Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B3D3C002D for ; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 21:42:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F83F40136 for ; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 21:42:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 3F83F40136 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=M8ksrTlV X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ldvO79xG3y_2 for ; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 21:42:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 33F30400BF Received: from mail-io1-xd31.google.com (mail-io1-xd31.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d31]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33F30400BF for ; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 21:42:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-io1-xd31.google.com with SMTP id b79so10107519iof.5 for ; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 14:42:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=cYHkkNIinjd26Ehsunf5aTg82C5+zu8Ly4A3I6aHJes=; b=M8ksrTlV/7Z8XcP3lamb5m65mJJIBYVz5kTJXBWIQwrKeZ47R9YH2bw+Fjcwgd2SpX 6hvNJHBGlBrLy4aV0kM+nlw2iq/GDxu3CzttxbVbMuav11xOK0ZwRU1oDTvaokwvcS87 uT//1gaQ3bYJBaKDeV04FY4JYIKGxDs8WTE4MVsxLCnfgLNqSV+SBlKYQ6zzRShNmlkR o7DaY4+haII4x7OPXxtSMvrwdRFtZzMWQlz/QK+maDbzHMciYO/PiGXdiIHbGl9Heqvh KomSK4DbJ0P74+RGb8LOESqFX92BOKt5TF3ZP1tV59RshK3xUeIp8AcI254tMme2Zxei 3hxQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=cYHkkNIinjd26Ehsunf5aTg82C5+zu8Ly4A3I6aHJes=; b=VgcbF9e7cJgutNfsUIAtWYAeIGV+ZvUq7Fz9dkDHhzbcTd8FQhHWWxbfLgxHzOL1+j msrar/13SZBeFxKVKojGdoClpriUPvIXMqRB6d/tDj254Nfz8k/31cSTvBvf9GdFs/pa Tdq0A+zXTIrupUkojj/Mar6FJjRDsIMZYiqgL0OjB5rwrvXL+j4/FBKUFiYJUk8ulkRw Cn3WPNkchJmIPq0X4gIDzmnmN/WfdCu6V5RFR9qFk5+3BV3Rl0YT96+1EPDgAhl0VaO7 qbfNsz+z4xnT0911jE4zgGRntHqARV8sBXUPvLBGEqJH2vr3hAWDXPOL7sLwdR1Uj3mp ls0g== X-Gm-Message-State: ACrzQf3IIqNiTQ7DOKucxh7LMP9qN2c+iPuzU5OI5j+FrT2JqXU+lwX8 Ah7Xlo+I+mh0bsdi6n1jqgPjrMwgcQW9Kf8BBlyQMDbXaZ91Ug== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMsMyM6Sd44mhpX681Ka8Zz0WlOg+PGOV5IAkYVLbg1t1rtKx+HkcTZs26DBV9T6hDDubBNpBAabVKObytxaSG2YHI8= X-Received: by 2002:a6b:f605:0:b0:6bb:cafc:ec27 with SMTP id n5-20020a6bf605000000b006bbcafcec27mr5823422ioh.194.1666042920118; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 14:42:00 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <0hpdGx-1WbZdG31xaMXGHKTCjJ2-0eB5aIXUdsp3bqI1MlCx6TMZWROwpl1TVI5irrBqRN2-ydM6hmf3M5L-7ZQfazbx66oameiWTHayr6w=@wuille.net> In-Reply-To: From: Antoine Riard Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 17:41:48 -0400 Message-ID: To: Anthony Towns , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000006f2eb005eb41d836" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 21:52:10 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Opt-in full-RBF] Zero-conf apps in immediate danger X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 21:42:03 -0000 --0000000000006f2eb005eb41d836 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi AJ, > 1) Continue supporting and encouraging accepting unconfirmed "on-chain" > payments indefinitely > > 2) Draw a line in the sand now, but give people who are currently > accepting unconfirmed txs time to update their software and business > model > > 3) Encourage mainnet miners and relay nodes to support unconditional > RBF immediately, no matter how much that increases the risk to > existing businesses that are still accepting unconfirmed txs To give more context, the initial approach of enabling full RBF through #25353 + #25600 wasn't making the assumption the enablement itself would reach agreement of the economic majority or unanimity. Rather, it would give the tools to node operators to build full-rbf relay paths and as such to fulfill their applications requirements (e.g lightning dual-funding). Without denying that such equilibrium would be unstable, it was designed to remove the responsibility of the Core project itself to "draw a hard line" on the subject. Moreover, relying on node operators turning on the setting provides a smoother approach offering time to zero-conf services to react in consequence. So the current path definitely belongs more to a 3) approach. While this way cannot be denied to be a zero-risk deployment for business accepting unconfirmed transactions, it should be weighed in face of multi-party contracting protocols encumbering an annoying pinning vector. It sounds to me that an adequate way to resolve such a "split-risk" situation has been to adopt a "micro" release practice rather than a "macro" one, namely offer the options to node operators and let them vote with their respective economic traffics. Since Dario's mail, I think we have learnt