, because this would be free money for<br>
them. It will probably be spend by a miner, as they can always replace<br>
the spending transaction with their own and claim the amount.<br>
<br>
After the revocation UTXO is spent, the covenant path that commits to<br>
having it in the inputs will be unspendable, and this would effectively<br>
constitute an &quot;inverse timelock&quot;.<br>
<br><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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