Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07280C002D for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:19:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6257842B9 for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:19:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org D6257842B9 Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=bitrefill.com header.i=@bitrefill.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=b header.b=PJ/RLW3m X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.089 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.089 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id f6HOHkIu0E0W for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:19:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org 1E2B783F8C Received: from mail-lj1-x231.google.com (mail-lj1-x231.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::231]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1E2B783F8C for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:19:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lj1-x231.google.com with SMTP id r22so3850448ljn.10 for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 07:19:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=bitrefill.com; s=b; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=osjOuJvBwnoh6sQDc1NAmGHY8WiYdXfSehaojPVyTMc=; b=PJ/RLW3msYm7C21ZHKCCaD/JiT/I0BsONafmWih68bOYaNTYoE9B0slCkEdxzIe+s8 rX63pstTeid79vjPRSIAhejlocQKZrD4FAzzsZmrP7c9xovJH/WuwjtYT19enjvZFrwV u95Gc5N01zsT4OBteXAlsGRe+JBQmQugVrixQmSvf25FsZnL2y2avL30sDEAlR1yAMk1 QfxhBYOiP57trqGsrbrU2uCpODNvrDwaGsbQRW684IsRNRlkGOoL5M80M9SE00M2SB5+ cs5uyL933DLh0LdvTLj4/aO5tWJhzmcO9H9PbINoAOl3QF9lBA8/Th8nuxOpdFxL1cVf nHHA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=osjOuJvBwnoh6sQDc1NAmGHY8WiYdXfSehaojPVyTMc=; b=Dk2GZD9sf2pvoZldO7HxRCITYFfKHWu+ev/nkT7Qk8czWIxpt9F+IVOuO58PP7ItqG M/abkCtSoMZ8knykgiljC9CEX9rfP1K2LSRW+UqCX+vgisR1WSZO4jrNyXojdLiKxQa0 6h1jMcJq0WjULgRlcqoA0PLqgcTJ/K4/aewiidAztQCXi9ZMWqI/1th3fVTwDiRGMcxu 6bPbRZv8NClubDbX9A0EIcmo6uA6troaxsaQj+6icmTNSfdCJuoAu8+gn/AVrt1lgiwB SSRVOw4MGC2+3wH8O/XaN8QABQ63pxpMSX7XinXg4Um8PAs0n4lgv+KKBOl7AYmRTUkq linw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACrzQf0wsOK7N4zdy6LPudJ/qHstR440gkWe7nWaF/w2JjeC/ZKlZqHu jl8aLCmCElfMkxZIZEdd+1XgD7I/XfEdfPmjkd72tg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMsMyM5rFaE9bkyNGpUlPAJ/rb+fFstuJP3Xnf9NajjChAYEVF5yPTSwMRoTuSn2gnuUysNjEGAfKBW8GfWUKMp5Tu8= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:3510:0:b0:26f:aecf:e0c6 with SMTP id z16-20020a2e3510000000b0026faecfe0c6mr7148991ljz.483.1666361983723; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 07:19:43 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Sergej Kotliar Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 16:19:32 +0200 Message-ID: To: Greg Sanders Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000001b88f305eb8c2237" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 18:47:17 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Anthony Towns Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Opt-in full-RBF] Zero-conf apps in immediate danger X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:19:49 -0000 --0000000000001b88f305eb8c2237 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Fri, 21 Oct 2022 at 16:01, Greg Sanders wrote: > Full-rbf is an odd duck, because while it is not a consensus issue, it > does affect a large % of transactions made by wallets already, contrary to > most policy changes. > Yeah, there are several policy features that are not consensus related but end up de facto setting rules for how bitcoin behaves. Minrelayfee being another, and probably other examples out there that I don't know of. > It's also a UX issue, not a safety issue for retail wallet users(except > Muun, who have given a clear timeline). Clearly considerations would be > very different otherwise, but retail wallets by and large do not consider > 0-conf as a valid deposit, or at least put up some warning symbols to that > effect. > > Can only speak for myself, but I am looking for a concrete timeframe from > 0-conf stakeholders. I have no preference for any particular time frame, as > long as it can be agreed upon in the near-ish future. This keeps the > transition technically speaking very simple, and removes uncertainty from > decision making going forward. > It's hard to give a timeframe because it's not clear what the path forward for these stakeholders is. Most of what I've heard in this channel is things like "just use Lightning" but that's contradicted by user data. So the action becomes "stop accepting payments onchain" which isn't really a timeframe type issue, it will hurt whenever it happens. Maybe a thorough discussion for a way