new data points, a) on the long term full RBF to align miner incentives is acknowledged and b) a clear timeline based on e.g a block height is favored over the pollination deployment. As such, I think it makes sense to revise the full RBF deployment approach, concentrating the discussion on the reasonable time buffer we should adopt before activating full RBF on mainet. A time buffer realistic with respect to the engineering, operational and vendoring needs of the zero-conf businesses/applications. I hope both #26305 and #26323 answer those criterias. Tie-breaking between both, I believe I would favor something like #26323 though only post 24.0 to avoid introducing a bikeshedding precedent in terms of release process, and with a longer timeline to be sure we ship 25.0 before the activation day. Though listening to more feedback and decision factors, if we have more things to consider. > But if (3) *is* what we're really trying to do, I think it's a bit > disingenuous to assume that that effort will fail, and tell people that > nothing's going to change on mainnet in the near future [8] [9] [10] > [11]. If pools are starting to allow replacements of txs that didn't > signal according to BIP 125 and mine blocks including those replacements, > then it's true that zero-conf apps are in much more immediate danger > than they were a month ago, and as far as I can see, we shouldn't be > pretending otherwise. Concerning my statement only, it should be re-contextualize with the other statements calling the zero-conf operators to adapt their services, or raise concerns, or be proactive at least [0]. On the other hand, from my perspective, a status quo situation is also unsafe, as we left things like multi-party coinjoins being DoSed by deanonymizing attackers. So in case of risk arbitrage situation, as developers, best we can do is be vocal about it and if possible find a common ground among all stakeholders. And I think this is what this current thread aims to achieve, which I would say is a healthy release process. Best, Antoine [0] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020557.ht= ml Le dim. 16 oct. 2022 =C3=A0 04:09, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> a =C3=A9crit : > On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 02:35:22PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 12, 2022 at 04:11:05PM +0000, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > > In my view, it is just what I said: a step towards getting full RBF > > > on the network, by allowing experimentation and socializing the notio= n > > > that developers believe it is time. > > We "believe it is time" for what exactly, though? (a) To start > > deprerecating accepting zeroconf txs on mainnet, over the next 6, 12 or > > 18 months; or (b) to start switching mainnet mining and relay nodes ove= r > > to full RBF? > > For what it's worth, that was a serious question: I don't feel like I > know what other people's answer to it is. > > Seems to me like there's fundamentally maybe three approaches: > > 1) Continue supporting and encouraging accepting unconfirmed "on-chain" > payments indefinitely > > 2) Draw a line in the sand now, but give people who are currently > accepting unconfirmed txs time to update their software and business > model > > 3) Encourage mainnet miners and relay nodes to support unconditional > RBF immediately, no matter how much that increases the risk to > existing businesses that are still accepting unconfirmed txs > > I think Antoine gave a pretty decent rationale for why we shouldn't > indefinitely continue with conditional RBF in [0] [1] -- it makes it > easy to disrupt decentralised pooling protocols, whether that be for > establishing lightning channels or coinjoins or anything else. > > [0] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033= .html > [1] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020557.= html > > It's also an unstable equilibrium -- if everyone does first-seen-is-final > at the mempool level, everything is fine; but it only takes a few > defectors to start relaying and mining full RBF txs to spoil zeroconf > for everyone -- so even if it were desirable to maintain it forever, > it's probably not actually possible to maintain it indefinitely. > > If so, that leaves the choice between (2) and (3). You might argue > that there's a 4th option: ignore the problem and think about it later; > but to me that seems like it will just eventually result in outcome (3). > > > At least a few people are already running full RBF relay nodes [2] [3] > [4], and there's a report that non-signalling RBF txs are now getting > mined [5] when they weren't a few months ago [6]. I wasn't able to > confirm the latter to my satisfaction: looking at mempool.observer, the > non-RBF signalling conflicting txs don't seem to have been consistently > paying a higher feerate, so I couldn't rule out the possibility that > the difference might just be due to inconsistent relaying. > > [2] https://twitter.com/murchandamus/status/1552488955328831492 > [3] https://twitter.com/LukeDashjr/status/977211607947317254 > [4] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020592.