Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C710C002A for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 21:01:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08DAD61308 for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 21:01:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 08DAD61308 Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=q32-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com header.i=@q32-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20221208 header.b=VqUlTEgU X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.399 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.399 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kESiMEcOmLyh for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 21:01:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 7A11A61114 Received: from mail-yw1-x1135.google.com (mail-yw1-x1135.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1135]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A11A61114 for ; Mon, 8 May 2023 21:01:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-yw1-x1135.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-54f9e2d0714so6882607b3.1 for ; Mon, 08 May 2023 14:01:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=q32-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com; s=20221208; t=1683579699; x=1686171699; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=IBxYiAb42jIKvVqQQn7URZdTA6/ZI3whODs5YczeJCo=; b=VqUlTEgUe6HqunyEtJ2v4R8ToqPgnmiCQLGHiWiQw5q3dChSYzJ6yPHrUyvrxI6qvJ Axc12em9ghcrMwxqwvjeqC4CCjfZw/p1lCgJiuMP+dnlJ/HIjc9vrVB7+iSTTrrgeee3 I5It+ZLLLnQ0Sse2a5sJwuJm2ycLTClBDKQ61YnfQK/mZTTRAIkKjC16VzkL6ajoOxmO mUI9Ihy/jBMZh+li8QZj6RGmeZBqbWm46j5nH47x44fY88tjyqyW6+wl9UReKFEw4CDm A4LCkVe0Dtw1j6QLP/MIPS5dmweoblBA5sG3u/hTJELoix1VRjEiioamK9q/fuYvInVI Xqqg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1683579699; x=1686171699; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=IBxYiAb42jIKvVqQQn7URZdTA6/ZI3whODs5YczeJCo=; b=Zfr3f67UnJZCDZl4woUaPm97Tw+ZxxiiR6/YjsJ59taUxyv/p6eLQQNLovyydb8Hig lyjQWksOmFVNUNFI02RVXZIeoGCN38FHnE6KDodr/bfSAa7Iuduu1zbJQDbafIrjUvhw UjwusEDLdkjS0n38zCvNbWoWirFbDxxAGQ8fjtTa8f0H4C3MiStRUH8s92SrZnaQBA8U w/LR7dUeQRL59GJhXPja477B7tdC1lWX3xzpisqrgbIDpztvTRHanbWF4wQa6Tr4v9Oh IYJGmgBBs5dWnzOAPASR6OWTWz9u9tWe0mWB8/BU/JJ1uUve6D1w3abc8TNIfKDPYNrI kGLA== X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDxh30bjmZUKyycO062q+Bs2nRRCORTzmsELXchKMkup/8P6P8i9 MnnQARNoCzh/M4fHDi9FHqGpEquQHT9rhX8yeJllM65oIbLpF/M= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACHHUZ5bPn7nBAtZAsXqNaffnwA1gmQ/pvZEBrByor0Z6kmpLKW4/L1og3jGgvvnGLbRrkFLZtV3BYvrfjq5Ay6znIU= X-Received: by 2002:a25:aac3:0:b0:b9e:76b4:df36 with SMTP id t61-20020a25aac3000000b00b9e76b4df36mr11347662ybi.5.1683579699156; Mon, 08 May 2023 14:01:39 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <-2tdTjN6WfQI-CTPM49DiMOC2X5El1vJdlWTQvpalXAHKVLdFd_7ADpYN7Cz57v0fJSkaiG75fHJzcBtvJgn7Pj-RZrEk6hXk6Rp_1Y7SrE=@protonmail.com> In-Reply-To: From: Erik Aronesty Date: Mon, 8 May 2023 17:01:27 -0400 Message-ID: To: Michael Folkson Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000eb5c3605fb34f179" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 09 May 2023 01:59:03 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Ali Sherief Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Mempool spam] Should we as developers reject non-standard Taproot transactions from full nodes? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 08 May 2023 21:01:42 -0000 --000000000000eb5c3605fb34f179 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable the more i think about it, the more that this is essential. consider that bitcoin is secured by mining and mining is secured by fees. all of that is relative to the value of bitcoin itself. but consider the incentive for a reorg if a single ordinal is worth 1 billion dollars and is being transferred. now all the incentive logic is thrown to the wind. non-monetary use is quite dangerous to network stability, and the game theory underpinning it, imo. On Mon, May 8, 2023 at 4:59=E2=80=AFPM Erik Aronesty wrote: > > value you can from these Lightning channel(s) onchain even if it means > paying a higher fee than the amount you are receiving. > > in that case, you're not getting any value - you're losing value. the > only benefit i could imagine would be to prevent the other party from > having access to the funds should the channel expire. > > regardless, this is an edge case. it's clear that a utxo whose value is > less than the fee paid to move it is dust, and we already have plenty of > code to censor dust transactions > > > no reason to prevent > > the reason to prevent them is to prevent something that has more value > than the bitcoin itself from being stored on-chain. that is to say: > real-estate ownership, nfts, or any other thing that isn't "using bitcoin > as money" > > by going at the "incentive/economic layer", rather than pointlessly > forcing brc-20 and ordinals users to obfuscate their transactions, we can > provide a permanent incentive to keep that stuff off of bitcoin > > personally, i'm not sure it's desirable to keep it off of bitcoin, but if > it is, the only sure way to disincentivize it is to go at it in this way = or > similar > > i suspect all the opcode validation suggestions are just silly. ordinal= s > can time their fork to the same moment, and store data in a less efficien= t, > but still functional, way using any number of mechanisms. we've had > similar things posted on-chain since 2010 (my favorite was a software > license key - in an attempt to make bitcoin nodes illegal. it's still i= n > there) > > > On Mon, May 8, 2023 at 4:36=E2=80=AFPM Michael Folkson < > michaelfolkson@protonmail.com> wrote: > >> > im unclear as to the purpose paying an onchain transaction fee greater >> than the amount receiving could possibly serve. >> >> If you expect fees to continue to rise and be sustained at abnormally >> high levels for a long period of time you might seek to close your >> Lightning channel(s) and move whatever value you can from these Lightnin= g >> channel(s) onchain even if it means paying a higher fee than the amount = you >> are receiving. >> >> I don't necessarily recommend doing this (it would depend on a number of >> factors, both personal and external) but there is no reason to prevent >> someone in say the consensus rules from doing this if they wish. >> >> -- >> Michael Folkson >> Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com >> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F >> >> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin >> >> ------- Original Message ------- >> On Monday, May 8th, 2023 at 20:47, Erik Aronesty wrote: >> >> im unclear as to the purpose paying an onchain transaction fee greater >> than the amount receiving could possibly serve. >> >> what benefit do you get aside from losing bitcoin? >> >> are there any, non-theoretical, benefits to facilitating dust >> transactions? >> >> we could, of course, have it be non-consensus (no route dust) to start >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 8, 2023 at 1:13=E2=80=AFPM Michael Folkson < >> michaelfolkson@protonmail.com> wrote: >> >>> > probably easier just to reject any transaction where the fee is >>> higher than the sum of the outputs >>> >>> And prevent perfectly reasonable transfers of value and attempted >>> Lightning channel closes during fee spikes? If I *want* to close my >>> Lightning channel during a protracted fee spike where I have to pay an >>> onchain transaction fee greater than the amount I am receiving you want= to >>> stop me doing that? You are impinging on a valid use case as well as >>> requiring a consensus rule change. >>> >>> -- >>> Michael Folkson >>> Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com >>> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F >>> >>> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin >>> >>> ------- Original Message ------- >>> On Monday, May 8th, 2023 at 13:58, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> >>> probably easier just to reject any transaction where the fee is higher >>> than the sum of the outputs >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 8, 2023, 7:55 AM Ali Sherief via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi guys, >>>> >>>> I think everyone on this list knows what has happened to the Bitcoin >>>> mempool during the past 96 hours. Due to side projects such as BRC-20 >>>> having such a high volume, real bitcoin transactions are being priced = out >>>> and that is what is causing the massive congestion that has arguable n= ot >>>> been seen since December 2017. I do not count the March 2021 congestio= n >>>> because that was only with 1-5sat/vbyte. >>>> >>>> Such justifiably worthless ("worthless" is not even my word - that's >>>> how its creator described them[1]) tokens threaten the smooth and norm= al >>>> use of the Bitcoin network as a peer-to-pear digital currency, as it w= as >>>> intended to be used as. >>>> >>>> If the volume does not die down over the next few weeks, should we tak= e >>>> an action? The bitcoin network is a triumvirate of developers, miners,= and >>>> users. Considering that miners are largely the entities at fault for >>>> allowing the system to be abused like this, the harmony of Bitcoin >>>> transactions is being disrupted right now. Although this community has= a >>>> strong history of not putting its fingers into pies unless absolutely >>>> necessary - an example being during the block size wars and Segwit - s= hould >>>> similar action be taken now, in the form of i) BIPs and/or ii) commits= into >>>> the Bitcoin Core codebase, to curtail the loophole in BIP 342 (which >>>> defines the validation rules for Taproot scripts) which has allowed th= ese >>>> unintended consequences? >>>> >>>> An alternative would be to enforce this "censorship" at the node level >>>> and introduce a run-time option to instantly prune all non-standard Ta= proot >>>> transactions. This will be easier to implement, but won't hit the road >>>> until minimum next release. >>>> >>>> I know that some people will have their criticisms about this, >>>> absolutists/libertarians/maximum-freedom advocates, which is fine, but= we >>>> need to find a solution for this that fits everyone's common ground. W= e >>>> indirectly allowed this to happen, which previously wasn't possible be= fore. >>>> So we also have a responsibility to do something to ensure that this k= ind >>>> of congestion can never happen again using Taproot. >>>> >>>> -Ali >>>> >>>> --- >>>> >>>> [1]: >>>> https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2023/05/05/pump-the-brcs-t= he-promise-and-peril-of-bitcoin-backed-tokens/ >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>>> >>> >>> >> --000000000000eb5c3605fb34f179 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
the more i think about it, the more that = this is essential.=C2=A0 =C2=A0consider that bitcoin is secured by mining a= nd mining is secured by fees.=C2=A0 =C2=A0all of that is relative to the va= lue of bitcoin itself.=C2=A0 =C2=A0but consider the incentive for a reorg i= f a single ordinal is worth 1 billion dollars and is being transferred.=C2= =A0 now all the incentive logic is thrown to the wind.=C2=A0 =C2=A0non-mone= tary use is quite dangerous to network stability, and the game theory under= pinning it, imo.=C2=A0

