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In-Reply-To: <YrEHo+3XLDNgIOnz@petertodd.org>
From: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 19:45:48 -0400
Message-ID: <CALZpt+EL=k_6iE5B950oz3EdLaQbRvgCNYZ8Lko4fcONcACvfw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s
	security
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> BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without th=
e
> opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would
propagate to
> the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per
block),
> without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at
the
> minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block
arrives
> without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much
full-rbf
> hash power at this moment.
>
> You can see the current status at:
https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/

That's interesting. I'm not sure if we can conclude of the absence of
full-rbf hash power at this moment, as it could also be a lack of full-rbf
propagation path towards such potential hash power. I think the day we see
an opt-out replacement transaction mined, it would constitute a good hint
of full-rbf hash power (assuming the tx-relay topology stays relatively
stable across the transaction issuance...)

Anyway, if/when the `fullrbf` patch lands in Bitcoin Core, including
automatic outbound connections to few `NODE_REPLACE_BY_FEE` peers, I'm
thinking of reaching out to a few mining node operators to advocate them
with the new policy setting.

Antoine

Le lun. 20 juin 2022 =C3=A0 19:49, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> a =C3=A9=
crit :

> On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 08:25:11PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing of
> > multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subse=
t
> of
> > the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest
> multi-party
> > transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signalin=
g
> > double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that
> direction,
> > I've submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to turn o=
n
> > full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stays
> > **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I've
> > started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15.
>
> BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without th=
e
> opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would propagat=
e
> to
> the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per
> block),
> without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at
> the
> minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arriv=
es
> without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much
> full-rbf
> hash power at this moment.
>
> You can see the current status at:
> https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt; BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bu=
mping txs without the<br>&gt; opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also =
made sure txs would propagate to<br>&gt; the above node. As of right now, i=
t&#39;s up to 32 replacements (once per block),<br>&gt; without any of them=
 mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at the<br>&gt; minimum p=
ossible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arrives<br>&gt; =
without the tx getting mined. So that&#39;s evidence we don&#39;t have much=
 full-rbf<br>&gt; hash power at this moment.<br>&gt; <br>&gt; You can see t=
he current status at: <a href=3D"https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.=
org/">https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/</a><br><br>That&#39;s =
interesting. I&#39;m not sure if we can conclude of the absence of full-rbf=
 hash power at this moment, as it could also be a lack of full-rbf propagat=
ion path towards such potential hash power. I think the day we see an opt-o=
ut replacement transaction mined, it would constitute a good hint of full-r=
bf hash power (assuming the tx-relay topology stays relatively stable acros=
s the transaction issuance...)<br><br>Anyway, if/when the `fullrbf` patch l=
ands in Bitcoin Core, including automatic outbound connections to few `NODE=
_REPLACE_BY_FEE` peers, I&#39;m thinking of reaching out to a few mining no=
de operators to advocate them with the new policy setting.<br><br>Antoine<b=
r></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr=
">Le=C2=A0lun. 20 juin 2022 =C3=A0=C2=A019:49, Peter Todd &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:pete@petertodd.org">pete@petertodd.org</a>&gt; a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Jun 13, 202=
2 at 08:25:11PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote:<br>
&gt; For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing o=
f<br>
&gt; multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subs=
et of<br>
&gt; the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest multi-=
party<br>
&gt; transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signali=
ng<br>
&gt; double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that direct=
ion,<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to t=
urn on<br>
&gt; full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stay=
s<br>
&gt; **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I&#=
39;ve<br>
&gt; started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15.<br>
<br>
BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without the<=
br>
opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would propagate =
to<br>
the above node. As of right now, it&#39;s up to 32 replacements (once per b=
lock),<br>
without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at th=
e<br>
minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arrives=
<br>
without the tx getting mined. So that&#39;s evidence we don&#39;t have much=
 full-rbf<br>
hash power at this moment.<br>
<br>
You can see the current status at: <a href=3D"https://alice.btc.calendar.op=
entimestamps.org/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://alice.btc.c=
alendar.opentimestamps.org/</a><br>
<br>
-- <br>
<a href=3D"https://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http=
s://petertodd.org</a> &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@<a href=3D"http://petertodd.org"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">petertodd.org</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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