forward would be useful here. Jeremy Rubin suggested an interesting idea for using CPFP to force a transaction to complete. We'll evaluate it and see if it works in the wild for zero-conf of RBF today and report findings, need to evaluate from several angles first incentives-wise. There might also be other solutions. I'd also ask if there might also be other solutions for solving the pinning issue as well if we dig deep into it? Perhaps there are those with tradeoffs, but those tradeoffs being less significant than the tradeoffs of rbf policy? Best, Sergej > > On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 8:02 AM Sergej Kotliar > wrote: > >> On Thu, 20 Oct 2022 at 23:07, Greg Sanders wrote: >> >>> A large number of coins/users sit on custodial rails and this would >>> essentially encumber protocol developers to those KYC/AML institutions. If >>> Binance decides to never support Lightning in favor of BNC-wrapped BTC, >>> should this be an issue at all for reasoning about a path forward? >>> >> >> This is a big question here, with the caveat that it's not just binance >> but in fact the majority of wallets and services that people use with >> bitcoin today. >> But the question remains as you phrased: At which point do we break >> backwards compatibility? Another analogy would be to have sunset the old >> P2PKH addresses during rollout of Segwit - it would certainly have led to >> Segwit getting rolled out faster. The rbf change actually breaks more >> things than that, takes more effort to address than just implementing a new >> address format. Previously in the Bitcoin Core process we've chosen to keep >> backwards compatibility and only roll out opt-in changes with broad >> consensus over them, with the default behavior being to not roll out >> changes that are controversial. At which point it's time to back away from >> that - I honestly don't know. There is probably such a point, and we should >> maybe have some kind of discussion around that topic on a higher level, >> just as you phrased it, and I'll paraphrase: >> If a majority of bitcoin wallets and services continue using legacy >> patterns and features, preventing progress, at which point do we want to >> break compatibility with them? >> >> Best, >> Sergej >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 3:59 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> >>>> On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via >>>> bitcoin-dev wrote: >>>> > > If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via this >>>> > > mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet with a >>>> good >>>> > > UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not >>>> something >>>> > > where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all? >>>> > Sort of. But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will >>>> have to >>>> > do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC >>>> to a >>>> > custodial account. But this option isn't available to your normal >>>> payment >>>> > processor type business. >>>> >>>> So, what I'm hearing is: >>>> >>>> * lightning works great, but is still pretty small >>>> * zeroconf works great for txs that opt-out of RBF >>>> * opt-in RBF is a pain for two reasons: >>>> - people don't like that it's not treated as zeroconf >>>> - the risk of fiat/BTC exchange rate changes between >>>> now and when the tx actually confirms is worrying >>>> even if it hasn't caused real problems yet >>>> >>>> (Please correct me if that's too far wrong) >>>> >>>> Maybe it would be productive to explore this opt-in RBF part a bit >>>> more? ie, see if "we" can come up with better answers to some question >>>> along the lines of: >>>> >>>> "how can we make on-chain payments for goods priced in fiat work well >>>> for payees that opt-in to RBF?" >>>> >>>> That seems like the sort of thing that's better solved by a >>>> collaboration >>>> between wallet devs and merchant devs (and protocol devs?), rather than >>>> just one or the other? >>>> >>>> Is that something that we could talk about here? Or maybe it's better >>>> done via an optech workgroup or something? >>>> >>>> If "we'll credit your account in BTC, then work out the USD coversion >>>> and deduct that for your purchase, then you can do whatever you like >>>> with any remaining BTC from your on-chain payment" is the idea, maybe we >>>> should just roll with that design, but make it more decentralised: have >>>> the initial payment setup a lightning channel between the customer and >>>> the merchant with the BTC (so it's not custodial), but do some magic to >>>> allow USD amounts to be transferred over it (Taro? something oracle >>>> based >>>> so that both parties are confident a fair exchange rate will be used?). >>>> >>>> Maybe that