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[76.111.96.126]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id bm15sm2861651qab.17.2012.04.03.17.01.04 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Tue, 03 Apr 2012 17:01:05 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <4F7B8F46.8060706@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 03 Apr 2012 20:01:10 -0400 From: Alan Reiner User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.9.2.28) Gecko/20120313 Thunderbird/3.1.20 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Mike Koss References: <4F7A1227.7070306@gmail.com> <201204031455.42265.luke@dashjr.org> <4F7B67D6.7090101@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------070402000406060702000909" X-Spam-Score: -0.1 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (etotheipi[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 1.0 FREEMAIL_REPLY From and body contain different freemails -0.5 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1SFDex-00017q-7t Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Signature Blocks and URI Sign Requests X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2012 00:01:13 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------070402000406060702000909 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mike, You make an excellent point. Neither of these proposals impact the protocol itself. I hadn't considered that. But I think it's a critically important problem to solve (signature blocks, not so much, but it could piggy back on the same solution). So the mailing list is a good place to discuss this, but it maybe it shouldn't be labeled as a BIP. I'll leave that up to the others (arguably, the URI scheme is not a protocol change, either, but was still a BIP). There is all this fanfare around P2SH and how multi-sig is the solution to all these security problems, but how the hell do you use it? I believe that BIP 10 (or successor) is *critical//*to the success of multi-sig, because the greatest barrier to using multi-sig will be the ability to actually execute them in less than 14 steps. And if every client implements it differently, there's even less chance it will be used (assuming the userbase reaches any level of client diversity). I think we need to supply a solution to this existing problem before everyone starts solving it on their own and fragmenting the market. No one has to use the solution we come up with -- but I believe it's a problem for which most developers will take any solution that is easy to exchange, size-efficient and promised to be interoperable (if for no other reason than the Satoshi client uses it). -Alan On 04/03/2012 07:37 PM, Mike Koss wrote: > Alan, I'm coming in late to the conversation - do I understand that > BIP 010 does not propose any changes to the protocol - but just an > intermediate data format that other clients might use to collect the > need key material to sign a multi-signature block? > > If so - one might ask what the role of BIP's are if they actually do > not impact the protocol? > > If there is any encapsulated data format that is expected to be > interpreted by clients - I'd call that a "protocol change"; but I take > it in this instance that you will transmit these signature block out > of band from the client ... yet they would have to be parsed and > converted into a Transaction Script once collected by SOME client? > Would we expect the standard client do so? > > Sorry if this has been discussed before - I'm trying to understand the > proposal. > > > On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Alan Reiner > wrote: > > Just to clarify, I'm not proposing anything to the protocol > itself. Simply that some applications might benefit from users > being to sign messages with existing Bitcoin identities, and what > can we do to accommodate that (out of band)? It's not a high > priority, but I think it's potentially useful, and most codebases > already have everything they need in place to implement it. > > > > On 04/03/2012 04:04 PM, Peter Vessenes wrote: >> I don't think it's minimally invasive to layer PGP's web of trust >> on top of Bitcoin, in fact, the opposite. >> >> From a certain angle, bitcoin exists as a sort of answer / >> alternate solution to the web of trust. Digital cash with an >> existing web of trust in place was a working concept in the >> mid-1990s, courtesy of David Chaum, I believe. >> >> I totally agree on the kitchen sink concern; I would personally >> like to see something like a one-year required discussion period >> on all non-security changes proposed to the blockchain protocol. >> We know almost nothing about how bitcoin will be used over the >> next 20 years; I believe it's a mistake to bulk up the protocol >> too rapidly right now. >> >> There's a famous phrase from the founder of Lotus about Lotus' >> engineering process: "add lightness." The equivalent for protocol >> design might be "add simplicity." I'd like to see us adding >> simplicity for now, getting a core set of tests together for >> alternate implementations like libbitcoin, and thinking hard >> about the dangers of cruft over a 10+ year period when it comes >> to a technology which will necessarily include a complete history >> of every crufty decision embodied in transaction histories. >> >> Peter >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 1:42 PM, Wladimir > > wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 8:55 PM, Luke-Jr > > wrote: >> >> On Tuesday, April 03, 2012 2:46:17 PM Gavin Andresen wrote: >> > We should avoid reinventing the wheel, if we can. I >> think we should >> > extend existing standards whenever possible. >> >> I wonder if it's possible to make sigs compatible with >> PGP/EC ? >> >> >> Or we could take a step back, further into "don't reinvent >> the wheel" territory. Why not simply make use of PGP(/EC) to >> sign and verify messages? It has many advantages, like an >> already existing web-of-trust and keyserver infrastructure. >> >> I still feel like this is sign message stuff is dragging the >> kitchen sink into Bitcoin. It's fine for logging into a >> website, what you use it for, but anything that approaches >> signing email (such as S/MIME implementations and handling >> different character encodings) is going too far IMO. >> >> Wladimir >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Better than sec? Nothing is better than sec when it comes to >> monitoring Big Data applications. Try Boundary one-second >> resolution app monitoring today. Free. >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/Boundary-dev2dev >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Peter J. Vessenes >> CEO, CoinLab >> M: 206.595.9839 >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Better than sec? Nothing is better than sec when it comes to >> monitoring Big Data applications. Try Boundary one-second >> resolution app monitoring today. Free. >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/Boundary-dev2dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Better than sec? Nothing is better than sec when it comes to > monitoring Big Data applications. Try Boundary one-second > resolution app monitoring today. Free. > http://p.sf.net/sfu/Boundary-dev2dev > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > > > > -- > Mike Koss > CTO, CoinLab > (425) 246-7701 (m) > > A Bitcoin Primer - What you > need to know about Bitcoins. > --------------070402000406060702000909 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mike,

