Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35419910 for ; Fri, 29 Sep 2017 02:17:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-oi0-f52.google.com (mail-oi0-f52.google.com [209.85.218.52]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 89B55D3 for ; Fri, 29 Sep 2017 02:17:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oi0-f52.google.com with SMTP id u130so5357096oib.11 for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2017 19:17:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=z.cash; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ob/tVo7hfkiMjkdzXY2cSj6BwJm1e5B9qnvVE1Yp5wA=; b=FUPyAoqmYH9NwY4GCeeu2mIZ0TU5oCgoBmhaizxS5jL6nj6jwgMLHjoxsGh2c87My+ NU+ZzLdsYL54c3nlYhAnMDhGVJLaxEPZwikJ2V9vHhgG/dfgthEs5EJWc0IZr0/iCQRA oOtuvVdQbJbrq7ICRb/vJCEZcFd2yWjKWWb00VwXjCyLqM7ZcyhGYF91o93s7H3Bi7r+ OtOMNwtSxyugE5yUm5xHT6XuTLbYlt1TLzTfs4CZMjp4NfDq8xO+W2wkANAQFQVsan+K 6njo3gg0WmeCEAgdL2eLE1e9CXvFPYH5pQSeIjTXByH2nMyCHzer+4UzZBz5WXzP5wU8 HJPw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ob/tVo7hfkiMjkdzXY2cSj6BwJm1e5B9qnvVE1Yp5wA=; b=t8iaV95sA9d6kxbK+Nx6Qd0TM4TMt58/cYvwWW9EQ8BKvQSoBt244EHepr0CZid22G AqpkXPfPtSpb+Kl5vlduv4GDX6dLzKVDoMYsFXRRU3MBuG2R1cHnJa275UH2Z2vkfVuZ NFQx6U8nXIaXPTF0M9G5bO6K+n9ZYjtTaMSyjIEQvhtglXnyWNuUUP4z9tY/ek5+cNQT FXG/P47dv8Tec+WaTmvT8wgtytFj0fSRdrPceu9OgC3+evBQo6m03L+EGSk9Ar522R6l Ah4q4FHeRm0iXH+21cXrhO3GqqaG+aE3Sj/vnha7BJPdTUrUtY9C4miHP5bKDnciFldA HGOA== X-Gm-Message-State: AMCzsaWfvh6pgy1rV/aYkBYQ83WgPS7yncx25oVwQ/pDAB/aqRFeVWQN ceXtfojK5CgdgXUSu67BUyKbU2LEQeNpJQj8etGVHRLD X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QD3cypa74F1RJErYOjwrecU2XAYwt/14F9XuLRA7v3Os0ZUazYzRQZ/SuZezTHCUe/eSnd1xSDhxWEh60A+2dU= X-Received: by 10.157.51.76 with SMTP id u12mr1283763otd.113.1506651425895; Thu, 28 Sep 2017 19:17:05 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.157.48.133 with HTTP; Thu, 28 Sep 2017 19:17:05 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20170929021033.GA12303@savin.petertodd.org> References: <359FFE85-86AF-4FBD-9491-3528382E5002@friedenbach.org> <20170929021033.GA12303@savin.petertodd.org> From: Nathan Wilcox Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 11:17:05 +0900 Message-ID: To: Peter Todd , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a113e1d360a8fdf055a4a9fde" X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.4 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=disabled version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 03:03:47 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 02:17:07 -0000 --001a113e1d360a8fdf055a4a9fde Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 11:10 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 01:53:55AM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > I'm somewhat curious what the authors envisioned the real-world > implications of this model to be. While blindly asking users to enter what > they're willing to pay always works in theory, I'd imagine in such a world > the fee selection UX would be similar to what it is today - users are > provided a list of options with feerates and expected confirmation times > from which to select. Indeed, in a world where users pay a lower fee if > they paid more than necessary fee estimation could be more willing to > overshoot and the UX around RBF and CPFP could be simplified greatly, but > I'm not actually convinced that it would result in higher overall mining > revenue. > > Note too that the fee users are willing to pay often changes over time. > > My OpenTimestamps service is a perfect example: getting a timestamp > confirmed > within 10 minutes of the previous one has little value to me, but if the > previous completed timestamp was 24 hours ago I'm willing to pay > significantly > more money because the time delay is getting significant enough to affect > the > trustworthyness of the entire service. So the fee selection mechanism is > nothing more than a RBF-using loop that bumps the fee every time a block > gets > mined w/o confirming my latest transaction. > > This kind of time sensitivity is probably true of a majority of Bitcoin > use-cases, with the caveat that often the slope will be negative > eventually: > after a point in time completing the transaction has no value. > > Wouldn't this RBF loop behave pretty much the same in the Monopolistic Price Mechanism? (I haven't grokked RSOP yet.) In fact, so long as RBF works, isn't it possible to raise Pay-Your-Bid fees and Monopolistic Price fees over time to express the time curve preference? > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a113e1d360a8fdf055a4a9fde Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 11:10 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 01= :53:55AM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I'm somewhat curious what the authors envisioned the real-world im= plications of this model to be. While blindly asking users to enter what th= ey're willing to pay always works in theory, I'd imagine in such a = world the fee selection UX would be similar to what it is today - users are= provided a list of options with feerates and expected confirmation times f= rom which to select. Indeed, in a world where users pay a lower fee if they= paid more than necessary fee estimation could be more willing to overshoot= and the UX around RBF and CPFP could be simplified greatly, but I'm no= t actually convinced that it would result in higher overall mining revenue.=

Note too that the fee users are willing to pay often changes over ti= me.

My OpenTimestamps service is a perfect example: getting a timestamp confirm= ed
within 10 minutes of the previous one has little value to me, but if the previous completed timestamp was 24 hours ago I'm willing to pay signif= icantly
more money because the time delay is getting significant enough to affect t= he
trustworthyness of the entire service. So the fee selection mechanism is nothing more than a RBF-using loop that bumps the fee every time a block ge= ts
mined w/o confirming my latest transaction.

This kind of time sensitivity is probably true of a majority of Bitcoin
use-cases, with the caveat that often the slope will be negative eventually= :
after a point in time completing the transaction has no value.


Wouldn't this RBF loop behave pretty muc= h the same in the Monopolistic Price Mechanism? (I haven't grokked RSOP= yet.)

In fact, so long as RBF works, isn't it possib= le to raise Pay-Your-Bid fees and Monopolistic Price fees over time to expr= ess the time curve preference?

=C2=A0

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bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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