particular idea is naive, but having an actual problem to >>>> solve seems more constructive than just saying "we want rbf" "but we >>>> want zeroconf" all the time? >>>> >>>> (Ideally the lightning channels above would be dual funded so they could >>>> be used for routing more generally; but then dual funded channels are >>>> one of the things that get broken by lack of full rbf) >>>> >>>> > > I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroconf was to >>>> create >>>> > > two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one paying >>>> > > yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchant >>>> to >>>> > > the merchant, and the other to everyone else. >>>> > > I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ago: >>>> > > >>>> https://np.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my_doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/ >>>> > > >>>> https://github.com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend.py >>>> > Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years >>>> ago to >>>> > declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data >>>> that of >>>> > the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully >>>> > abusing us. >>>> >>>> I mean, the avenue above isn't easy to exploit -- you have to identify >>>> the merchant's node so that they get the bad tx, and you have to connect >>>> to many peers so that your preferred tx propogates to miners first -- >>>> and probably more importantly, it's relatively easy to detect -- if the >>>> merchant has a few passive nodes that the attacker doesn't know about >>>> it, and uses those to watch for attempted doublespends while it tries >>>> to ensure the real tx has propogated widely. So it doesn't surprise me >>>> at all that it's not often attempted, and even less often successful. >>>> >>>> > > > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bitcoin >>>> > > > payments. >>>> > > So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your bitcoin >>>> > > payments break down as something like: >>>> > > 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded from zeroconf >>>> > > 15% txs are lightning >>>> > > 20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded from zeroconf >>>> > > 60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf >>>> > Numbers are right. Shady is too strong a word, >>>> >>>> Heh, fair enough. >>>> >>>> So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience, >>>> compared to what you'd like them to have (which sucks, but if you're >>>> trying to reinvent both money and payments, maybe isn't surprising). And >>>> going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty >>>> terrible. >>>> >>>> > RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone >>>> > accepting bitcoin payments at scale. >>>> >>>> So let's make it better? Building bitcoin businesses on the lie that >>>> unconfirmed txs are safe and won't be replaced is going to bite us >>>> eventually; focussing on trying to push that back indefinitely is just >>>> going to make everyone less prepared when it eventually happens. >>>> >>>> > > > For me >>>> > > > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when >>>> Lightning is at >>>> > > > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions. >>>> > > Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate when >>>> that >>>> > > might be, given current trends? >>>> > Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of >>>> Lightning >>>> > growth happen faster than the first 15%. Hard to tell. But we're >>>> likely >>>> > talking years here.. >>>> >>>> Okay? Two years is very different from 50 years, and at the moment >>>> there's >>>> not really any data, so people are just going to go with their gut... >>>> >>>> If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per >>>> bitcoinvisuals.com/ln-capacity; then 15% now would have grown from >>>> perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year. With linear growth, >>>> getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years. >>>> >>>> Presumably that's a laughably terrible model, of course. But if we had >>>> some actual numbers where we can watch the progress, it might be a lot >>>> easier to be patient about waiting for lightning adoption to hit 80% >>>> or whatever, and focus on productive things in the meantime? >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> aj >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> >> Sergej Kotliar >> >> CEO >> >> >> Twitter: @ziggamon >> >> >> www.bitrefill.com >> >> Twitter | Blog >> | Angellist >> >> > -- Sergej Kotliar CEO Twitter: @ziggamon www.bitrefill.com Twitter | Blog | Angellist --0000000000001b88f305eb8c2237 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