You make an excellent point.  Neither of these proposals impact the protocol itself.  I hadn't considered that.  But I think it's a critically important problem to solve (signature blocks, not so much, but it could piggy back on the same solution).    So the mailing list is a good place to discuss this, but it maybe it shouldn't be labeled as a BIP.  I'll leave that up to the others (arguably, the URI scheme is not a protocol change, either, but was still a BIP).

There is all this fanfare around P2SH and how multi-sig is the solution to all these security problems, but how the hell do you use it?  I believe that BIP 10 (or successor) is critical to the success of multi-sig, because the greatest barrier to using multi-sig will be the ability to actually execute them in less than 14 steps.  And if every client implements it differently, there's even less chance it will be used (assuming the userbase reaches any level of client diversity).  

I think we need to supply a solution to this existing problem before everyone starts solving it on their own and fragmenting the market.  No one has to use the solution we come up with -- but I believe it's a problem for which most developers will take any solution that is easy to exchange, size-efficient and promised to be interoperable (if for no other reason than the Satoshi client uses it).

-Alan



On 04/03/2012 07:37 PM, Mike Koss wrote:
Alan, I'm coming in late to the conversation - do I understand that BIP 010 does not propose any changes to the protocol - but just an intermediate data format that other clients might use to collect the need key material to sign a multi-signature block?

If so - one might ask what the role of BIP's are if they actually do not impact the protocol?

If there is any encapsulated data format that is expected to be interpreted by clients - I'd call that a "protocol change"; but I take it in this instance that you will transmit these signature block out of band from the client ... yet they would have to be parsed and converted into a Transaction Script once collected by SOME client?  Would we expect the standard client do so?

Sorry if this has been discussed before - I'm trying to understand the proposal.


On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com> wrote:
Just to clarify, I'm not proposing anything to the protocol itself.  Simply that some applications might benefit from users being to sign messages with existing Bitcoin identities, and what can we do to accommodate that (out of band)?  It's not a high priority, but I think it's potentially useful, and most codebases already have everything they need in place to implement it.



On 04/03/2012 04:04 PM, Peter Vessenes wrote:
I don't think it's minimally invasive to layer PGP's web of trust on top of Bitcoin, in fact, the opposite. 

From a certain angle, bitcoin exists as a sort of answer / alternate solution to the web of trust. Digital cash with an existing web of trust in place was a working concept in the mid-1990s, courtesy of David Chaum, I believe.

I totally agree on the kitchen sink concern; I would personally like to see something like a one-year required discussion period on all non-security changes proposed to the blockchain protocol. We know almost nothing about how bitcoin will be used over the next 20 years; I believe it's a mistake to bulk up the protocol too rapidly right now.

There's a famous phrase from the founder of Lotus about Lotus' engineering process: "add lightness." The equivalent for protocol design might be "add simplicity." I'd like to see us adding simplicity for now, getting a core set of tests together for alternate implementations like libbitcoin, and thinking hard about the dangers of cruft over a 10+ year period when it comes to a technology which will necessarily include a complete history of every crufty decision embodied in transaction histories.

Peter


On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 1:42 PM, Wladimir <laanwj@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 8:55 PM, Luke-Jr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:
On Tuesday, April 03, 2012 2:46:17 PM Gavin Andresen wrote:
> We should avoid reinventing the wheel, if we can. I think we should
> extend existing standards whenever possible.

I wonder if it's possible to make sigs compatible with PGP/EC ?

Or we could take a step back, further into "don't reinvent the wheel" territory. Why not simply make use of PGP(/EC) to sign and verify messages? It has many advantages, like an already existing web-of-trust and keyserver infrastructure.

I still feel like this is sign message stuff is dragging the kitchen sink into Bitcoin. It's fine for logging into a website, what you use it for, but anything that approaches signing email (such as S/MIME implementations and handling different character encodings) is going too far IMO.

Wladimir


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better than sec? Nothing is better than sec when it comes to
monitoring Big Data applications. Try Boundary one-second
resolution app monitoring today. Free.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/Boundary-dev2dev
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development




--

Peter J. Vessenes
CEO, CoinLab


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better than sec? Nothing is better than sec when it comes to
monitoring Big Data applications. Try Boundary one-second 
resolution app monitoring today. Free.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/Boundary-dev2dev

_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better than sec? Nothing is better than sec when it comes to
monitoring Big Data applications. Try Boundary one-second
resolution app monitoring today. Free.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/Boundary-dev2dev
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development




--
Mike Koss
CTO, CoinLab
(425) 246-7701 (m)

A Bitcoin Primer - What you need to know about Bitcoins.


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