Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 22:10:33 -0400
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo.com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <20170929021033.GA12303@savin.petertodd.org>
References: <359FFE85-86AF-4FBD-9491-3528382E5002@friedenbach.org>
	<DC1B3730-756E-4A9B-BE6E-481B78E4104D@mattcorallo.com>
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In-Reply-To: <DC1B3730-756E-4A9B-BE6E-481B78E4104D@mattcorallo.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12)
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets
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On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 01:53:55AM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrot=
e:
> I'm somewhat curious what the authors envisioned the real-world implicati=
ons of this model to be. While blindly asking users to enter what they're w=
illing to pay always works in theory, I'd imagine in such a world the fee s=
election UX would be similar to what it is today - users are provided a lis=
t of options with feerates and expected confirmation times from which to se=
lect. Indeed, in a world where users pay a lower fee if they paid more than=
 necessary fee estimation could be more willing to overshoot and the UX aro=
und RBF and CPFP could be simplified greatly, but I'm not actually convince=
d that it would result in higher overall mining revenue.

Note too that the fee users are willing to pay often changes over time.

My OpenTimestamps service is a perfect example: getting a timestamp confirm=
ed
within 10 minutes of the previous one has little value to me, but if the
previous completed timestamp was 24 hours ago I'm willing to pay significan=
tly
more money because the time delay is getting significant enough to affect t=
he
trustworthyness of the entire service. So the fee selection mechanism is
nothing more than a RBF-using loop that bumps the fee every time a block ge=
ts
mined w/o confirming my latest transaction.

This kind of time sensitivity is probably true of a majority of Bitcoin
use-cases, with the caveat that often the slope will be negative eventually:
after a point in time completing the transaction has no value.

--=20
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

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