= html > [5] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020592.= html > [6] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020592.= html > > It seems to me that the best approach for implementing (3) would be > to change the default for -mempoolfullrbf to true immediately, which > is both what Knots has been doing for years, and what #26305 proposes > [7]. So from seeing what people are actually *doing*, I could easily > be convinced that (3) is the goal people are actually working towards. > > [7] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26305 > > But if (3) *is* what we're really trying to do, I think it's a bit > disingenuous to assume that that effort will fail, and tell people that > nothing's going to change on mainnet in the near future [8] [9] [10] > [11]. If pools are starting to allow replacements of txs that didn't > signal according to BIP 125 and mine blocks including those replacements, > then it's true that zero-conf apps are in much more immediate danger > than they were a month ago, and as far as I can see, we shouldn't be > pretending otherwise. > > [8] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26287#issuecomment-1274953204 > [9] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26287#issuecomment-1276682043 > [10] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/0209= 81.html > [11] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/0210= 06.html > > Personally, I prefer an approach like (2) -- commit to doing something > first, give people time to prepare for it, and then do it, and outside > of Knots, I don't think there's been any clear commitment to deprecating > zeroconf txs up until now. But what we're currently doing is suboptimal > for that in two ways: > > - there's no real commitment that the change will actually happen > - even if it does, there's no indication when that will be > - it's not easy to test your apps against the new world order, because > it's not well supported on either testnet or signet, being disabled > by default on both those networks > > Dario suggested an approach [12] that seems like it would resolve all > these issues: > > ] This could be one such proposal: > ] 1. We activate [..] full-RBF on testnet now. > ] 2. We commit now (in the code) to a block height in the future at > ] which [..] full-RBF will activate on mainnet. > > (I've delted the words "opt-in" and "opt-out" from the quote above, > because they didn't make sense to me) > > [12] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/0210= 07.html > > I've made up a patch along these lines [13]; it's easy to use a timestamp > rather than a block height, so I've arbitrarily picked 1st May (slightly > over 6 months away) as the changeover time. If people are willing to > give zeroconf businesses some time to adapt, including something along > those lines in 24.0 seems a better approach to me: > > * it gives a clear deadline for businesses to adapt, so that they don't > defer it and suddenly complain "oh no, we didn't think you were > serious, please give us more time" later > > * it gives plenty(?) of time to update your code and test it, as well > as teach customers and customer support about the new behaviour > > * when the deadline hits, presumably plenty of nodes and miners will > immediately start supporting the new behaviour on mainnet, so that > protocols can quickly start relying on that method of tx pinning no > longer being applicable > > * nodes on signet and testnet will quickly adopt the new behaviour, > well before it's available on mainnet, making testing easier > > [13] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26323 > > To me, this seems like a good way of achieving what I said previously: > > > If we're trying to socialise the idea that zeroconf deprecation is > > happening and that your business now has a real deadline for migrating > > away from accepting unconfirmed txs if the risk of being defrauded > > concerns you, then enabling experimentation on test nets and not touchi= ng > > mainnet until a later release seems fairly fine to me -- similar to > > activating soft forks on test nets prior to activating it on mainnet. > > Cheers, > aj > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --0000000000006f2eb005eb41d836 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi AJ,

