Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 16DD2FE7 for ; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 16:46:35 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yk0-f172.google.com (mail-yk0-f172.google.com [209.85.160.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3E12223A for ; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 16:46:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykcf206 with SMTP id f206so127697490ykc.3 for ; Tue, 08 Sep 2015 09:46:33 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=vBMG3J8D+y5Ng3i0iSX/xdRPfUPUlD5iKSFDVWzF5Ag=; b=TKb80WvDZdlEkv95vf3qhpwDgQZw3QaqK1DYvXcIf8qMZpqweDjqR8bwZ0RSkFy+C/ GnqBF2LBXPkrE5igssfCyPARMrvH2umDrMo2o8U9mvBCebRJ25pJerdAtZBG+0rsiFl1 c3su7oRymg6mIJNThr6hGVvv2dPuzlrmcdQSOic5fSkcrb7iIcuCM5dq28RJrNHonw6s +C+ZZVlYjZ8bzzET/W1+kqrqmPVQ4yVbhf4RNXdZiaqjafuk9Ti+40DETcuH5p/HVihn JZ4JXeAR5hq3BJlf7O1vCQYC5pSDWxWNMc8miFOsorpY2HXIVOMwmcWRmflHCoT9fLXr pI+Q== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.13.244.134 with SMTP id d128mr29741619ywf.27.1441730793530; Tue, 08 Sep 2015 09:46:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.103.39.133 with HTTP; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 09:46:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.103.39.133 with HTTP; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 09:46:33 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2015 11:46:33 -0500 Message-ID: From: Andrew Johnson To: Washington Sanchez Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c0887bccf888a051f3f1b79 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT,FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamic limit to the block size - BIP draft discussion X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2015 16:46:35 -0000 --94eb2c0887bccf888a051f3f1b79 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I rather like this idea, I like that we're taking block scaling back to a technical method rather than political. BIP100 is frightening to me as it gives a disproportionate amount of power to the miners, who can already control their own blocksize with a soft cap. It also seems silly to worry about a selfish mining attack if you're going to institute a miner vote that an entity with that much hashrate can noticeably influence anyway. 101 is better but is still attempting to make a guess as to technological progression quite far into the future. And then when we do finally hit 8GB we will need yet another hard fork if we need to go bigger(or we may need to do it earlier if the increase schedule isn't aggressive enough). And who knows how large the ecosystem may be at that time, a hard fork may be an undertaking of truly epic proportions due to the sheer number of devices and embedded firmware that operates on the block chain. I've done no math on this(posting from mobile) but something similar to this would be reasonable, I think. Unbounded growth, as Adam points out, is also undesirable. Every 4032 blocks (~4 weeks), the maximum block size will be decreased by 10% *IF* a minimum of 2500 blocks has a size <= 40% of the maximum block size at that time. This requires a larger threshold to be crossed to move downwards, that way we hopefully aren't oscillating back and forth constantly. I'll try to do some blockchain research sometime this week and either back my plucked from the air numbers or change them. Andrew Johnson On Sep 8, 2015 10:11 AM, "Washington Sanchez via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > 1) It's not really clear to me how that would work, but assuming it does > then it will go into a basket of attacks that are possible but unlikely due > to the economic disincentives to do so. > > 2) That said, is the Achilles heal of this proposal the lack of a > mechanism to lower the block size? > > 3) Let me put it another way, I've read that both Gavin and yourself are > favorable to a dynamic limit on the block size. In your view, what is > missing from this proposal, or what variables should be adjusted, to get > the rules to a place where you and other Core developers would seriously > consider it? > > On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:18 AM, Adam Back wrote: > >> > A selfish mining attack would have to be performed for at least 2000 >> blocks over a period of 4 weeks in order to achieve a meager 10% increase >> in the block size. >> >> You seem to be analysing a different attack - I mean that if someone >> has enough hashrate to do a selfish mining attack, then setting up a >> system that has no means to reduce block-size risks that at a point >> where there is excess block-size they can use that free transaction >> space to amplify selfish mining instead of collecting transaction >> fees. >> >> Adam >> > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------- > *Dr Washington Y. Sanchez * > Co-founder, OB1 > Core developer of OpenBazaar > @drwasho > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --94eb2c0887bccf888a051f3f1b79 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I rather like this idea, I like that we're taking block = scaling back to a technical method rather than political.=C2=A0 BIP100 is f= rightening to me as it gives a disproportionate amount of power to the mine= rs, who can already control their own blocksize with a soft cap.=C2=A0 It a= lso seems silly to worry about a selfish mining attack if you're going = to institute a miner vote that an entity with that much hashrate can notice= ably influence anyway.

101 is better but is still attempting to make a guess as to = technological progression quite far into the future.=C2=A0 And then when we= do finally hit 8GB we will need yet another hard fork if we need to go big= ger(or we may need to do it earlier if the increase schedule isn't aggr= essive enough).=C2=A0 And who knows how large the ecosystem may be at that = time, a hard fork may be an undertaking of truly epic proportions due to th= e sheer number of devices and embedded firmware that operates on the block = chain.

I've done no math on this(posting from mobile) but somet= hing similar to this would be reasonable, I think.=C2=A0 Unbounded growth, = as Adam points out, is also undesirable.

Every 4032 blocks (~4 weeks), the maximum block size will be= decreased by 10% *IF* a minimum of 2500 blocks has a size <=3D 40% of t= he maximum block size at that time.

This requires a larger threshold to be crossed to move downw= ards, that way we hopefully aren't oscillating back and forth constantl= y.=C2=A0 I'll try to do some blockchain research sometime this week and= either back my plucked from the air numbers or change them.

Andrew Johnson

On Sep 8, 2015 10:11 AM, "Washington Sanche= z via bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

= 1) It's not really clear to me how that would work, but assuming it doe= s then it will go into a basket of attacks that are possible but unlikely d= ue to the economic disincentives to do so.

2) That said,= is the Achilles heal of this proposal the lack of a mechanism to lower the= block size?=C2=A0

3) Let me put it another way, I= 've read that both Gavin and yourself are favorable to a dynamic limit = on the block size. In your view, what is missing from this proposal, or wha= t variables should be adjusted, to get the rules to a place where you and o= ther Core developers would seriously consider it?

On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:18 AM= , Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
> A selfish mining attack would have to be perf= ormed for at least 2000 blocks over a period of 4 weeks in order to achieve= a meager 10% increase in the block size.

You seem to be analysing a different attack - I mean that if someone=
has enough hashrate to do a selfish mining attack, then setting up a
system that has no means to reduce block-size risks that at a point
where there is excess block-size they can use that free transaction
space to amplify selfish mining instead of collecting transaction
fees.

Adam



--
-------------------= ------------------------
Co-founder, = OB1
Core develope= r of OpenBazaar


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bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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