Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A44E360 for ; Sun, 9 Apr 2017 18:44:49 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt0-f171.google.com (mail-qt0-f171.google.com [209.85.216.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E716D213 for ; Sun, 9 Apr 2017 18:44:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt0-f171.google.com with SMTP id i34so90976829qtc.0 for ; Sun, 09 Apr 2017 11:44:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=CKFhWmyp2foZuwQp8hu+gD5gIN30EKHcFYYQKAz6hBw=; b=Gx//EwQXvCOVlpTjJAGFuJO3hfkHECx1/iF+kPAHOIAenCA2E3e9QxmisNZZjMW8jF 3ayoY2tZ8kcBVrDWIMlCTXT3sPV0EELE5zZjvZIMFLSIG0m/lFX9JcgQcdLuNKKOO/k+ SMl2CKcrv+cLRRqpjUFE9kI+8dgu0EwEvd5Zuk3ucVUH83jdSv7kn0Atjscq1mfyeVrm 9bNi9mGuuLPlfZ7KeW0O88I5yG/ZStMuGrrEDTaLTG/2iYEr6CH6SNJ76hRKDT/q2ybV iceqrZLNMf6MrlMzU4cUTFymh33+mG+Dkr4DBBJ5Vlq58npA3zKMnMq7XO1TEcnqiJOP I4GQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from :date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=CKFhWmyp2foZuwQp8hu+gD5gIN30EKHcFYYQKAz6hBw=; b=fId5QOjy66Y3Y43xTPSE3Ef/C4dD7uW+K6vpRwraZIf+GpdKKSqT78A0eZey48Tt0e iUSgeV1Q3jYDcJoWs3rFiKhsM4WRJDmKWYe4hoSRSgv3Vgmi1jK0kjyE4IUtbJpVsGsu ZuMXs2/PsUqijhVTcB6vOdiRCY5Tgodune0QFRvr+GacI/fPiVVuPtbi392kevq06jXd G+IHK1sQAV8b7DP13oYaqlIl0PAQLn21U9NcTCKu6sRxCKD0KrxgVEpmbRarlMhtAt6n hILDQUycekJe/SqQh0AIxbQllsL7D0SauvoeD+eIcBWPmNrSGQYtY0qhfpH7fzi4lDe0 w9Zg== X-Gm-Message-State: AFeK/H2mOAe/yz1de7xrRkNzDtEOk0DR/Mhrayy9u2938iSTijLKeLm1zD6ycBV/0JJUnNwWbv6yKPQPYzOPNQ== X-Received: by 10.237.34.212 with SMTP id q20mr49803245qtc.5.1491763487991; Sun, 09 Apr 2017 11:44:47 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: earonesty@gmail.com Received: by 10.200.0.146 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Apr 2017 11:44:47 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Erik Aronesty Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2017 14:44:47 -0400 X-Google-Sender-Auth: 7voKW4hx2Dj216hTG_B3eEg3L1M Message-ID: To: praxeology_guy , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11375e08ca706b054cc040b4 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 09 Apr 2017 20:15:36 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Apr 2017 18:44:49 -0000 --001a11375e08ca706b054cc040b4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW change is not on the table as a part of a longer-term roadmap. Done right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of the proven, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would keep Bitcoin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized manufacturing for many years. Clearly a level-playing field is critical to keeping centralization from being a "defining feature" of Bitcoin over the long term. I've heard the term "level playing field" bandied about quite a bit. And it seems to me that the risk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than state-actor manipulation of specialized manufacturing of "SHA-256 forever" hardware. Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and less likely a "feature" and more of a baggage. Perhaps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as a part of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general. Killing the existing POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW field to flip-flop between the current and the "next one" every 8 years or or so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year.... A stub function that is guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected within 7 years. Something like that? Haven't thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would respond well to a well known cutover date. This would enable rapid-response to quantum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... because the mechanisms would be in-place and ready to switch as needed. Lots of people seem to panic over POW changes as "irresponsible", but it's only irresponsible if done irresponsibly. On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 9:48 PM, praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Jimmy Song, > > Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term > owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change Bitcoin > policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack? > > If anything, we would be making policy changes to prevent the use of > patented PoW algorithms instead of making changes to enable them. > > Thanks, > Praxeology Guy > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11375e08ca706b054cc040b4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW = change is not on the table as a part of a longer-term roadmap.

Done = right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of the prov= en, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would keep Bitc= oin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized manufacturing= for many years. =C2=A0

Clearly a level-playing field is critical t= o keeping centralization from being a "defining feature" of Bitco= in over the long term. =C2=A0 I've heard the term "level playing f= ield" bandied about quite a bit. =C2=A0 And it seems to me that the ri= sk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than state-actor manip= ulation of specialized manufacturing of "SHA-256 forever" hardwar= e. =C2=A0 Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and less = likely a "feature" and more of a baggage.

Perh= aps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as a part= of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general. =C2=A0 Killing the exist= ing POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW field = to flip-flop between the current and the "next one" every 8 years= or or so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year....=C2=A0 A stub func= tion that is guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected with= in 7 years. =C2=A0

Something like that? =C2=A0

Haven't = thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would respond well to= a well known cutover date. =C2=A0 This would enable rapid-response to quan= tum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... because the mechanisms= would be in-place and ready to switch as needed.

= Lots of people seem to panic over POW changes as "irresponsible",= but it's only irresponsible if done irresponsibly.


On Fri, Ap= r 7, 2017 at 9:48 PM, praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev <= = bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Jimmy Song,

Why would = the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term owners of bit= coins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change Bitcoin policy in order= to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack?

If anything, we would be making policy changes to prevent the use of = patented PoW algorithms instead of making changes to enable them.
=

Thanks,
Praxeology Guy

_____= __________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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