Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 10.3 \(3273\))
From: Cameron Garnham <da2ce7@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgSXOkTcJ5tTssuGMCQwh-JFQTkzU5VBjaR+hKT+bD3Q6A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2017 11:05:10 +0300
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <99CEF27C-4C2B-4F62-91D4-37ACB63B443A@gmail.com>
References: <CAAS2fgRdSOu8N6L3+fBpnye+rM+W6+F=cePy=9oL4tJuCj=Jsw@mail.gmail.com>
	<E7A3E345-15C9-4C4C-B3D7-C75634243430@gmail.com>
	<CAAS2fgSXOkTcJ5tTssuGMCQwh-JFQTkzU5VBjaR+hKT+bD3Q6A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] I do not support the BIP 148 UASF
Precedence: list

Thank-you for your prompt response,

I believe I must have a different prospective of Bitcoin to you.  =
Ideologically I don=E2=80=99t agree that miners can be passive =
participants in the Bitcoin Network; and I certainly don=E2=80=99t see =
them acting as passive participants in the Bitcoin Community now.

The miners are very much political actors.  Hence why I fail to =
take-to-heart your concern "that the proposal will reject the blocks of =
passive participants=E2=80=9D.

With AsicBoost, there are three miner groups: Those who use it (and have =
legal sanction to do so); Those who use it (without legal sanction); and =
those who don=E2=80=99t use it.  If SegWit didn=E2=80=99t directly =
affect miners, then one could possibly claim that there could be an =
ideal passive participant miner in reality. However since your important =
revelations on AsicBoost: SegWit cannot be a =E2=80=98passive=E2=80=99 =
option for miners.

Hence, I don=E2=80=99t care about orphaning the blocks of of the =
theoretical "passive participant=E2=80=9D miner. As I have no logical =
reasoning to suggest one could exists; and a large amount of evidence to =
suggesting one dose not exit.


On BIP 16 vs. BIP 17;  I cannot see how BIP 148 similar engineering =
tradeoffs.  Is there any long-term =E2=80=98technical debt=E2=80=99 from =
BIP 148 that I=E2=80=99m unaware of that could be similar to BIP 16?


On the Drama:  Well 100M USD p/a can pay for lots of Drama; Hence going =
back to the first point: The miners are not passive participants when it =
comes to *any* form of activation of SegWit.

Cameron.


> On 15 Apr 2017, at 10:04 AM, Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> wrote:
>=20
> On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 6:28 AM, Cameron Garnham <da2ce7@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> As many may remember, there was quite some controversy about the =
BIP16 vs BIP 17 split; the main argument for BIP16 was the urgency of =
P2SH, and how this was the already =E2=80=9Ctested and proven to work=E2=80=
=9D solution.
>=20
> And as a result we ultimately got a clearly inferior solution (520
> byte script limit; 80-bit security; months of orphaned blocks-- and
> two of those were not issues in BIP17).  I went along for the cram
> fest on 16 after 12 caught fire, and I was mistaken to do so.
>=20
> Doubly so because it took years for P2SH to achieve any kind of mass
> deployment due to issues far away from consensus.  An extra two months
> spent on some ground-work (including communications and documentation)
> could have pulled forward practical deployment by a year and given
> time to find and fix some of the flaws in the design of P2SH.
>=20
>> BIP 148 is out (our?) terms of peace.  The Bitcoin Community is =
tired-to-death of this war and wants a resolution swiftly. BIP 148 =
proves a outlet, and in Maxwell words: =E2=80=9C...almost guarantees at =
a minor level of disruption.=E2=80=9D.
>=20
> It seems I lost a word in my comment: that should have been "almost
> guarantees at _least_ a minor level of disruption". A minor level of
> disruption is the _minimum_ amount of disruption, and for no good
> reason except an unprecedented and unjustified level of haste.
>=20
> Considering that you did not spare a single word about the specific
> property that I am concerned about-- that the proposal will reject the
> blocks of passive participants, due to avoidable design limitations--
> I can't help but feel that you don't even care to understand the
> concern I was bringing up. :(
>=20
> How many people barely reviewed the specifics of the proposal simply
> because they want something fast and this proposal does something
> fast?
>=20
>> tired-to-death of this war and wants a resolution swiftly
>=20
> By now competitors and opponents to Bitcoin have surely realized that
> they can attack Bitcoin by stirring up drama.
>=20
> As a result, the only way that we will ever be free from "war" is if
> we choose to not let it impact us as much as possible. We must be
> imperturbable and continue working at the same level of excellence as
> if virtual shells weren't flying overhead-- or otherwise there is an
> incentive to keep them flying 24/7. Internet drama is remarkably cheap
> to generate. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself".
>=20
> The alternative is that we hand opponents a ready made formula for
> disruption: astroturf enough drama up that Bitcoiners "sacrifice
> correctness" themselves right off a cliff in a futile attempt to make
> it go away. :)