Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:11 +0000
To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
From: alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
Precedence: list

Sorry, I made some wrong calculations in the last email. I think the change=
 would just be required in validation.cpp:

https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a7f3479ba3fda4c9fb29bd7080165744c02=
ee921/src/validation.cpp#L1472

/dev/fd0

Sent with Proton Mail secure email.

------- Original Message -------
On Sunday, July 10th, 2022 at 2:17 PM, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-de=
v@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> Hi ZmnSCPxj,
>
> > Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy mu=
st be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a =
majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions =
without community consensus.
> > Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easie=
r to deploy.
>
>
> `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] c=
an be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 =
to 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sur=
e if this will be a soft fork.
>
> I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and p=
redictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change.=
 Maybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start bein=
g 'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation.
>
> [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L=
66
> [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply
>
>
> /dev/fd0
>
> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
>
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev bitcoin-=
dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
>
>
>
> > Good morning e, and list,
> >
> > > Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to=
 which I was responding.
> > >
> > > Math cannot prove how much coin is =E2=80=9Clost=E2=80=9D, and even i=
f it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount prod=
uced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I=E2=80=99ve already pointe=
d out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just =
as it does not with any other good.
> > >
> > > The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorshi=
p resistance, not on price.
> >
> > To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail em=
ission"):
> >
> > * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, an=
d one which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible=
 or zero.
> > * Now consider a censoring miner.
> > * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the min=
er loses out on the fees of those transactions.
> > * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from =
the censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.
> > * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs=
 is small relative to the total earnings of each block.
> > * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs=
 is large relative to the total earnings of each block.
> > * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains f=
rom the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situa=
tion.
> >
> > Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy =
erodes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved=
.
> > But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved =
are censored or not censored.
> > Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not=
 censor coin movements.
> > Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movement=
s.
> >
> > Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy mu=
st be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a =
majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions =
without community consensus.
> > Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easie=
r to deploy.
> >
> > Regards,
> > ZmnSCPxj
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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