> =C2=A01) Continue supporting and encour= aging accepting unconfirmed "on-chain"
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 paym= ents indefinitely
>
> =C2=A02) Draw a line in the sand now, bu= t give people who are currently
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 accepting unconfirmed= txs time to update their software and business
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 model=
>
> =C2=A03) Encourage mainnet miners and relay nodes to supp= ort unconditional
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RBF immediately, no matter how much= that increases the risk to
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 existing businesses that = are still accepting unconfirmed txs

To give more context, the initia= l approach of enabling full RBF through #25353 + #25600 wasn't making t= he assumption the enablement itself would reach agreement of the economic m= ajority or unanimity. Rather, it would give the tools to node operators to = build full-rbf relay paths and as such to fulfill their applications requir= ements (e.g lightning dual-funding). Without denying that such equilibrium = would be unstable, it was designed to remove the responsibility of the Core= project itself to "draw a hard line" on the subject. Moreover, r= elying on node operators turning on the setting provides a smoother approac= h offering time to zero-conf services to react in consequence.

So th= e current path definitely belongs more to a 3) approach. While this way can= not be denied to be a zero-risk deployment for business accepting unconfirm= ed transactions, it should be weighed in face of multi-party contracting pr= otocols encumbering an annoying pinning vector. It sounds to me that an ade= quate way to resolve such a "split-risk" situation has been to ad= opt a "micro" release practice rather than a "macro" on= e, namely offer the options to node operators and let them vote with their = respective economic traffics.

Since Dario's mail, I think we hav= e learnt new data points, a) on the long term full RBF to align miner incen= tives is acknowledged and b) a clear timeline based on e.g a block height i= s favored over the pollination deployment.

As such, I think it makes= sense to revise the full RBF deployment approach, concentrating the discus= sion on the reasonable time buffer we should adopt before activating full R= BF on mainet. A time buffer realistic with respect to the engineering,
o= perational and vendoring needs of the zero-conf businesses/applications. I = hope both #26305 and #26323 answer those criterias. Tie-breaking between bo= th, I believe I would favor something like #26323 though only post 24.0 to = avoid introducing a bikeshedding precedent in terms of release process, and= with a longer timeline to be sure we ship 25.0 before the activation day. = Though listening to more feedback and decision factors, if we have more thi= ngs to consider.

> But if (3) *is* what we're really trying t= o do, I think it's a bit
> disingenuous to assume that that effor= t will fail, and tell people that
> nothing's going to change on = mainnet in the near future [8] [9] [10]
> [11]. If pools are starting= to allow replacements of txs that didn't
> signal according to B= IP 125 and mine blocks including those replacements,
> then it's = true that zero-conf apps are in much more immediate danger
> than the= y were a month ago, and as far as I can see, we shouldn't be
> pr= etending otherwise.

Concerning my statement only, it should be re-co= ntextualize with the other statements calling the zero-conf operators to ad= apt their services, or raise concerns, or be proactive at least [0]. On the= other hand, from my perspective, a status quo situation is also unsafe, as= we left things like multi-party coinjoins being DoSed by deanonymizing att= ackers. So in case of risk arbitrage situation, as developers, best we can = do is be vocal about it and if possible find a common ground among all stak= eholders. And I think this is what this current thread aims to achieve, whi= ch I would say is a healthy release process.

Best,
Antoine
[0] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev= /2022-June/020557.html

Le=C2=A0dim. 16 oct. 2022 =C3=A0=C2=A004:09, = Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> a =C3=A9crit= =C2=A0:
On Thu, = Oct 13, 2022 at 02:35:22PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 12, 2022 at 04:11:05PM +0000, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-de= v wrote:
> > In my view, it is just what I said: a step towards getting full R= BF
> > on the network, by allowing experimentation and socializing the n= otion
> > that developers believe it is time.
> We "believe it is time" for what exactly, though? (a) To sta= rt
> deprerecating accepting zeroconf txs on mainnet, over the next 6, 12 o= r
> 18 months; or (b) to start switching mainnet mining and relay nodes ov= er
> to full RBF?

For what it's worth, that was a serious question: I don't feel like= I
know what other people's answer to it is.

Seems to me like there's fundamentally maybe three approaches:

=C2=A01) Continue supporting and encouraging accepting unconfirmed "on= -chain"
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 payments indefinitely

=C2=A02) Draw a line in the sand now, but give people who are currently
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 accepting unconfirmed txs time to update their software and b= usiness
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 model

=C2=A03) Encourage mainnet miners and relay nodes to support unconditional<= br> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RBF immediately, no matter how much that increases the risk t= o
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 existing businesses that are still accepting unconfirmed txs<= br>
I think Antoine gave a pretty decent rationale for why we shouldn't
indefinitely continue with conditional RBF in [0] [1] -- it makes it
easy to disrupt decentralised pooling protocols, whether that be for
establishing lightning channels or coinjoins or anything else.

[0] https://lists.linu= xfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html
[1] https://lists.linux= foundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020557.html

It's also an unstable equilibrium -- if everyone does first-seen-is-fin= al
at the mempool level, everything is fine; but it only takes a few
defectors to start relaying and mining full RBF txs to spoil zeroconf
for everyone -- so even if it were desirable to maintain it forever,
it's probably not actually possible to maintain it indefinitely.

If so, that leaves the choice between (2) and (3). You might argue
that there's a 4th option: ignore the problem and think about it later;=
but to me that seems like it will just eventually result in outcome (3).