=
On Fri, 21 Oct 2022 at 16:01, Greg Sa= nders <gsanders87@gmail.com&= gt; wrote:
Full-rbf is an odd duck, because while it is not a consensus is= sue, it does affect a large % of transactions made by wallets already, cont= rary to most policy changes.=C2=A0

Ye= ah, there are several policy features that are not consensus related but en= d up de facto setting rules for how bitcoin behaves. Minrelayfee being anot= her, and probably other examples out there that I don't know of.=C2=A0<= /div>
=C2=A0
It's also a UX issue, not a safety issue for retail = wallet users(except Muun, who have given a clear timeline). Clearly conside= rations would be very different otherwise, but retail wallets by and large = do not consider 0-conf as a valid deposit,=C2=A0or at least put up some war= ning symbols to that effect.

Can only speak for myse= lf, but I am looking for a concrete timeframe from 0-conf stakeholders. I h= ave no preference for any particular time frame, as long as it can be agree= d upon in the near-ish future. This keeps the transition technically speaki= ng very simple, and removes uncertainty from decision making going forward.=

It's hard to give a = timeframe because it's not clear what the path forward for these stakeh= olders is. Most of what I've heard in this channel is things like "= ;just use Lightning" but that's contradicted by user data. So the = action becomes "stop accepting payments onchain" which isn't = really a timeframe type issue, it will hurt whenever it happens. Maybe a th= orough discussion for a way forward would be useful here. Jeremy Rubin sugg= ested an interesting idea for using CPFP to force a transaction to complete= . We'll evaluate it and see if it works in the wild for zero-conf of RB= F today and report findings, need to evaluate from several angles first inc= entives-wise. There might also be other solutions.=C2=A0

I'd also ask if there might also be other solutions for solving = the pinning issue as well if we dig deep into it? Perhaps there are those w= ith tradeoffs, but those tradeoffs being less significant than the tradeoff= s of rbf policy?
=C2=A0

Best,=C2=A0
Sergej

On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 8:02 AM Sergej Kotliar <sergej@bitrefill.com= > wrote:
=
On Thu, 20 Oct 2022 at 23:07, Greg Sander= s <gsanders87@= gmail.com> wrote:
A large number of= coins/users sit on custodial rails and this would essentially encumber pro= tocol developers to those KYC/AML institutions. If Binance decides to never= support Lightning in favor of BNC-wrapped BTC, should this be an issue at = all for reasoning about a path forward?

This is a big question here, with the caveat that it's not jus= t binance but in fact the majority of wallets and services that people use = with bitcoin today.
But the question remains as you phrased: At w= hich point do we break backwards compatibility? Another analogy would be to= have sunset the old P2PKH addresses during rollout of Segwit - it would ce= rtainly have led to Segwit getting rolled out faster. The rbf change actual= ly breaks more things than that, takes more effort to address than just imp= lementing a new address format. Previously in the Bitcoin Core process we&#= 39;ve chosen to keep backwards compatibility and only roll out opt-in chang= es with broad consensus over them, with the default behavior being to not r= oll out changes that are controversial. At which point it's time to bac= k away from that - I honestly don't know. There is probably such a poin= t, and we should maybe have some kind of discussion around that topic on a = higher level, just as you phrased it, and I'll paraphrase:=C2=A0
<= div>If a majority of bitcoin wallets and services continue using legacy pat= terns and features, preventing progress, at which point do we want to break= compatibility with them?

Best,
Sergej


On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 3:59 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin= -dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Ser= gej Kotliar via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via t= his
> > mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet wit= h a good
> > UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not some= thing
> > where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all?<= br> > Sort of. But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will ha= ve to
> do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC = to a
> custodial account. But this option isn't available to your normal = payment
> processor type business.