On Mon, May 8, 2023 at 4:59=E2=80=AFPM Erik Aronesty = <erik@q32.com> wrote:
>=C2=A0= value you can from these Lightning channel(s= ) onchain even if it means paying a higher fee than the amount you are rece= iving.

in that case, you're not getting any value - you're losing = value.=C2=A0 =C2=A0the only benefit i could imagine would be to prevent the= other party from having access to the funds should the channel expire.=C2= =A0 =C2=A0

regardless, this is an edge case.=C2=A0 =C2=A0it's cl= ear that a utxo whose value is less than the fee paid to move it is dust, a= nd we already have plenty of code to censor dust transactions

=
> no reason to prevent

the reason t= o prevent them is to prevent something that has more value than the bitcoin= itself from being stored on-chain.=C2=A0 that is to say:=C2=A0 real-estate= ownership, nfts, or any other thing that isn't "using bitcoin as = money"

by going at the "incentive/economic layer", rather th= an pointlessly forcing brc-20 and ordinals users to obfuscate their transac= tions, we can provide a permanent incentive to keep that stuff off of bitco= in

personally, i'm not sure it's desirable to keep it off of bitcoi= n, but if it is, the only sure way to disincentivize it is to go at it in t= his way or similar

i suspect all the opcode validation suggestions are jus= t silly.=C2=A0 =C2=A0ordinals can time their fork to the same moment, and s= tore data in a less efficient, but still=C2=A0functional, way using any num= ber of mechanisms.=C2=A0 =C2=A0we've had similar things posted on-chain= since 2010 (my favorite was a software license key - in an attempt to make= bitcoin nodes illegal.=C2=A0 =C2=A0it's still in there)

