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Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Justus Ranvier <justusranvier@riseup.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Encrypt bitcoin messages
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"I suggest that Bitcoin Core should generate a public/private key pair and
share the public one with peers."

I've not read the p2p protocol of Bitcoin core, but I suppose the initial
handshake between 2 peers would be the ideal place to exchange a public
keys.

would it make sense to generate a new random pair of keys per each peer you
connect to?
then each subsequent message to every peer gets encrypted differently,
keeping each conversation isolated from each other encryption-speaking.

These keys would have nothing to do with your wallet, they're just to
encrypt any further communication between peers post-handshake. Would that
be of any use to "This could provide privacy and integrity but not
autentication."?

http://twitter.com/gubatron


On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Justus Ranvier
> <justusranvier@riseup.net> wrote:
> > If that's not acceptable, even using TLS with self-signed certificates
> > would be an improvement.
>
> TLS is a huge complex attack surface, any use of it requires an
> additional dependency with a large amount of difficult to audit code.
> TLS is trivially DOS attacked and every major/widely used TLS
> implementation has had multiple memory disclosure or remote execution
> vulnerabilities even in just the last several years.
>
> We've dodged several emergency scale vulnerabilities by not having TLS.
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

--001a11c1002480f34e0500fe6786
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:13px">I suggest that Bitcoin Core should generate a public/private key pa=
ir and share the public one with peers.&quot;<br><br>I&#39;ve not read the =
p2p protocol of Bitcoin core, but I suppose the initial handshake between 2=
 peers would be the ideal place to exchange a public keys.<br>

<br>would it make sense to generate a new random pair of keys per each peer=
 you connect to?<br>then each subsequent message to every peer gets encrypt=
ed differently, keeping each conversation isolated from each other encrypti=
on-speaking.<br>

<br>These keys would have nothing to do with your wallet, they&#39;re just =
to encrypt any further communication between peers post-handshake. Would th=
at be of any use to &quot;</span><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:13px">This could provide privacy and integrity but not autentic=
ation.&quot;</span><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13=
px">?</span></div>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br clear=3D"all"><div><a href=3D"http://twitter=
.com/gubatron" target=3D"_blank">http://twitter.com/gubatron</a><br></div>
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Gregor=
y Maxwell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">gmaxwell@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">

<div class=3D"">On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Justus Ranvier<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:justusranvier@riseup.net">justusranvier@riseup.net</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; If that&#39;s not acceptable, even using TLS with self-signed certific=
ates<br>
&gt; would be an improvement.<br>
<br>
</div>TLS is a huge complex attack surface, any use of it requires an<br>
additional dependency with a large amount of difficult to audit code.<br>
TLS is trivially DOS attacked and every major/widely used TLS<br>
implementation has had multiple memory disclosure or remote execution<br>
vulnerabilities even in just the last several years.<br>
<br>
We&#39;ve dodged several emergency scale vulnerabilities by not having TLS.=
<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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