Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A580B6D for ; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 17:43:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-oi1-f171.google.com (mail-oi1-f171.google.com [209.85.167.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 05FAD893 for ; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 17:43:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oi1-f171.google.com with SMTP id x204-v6so2185174oia.0 for ; Thu, 08 Nov 2018 09:43:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=cVsidiDYGg9crr41ivtW7fxiQS8ke2XpV6WqJTVKqDc=; b=rq9SFwJ/ZGAt+0LMhblG/bpkzYGXeyRsrU4BEWuMpcDDWXa/NbK2TVib/76Od4K0JH hoyVc7Dc3TNEXJ7/FdrgrCTYR5OBTdJgk/apHUvCPLlow0HjMynoduX3FtgPF757WYUr thiT73Kf4jY5WbF+fQzP6k7mnCdL5Nq41kSXi665cEowofrWRWRSEq4mGTLPCkB81LIS MDUOPimMARQWU2qL8vA4NrBC4R0M3Wv/PMjY5nMWr5/1E6ygR3KSM/HP5u+bNSybiuZX 77Z2hrvKpym+Di5iHJLysbvDaF+Sf5rJMDwl0Qf4+b695brEVYCJnclJJVh6thxMQ4HK Vu6Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=cVsidiDYGg9crr41ivtW7fxiQS8ke2XpV6WqJTVKqDc=; b=O6h+Dtdc5NIU5Hk2ws5pJoC8O0UthH+atbqp+m1+RZ7vWHWslSGRdhCoCwH/aooRM6 tW0BHAIDXNFNyJanN8Qz+PEkTar/mwa/wmlHrBj9o4YPmSbgt7CwHPqjLpFFNEkCGPhD PXt47Hf2LixHJzy8ZKIGwzioNBGo1kCB/jNtcegb7G1IPnsvobgALHD94xUHTTsIn8Jk n48BeGiYo8AOPpa3RP+oDqQ7GQ13T0uI4wsjRviTdmzrls7oS+uKHntYYzP8JHvlssMB 6NTdywMF918c6jBSZB8lKPx/+NGdItg/FWMTCH2ohoObOiBcrcCPQ8h7/kXATIwULqsL hf+w== X-Gm-Message-State: AGRZ1gI7lrrzUF3FAp3rDhohm58vyF6mqmq1p99Pvyfy3bZVyqZvc63f qeA0wEua3HtN9r+Pt4ckGF1fLdokK46W5Fdw7zOHNtFSCxY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5dGQKKUcWjs+cLWYkKG35UBPrTGifOGLN19Z0b4MfL/Moo3NWVBabHjpTgNcdgjNikXcpeJVJUAJkzV6tsZ7wA= X-Received: by 2002:aca:6ad3:: with SMTP id f202-v6mr2952126oic.50.1541699027290; Thu, 08 Nov 2018 09:43:47 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20181108131130.134b2d43@simplexum.com> In-Reply-To: <20181108131130.134b2d43@simplexum.com> From: Moral Agent Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 12:43:36 -0500 Message-ID: To: dp@simplexum.com, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000df5215057a2ac62c" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 17:46:51 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal - Address Paste Improvement X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 17:43:48 -0000 --000000000000df5215057a2ac62c Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" >The problem will be to come up with an address authentication procedure that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a result. You could locally hash the destination address and from the hash derive a BIP39 style list of 12 words for visual comparison. I would advise against using color or graphics -- the brain is too good at "snapping" to an expected perception when it is running in graphics mode instead of symbolic mode. On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 4:41 AM Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > Copying addresses to the clipboard should be discouraged, rather than > > supported. > > Do you know any reasonably convenient mechanism for end user to > transfer an address from, say, a web page to the wallet address > input field ? > > The clipboard is just a low-hanging fruit for malware, anyway. It just > the most easy point to replace an address. If the computer is > compromized, malware can edit the web page in the memory of the browser > process, for example. If it shown as QR code, malware can decode, > detect that it is an address, and replace the image of QR code. > > I think that the only way to protect from this is to add some form of > authentication for an address - 2fa (transfer checksum via second > channel), visual fingerprints for addresses, that will are hard to > detect (and hence, replace) for malware, signing the destination address > with the key of an address that is already known and checking the > signature, etc. > > The problem will be to come up with an address authentication procedure > that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a result. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --000000000000df5215057a2ac62c Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>The problem will be to come up with an address authent= ication procedure=C2=A0that will be convenient for users and widely support= ed, as a result.

You could locally hash the destinat= ion address and from the hash derive a BIP39 style list of 12 words for vis= ual comparison. I would advise against using color or graphics -- the brain= is too good at "snapping" to an expected perception when it is r= unning in graphics mode instead of symbolic mode.


On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 4:4= 1 AM Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:=

> Copying addresses to the clipboard should be discouraged, rather than<= br> > supported.

Do you know any reasonably convenient mechanism for end user to
transfer an address from, say, a web page to the wallet address
input field ?

The clipboard is just a low-hanging fruit for malware, anyway. It just
the most easy point to replace an address. If the computer is
compromized, malware can edit the web page in the memory of the browser
process, for example. If it shown as QR code, malware can decode,
detect that it is an address, and replace the image of QR code.

I think that the only way to protect from this is to add some form of
authentication for an address - 2fa (transfer checksum via second
channel), visual fingerprints for addresses, that will are hard to
detect (and hence, replace) for malware, signing the destination address with the key of an address that is already known and checking the
signature, etc.

The problem will be to come up with an address authentication procedure
that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a result.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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