At least a few people are already running full RBF relay nodes [2] [3]
[4], and there's a report that non-signalling RBF txs are now getting mined [5] when they weren't a few months ago [6]. I wasn't able to<= br> confirm the latter to my satisfaction: looking at mempool.observer, the
non-RBF signalling conflicting txs don't seem to have been consistently=
paying a higher feerate, so I couldn't rule out the possibility that the difference might just be due to inconsistent relaying.

[2] https://twitter.com/murchandamus/stat= us/1552488955328831492
[3] https://twitter.com/LukeDashjr/status/97= 7211607947317254
[4] https://lists.linux= foundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020592.html
[5] https://lists.linux= foundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020592.html
[6] https://lists.linux= foundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020592.html

It seems to me that the best approach for implementing (3) would be
to change the default for -mempoolfullrbf to true immediately, which
is both what Knots has been doing for years, and what #26305 proposes
[7].=C2=A0 So from seeing what people are actually *doing*, I could easily<= br> be convinced that (3) is the goal people are actually working towards.

[7] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26305
But if (3) *is* what we're really trying to do, I think it's a bit<= br> disingenuous to assume that that effort will fail, and tell people that
nothing's going to change on mainnet in the near future [8] [9] [10] [11]. If pools are starting to allow replacements of txs that didn't signal according to BIP 125 and mine blocks including those replacements, then it's true that zero-conf apps are in much more immediate danger than they were a month ago, and as far as I can see, we shouldn't be pretending otherwise.

[8] https://github.com/bitcoin/= bitcoin/pull/26287#issuecomment-1274953204
[9] https://github.com/bitcoin/= bitcoin/pull/26287#issuecomment-1276682043
[10] https://lists.l= inuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/020981.html
[11] https://lists.l= inuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/021006.html

Personally, I prefer an approach like (2) -- commit to doing something
first, give people time to prepare for it, and then do it, and outside
of Knots, I don't think there's been any clear commitment to deprec= ating
zeroconf txs up until now. But what we're currently doing is suboptimal=
for that in two ways:

=C2=A0- there's no real commitment that the change will actually happen=
=C2=A0- even if it does, there's no indication when that will be
=C2=A0- it's not easy to test your apps against the new world order, be= cause
=C2=A0 =C2=A0it's not well supported on either testnet or signet, being= disabled
=C2=A0 =C2=A0by default on both those networks

Dario suggested an approach [12] that seems like it would resolve all
these issues:

] This could be one such proposal:
] 1. We activate [..] full-RBF on testnet now.
] 2. We commit now (in the code) to a block height in the future at
]=C2=A0 =C2=A0 which [..] full-RBF will activate on mainnet.

(I've delted the words "opt-in" and "opt-out" from = the quote above,
because they didn't make sense to me)

[12] https://lists.l= inuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-October/021007.html

I've made up a patch along these lines [13]; it's easy to use a tim= estamp
rather than a block height, so I've arbitrarily picked 1st May (slightl= y
over 6 months away) as the changeover time. If people are willing to
give zeroconf businesses some time to adapt, including something along
those lines in 24.0 seems a better approach to me:

=C2=A0* it gives a clear deadline for businesses to adapt, so that they don= 't
=C2=A0 =C2=A0defer it and suddenly complain "oh no, we didn't thin= k you were
=C2=A0 =C2=A0serious, please give us more time" later

=C2=A0* it gives plenty(?) of time to update your code and test it, as well=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0as teach customers and customer support about the new behaviou= r

=C2=A0* when the deadline hits, presumably plenty of nodes and miners will<= br> =C2=A0 =C2=A0immediately start supporting the new behaviour on mainnet, so = that
=C2=A0 =C2=A0protocols can quickly start relying on that method of tx pinni= ng no
=C2=A0 =C2=A0longer being applicable

=C2=A0* nodes on signet and testnet will quickly adopt the new behaviour, =C2=A0 =C2=A0well before it's available on mainnet, making testing easi= er

[13] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26323<= br>
To me, this seems like a good way of achieving what I said previously:

> If we're trying to socialise the idea that zeroconf deprecation is=
> happening and that your business now has a real deadline for migrating=
> away from accepting unconfirmed txs if the risk of being defrauded
> concerns you, then enabling experimentation on test nets and not touch= ing
> mainnet until a later release seems fairly fine to me -- similar to > activating soft forks on test nets prior to activating it on mainnet.<= br>
Cheers,
aj
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