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From: Nathan Wilcox <nathan@z.cash>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 11:17:05 +0900
Message-ID: <CAK8perBDQDN0WvOn3bVxDHCVLjn=chg9=pVoBsVa6U67Qox8GQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>, 
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets
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On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 11:10 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 01:53:55AM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > I'm somewhat curious what the authors envisioned the real-world
> implications of this model to be. While blindly asking users to enter what
> they're willing to pay always works in theory, I'd imagine in such a world
> the fee selection UX would be similar to what it is today - users are
> provided a list of options with feerates and expected confirmation times
> from which to select. Indeed, in a world where users pay a lower fee if
> they paid more than necessary fee estimation could be more willing to
> overshoot and the UX around RBF and CPFP could be simplified greatly, but
> I'm not actually convinced that it would result in higher overall mining
> revenue.
>
> Note too that the fee users are willing to pay often changes over time.
>
> My OpenTimestamps service is a perfect example: getting a timestamp
> confirmed
> within 10 minutes of the previous one has little value to me, but if the
> previous completed timestamp was 24 hours ago I'm willing to pay
> significantly
> more money because the time delay is getting significant enough to affect
> the
> trustworthyness of the entire service. So the fee selection mechanism is
> nothing more than a RBF-using loop that bumps the fee every time a block
> gets
> mined w/o confirming my latest transaction.
>
> This kind of time sensitivity is probably true of a majority of Bitcoin
> use-cases, with the caveat that often the slope will be negative
> eventually:
> after a point in time completing the transaction has no value.
>
>
Wouldn't this RBF loop behave pretty much the same in the Monopolistic
Price Mechanism? (I haven't grokked RSOP yet.)

In fact, so long as RBF works, isn't it possible to raise Pay-Your-Bid fees
and Monopolistic Price fees over time to express the time curve preference?


> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>
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> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 11:10 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 01=
:53:55AM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:<br>
&gt; I&#39;m somewhat curious what the authors envisioned the real-world im=
plications of this model to be. While blindly asking users to enter what th=
ey&#39;re willing to pay always works in theory, I&#39;d imagine in such a =
world the fee selection UX would be similar to what it is today - users are=
 provided a list of options with feerates and expected confirmation times f=
rom which to select. Indeed, in a world where users pay a lower fee if they=
 paid more than necessary fee estimation could be more willing to overshoot=
 and the UX around RBF and CPFP could be simplified greatly, but I&#39;m no=
t actually convinced that it would result in higher overall mining revenue.=
<br>
<br>
</span>Note too that the fee users are willing to pay often changes over ti=
me.<br>
<br>
My OpenTimestamps service is a perfect example: getting a timestamp confirm=
ed<br>
within 10 minutes of the previous one has little value to me, but if the<br=
>
previous completed timestamp was 24 hours ago I&#39;m willing to pay signif=
icantly<br>
more money because the time delay is getting significant enough to affect t=
he<br>
trustworthyness of the entire service. So the fee selection mechanism is<br=
>
nothing more than a RBF-using loop that bumps the fee every time a block ge=
ts<br>
mined w/o confirming my latest transaction.<br>
<br>
This kind of time sensitivity is probably true of a majority of Bitcoin<br>
use-cases, with the caveat that often the slope will be negative eventually=
:<br>
after a point in time completing the transaction has no value.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br></div></div></blockquote><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Wouldn&#39;t this RBF loop behave pretty muc=
h the same in the Monopolistic Price Mechanism? (I haven&#39;t grokked RSOP=
 yet.)<br><br></div><div>In fact, so long as RBF works, isn&#39;t it possib=
le to raise Pay-Your-Bid fees and Monopolistic Price fees over time to expr=
ess the time curve preference?<br><br>=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">
--<br>
<a href=3D"https://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http=
s://petertodd.org</a> &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@<a href=3D"http://petertodd.org"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">petertodd.org</a><br>
</div></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
<wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>org=
/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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