So, what I'm hearing is:

=C2=A0* lightning works great, but is still pretty small
=C2=A0* zeroconf works great for txs that opt-out of RBF
=C2=A0* opt-in RBF is a pain for two reasons:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - people don't like that it's not treated as zeroconf=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - the risk of fiat/BTC exchange rate changes between
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 now and when the tx actually confirms is worrying
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 even if it hasn't caused real problems yet

(Please correct me if that's too far wrong)

Maybe it would be productive to explore this opt-in RBF part a bit
more? ie, see if "we" can come up with better answers to some que= stion
along the lines of:

=C2=A0"how can we make on-chain payments for goods priced in fiat work= well
=C2=A0 for payees that opt-in to RBF?"

That seems like the sort of thing that's better solved by a collaborati= on
between wallet devs and merchant devs (and protocol devs?), rather than
just one or the other?

Is that something that we could talk about here? Or maybe it's better done via an optech workgroup or something?

If "we'll credit your account in BTC, then work out the USD covers= ion
and deduct that for your purchase, then you can do whatever you like
with any remaining BTC from your on-chain payment" is the idea, maybe = we
should just roll with that design, but make it more decentralised: have
the initial payment setup a lightning channel between the customer and
the merchant with the BTC (so it's not custodial), but do some magic to=
allow USD amounts to be transferred over it (Taro? something oracle based so that both parties are confident a fair exchange rate will be used?).

Maybe that particular idea is naive, but having an actual problem to
solve seems more constructive than just saying "we want rbf" &quo= t;but we
want zeroconf" all the time?

(Ideally the lightning channels above would be dual funded so they could be used for routing more generally; but then dual funded channels are
one of the things that get broken by lack of full rbf)

> > I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroc= onf was to create
> > two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one payi= ng
> > yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchan= t to
> > the merchant, and the other to everyone else.
> > I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ag= o:
> > https://np.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my= _doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/
> > https://github= .com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend.py
> Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years a= go to
> declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data tha= t of
> the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully > abusing us.

I mean, the avenue above isn't easy to exploit -- you have to identify<= br> the merchant's node so that they get the bad tx, and you have to connec= t
to many peers so that your preferred tx propogates to miners first --
and probably more importantly, it's relatively easy to detect -- if the=
merchant has a few passive nodes that the attacker doesn't know about it, and uses those to watch for attempted doublespends while it tries
to ensure the real tx has propogated widely. So it doesn't surprise me<= br> at all that it's not often attempted, and even less often successful.
> > > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bit= coin
> > > payments.
> > So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your = bitcoin
> > payments break down as something like:
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded = from zeroconf
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A015% txs are lightning
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A020% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded = from zeroconf
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A060% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf
> Numbers are right. Shady is too strong a word,

Heh, fair enough.

So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience,
compared to what you'd like them to have (which sucks, but if you'r= e
trying to reinvent both money and payments, maybe isn't surprising). An= d
going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty
terrible.

> RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone
> accepting bitcoin payments at scale.

So let's make it better? Building bitcoin businesses on the lie that unconfirmed txs are safe and won't be replaced is going to bite us
eventually; focussing on trying to push that back indefinitely is just
going to make everyone less prepared when it eventually happens.

> > > For me
> > > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Lig= htning is at
> > > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions.
> > Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate = when that
> > might be, given current trends?
> Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of Lightnin= g
> growth happen faster than the first 15%. Hard to tell. But we're l= ikely
> talking years here..

Okay? Two years is very different from 50 years, and at the moment there= 9;s
not really any data, so people are just going to go with their gut...

If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per
bitcoinvisuals.com/ln-capacity; then 15% now would have gro= wn from
perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year. With linear growth,
getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years.

Presumably that's a laughably terrible model, of course. But if we had<= br> some actual numbers where we can watch the progress, it might be a lot
easier to be patient about waiting for lightning adoption to hit 80%
or whatever, and focus on productive things in the meantime?

Cheers,
aj
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--


--

Sergej Kotliar

CEO


Twitter: @ziggamon=C2= =A0


www= .bitrefill.com

Twitter | Blog | Angellist

--0000000000001b88f305eb8c2237--