Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Td7xs-0005Sq-3L for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 26 Nov 2012 23:19:48 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from zinan.dashjr.org ([173.242.112.54]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1Td7xr-00065Q-3t for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 26 Nov 2012 23:19:48 +0000 Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [173.170.188.216]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7566B27A296E; Mon, 26 Nov 2012 23:19:39 +0000 (UTC) From: "Luke-Jr" To: Mike Hearn Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 23:19:34 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.5.4-gentoo; KDE/4.8.5; x86_64; ; ) References: <201211262313.44463.luke@dashjr.org> In-Reply-To: X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201211262319.37533.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Score: -0.4 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.4 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain -0.0 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1Td7xr-00065Q-3t Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment Protocol Proposal: Invoices/Payments/Receipts X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 23:19:48 -0000 On Monday, November 26, 2012 11:16:03 PM Mike Hearn wrote: > They could be included as well of course, but from a seller > perspective the most important thing is consistency. You have to be > able to predict what CAs the user has, otherwise your invoice would > appear in the UI as unverified and is subject to manipulation by > viruses, etc. That's expected behaviour - except it's mainly be manipulated by *users*, not viruses (which can just as easily manipulate whatever custom cert store we use). If I don't trust Joe's certs, I don't want Bitcoin overriding that no matter who Joe is or what connections he has. > So using the OS cert store would effectively restrict merchants to the > intersection of what ships in all the operating systems their users > use, which could be unnecessarily restrictive. As far as I know, every > browser has its own cert store for that reason. Browsers with this bug are not relevant IMO.