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From: James MacWhyte <macwhyte@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2016 02:50:12 +0000
Message-ID: <CAH+Axy5wOLfAO5XKb5v=A34k5V8RYxnO7ubUd_H7bmH+iS4-0w@mail.gmail.com>
To: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>, 
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>, 
	Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11420f821c16e4053b18cf67
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capital Efficient Honeypots w/ "Scorched Earth"
 Doublespending Protection
Precedence: list

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Why not just have a single 1-of-m multisig transaction, with one key on
each server? Based on which key is used you would know which server is
compromised, and (in my opinion) it wouldn't look nearly as suspicious.

On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 11:26 AM Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 2:27 PM, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > If however
> > he is planning to use it as a foothold to further compromise your
> > company, send spam or similar, he will likely try to avoid these
> > tripwires. [...]
>
> Depends on the value of their activity compared to the value of the coins.
> Spamming doesn't pay much.
>
> Covert tripwires would obviously be better, but if shared tripwires
> allow you to have 100x the funds available it could be a good
> trade-off.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Why not just have a single 1-of-m multisig transaction, wi=
th one key on each server? Based on which key is used you would know which =
server is compromised, and (in my opinion) it wouldn&#39;t look nearly as s=
uspicious.</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Aug=
 25, 2016 at 11:26 AM Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.o=
rg</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Thu, Aug 25, 2=
016 at 2:27 PM, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; If however<br>
&gt; he is planning to use it as a foothold to further compromise your<br>
&gt; company, send spam or similar, he will likely try to avoid these<br>
&gt; tripwires. [...]<br>
<br>
Depends on the value of their activity compared to the value of the coins.<=
br>
Spamming doesn&#39;t pay much.<br>
<br>
Covert tripwires would obviously be better, but if shared tripwires<br>
allow you to have 100x the funds available it could be a good<br>
trade-off.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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