<= /div>
O= n Mon, May 8, 2023 at 4:36=E2=80=AFPM Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail= .com> wrote:
>=C2= =A0= im unclear as to the purpose=C2=A0paying an onchain tran= saction fee greater than the amount receiving could possibly serve.<= /span>

If you expect fees to continue to rise and be sustained a= t abnormally high levels for a long period of time you might seek to close = your Lightning channel(s) and move whatever value you can from these Lightn= ing channel(s) onchain even if it means paying a higher fee than the amount= you are receiving.

I don't necessarily recommend doing this (it would = depend on a number of factors, both personal and external) but there is no = reason to prevent someone in say the consensus rules from doing this if the= y wish.
--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson = at protonmail.com
GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE= 0F


------- Original Message -------
On Monday, May 8th, 2023 at 20:47, Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:

im unclear as to the purpose paying an onchain tran= saction fee greater than the amount receiving could possibly serve.<= /div>
<= br>
what benefit do you get aside from losing bitcoin?

are there any, non-theoretical, benefits to facilitating dust transactio= ns?

we could, of course, have it be non-consensus (no rout= e dust) to start with





On Mon, May 8, 2023 at 1:13=E2=80=AFPM Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail.com> wrote:
<= blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l= eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
> probably easier just to reject any transaction w= here the fee is higher than the sum of the outputs

And prevent perfectly reasonable transfers of v= alue and attempted Lightning channel closes during fee spikes? If I want= to close my Lightning channel during a protracted fee spike where I ha= ve to pay an onchain transaction fee greater than the amount I am receiving= you want to stop me doing that? You are impinging on a valid use case as w= ell as requiring a consensus rule change.

--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson = at protonmail.com
GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE= 0F


------- Original Message -------
On Monday, May 8th, 2023 at 13:58, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev &l= t;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.or= g> wrote:

probably easier just to reject any transactio= n where the fee is higher than the sum of the outputs

=


On Mon, May 8, 2023, 7:55 AM Ali Sherief = via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Hi guys,

I thi= nk everyone on this list knows what has happened to the Bitcoin mempool dur= ing the past 96 hours. Due to side projects such as BRC-20 having such a hi= gh volume, real bitcoin transactions are being priced out and that is what = is causing the massive congestion that has arguable not been seen since Dec= ember 2017. I do not count the March 2021 congestion because that was only = with 1-5sat/vbyte.

Such justifiably worthless ("worthless" is not even my word - t= hat's how its creator described them[1]) tokens threaten the smooth and= normal use of the Bitcoin network as a peer-to-pear digital currency, as i= t was intended to be used as.

If the volume does not die down over the next few weeks, shoul= d we take an action? The bitcoin network is a triumvirate of developers, mi= ners, and users. Considering that miners are largely the entities at fault = for allowing the system to be abused like this, the harmony of Bitcoin tran= sactions is being disrupted right now. Although this community has a strong= history of not putting its fingers into pies unless absolutely necessary -= an example being during the block size wars and Segwit - should similar ac= tion be taken now, in the form of i) BIPs and/or ii) commits into the Bitco= in Core codebase, to curtail the loophole in BIP 342 (which defines the val= idation rules for Taproot scripts) which has allowed these unintended conse= quences?
An alter= native would be to enforce this "censorship" at the node level an= d introduce a run-time option to instantly prune all non-standard Taproot t= ransactions. This will be easier to implement, but won't hit the road u= ntil minimum next release.

I know that some people will have their criticisms about this, ab= solutists/libertarians/maximum-freedom advocates, which is fine, but we nee= d to find a solution for this that fits everyone's common ground. We in= directly allowed this to happen, which previously wasn't possible befor= e. So we also have a responsibility to do something to ensure that this kin= d of congestion can never happen again using Taproot.

-Ali

---

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org<= /a>
https://lists.linuxf= oundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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