Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83A41C002D for ; Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D63460A78 for ; Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 5D63460A78 Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com header.i=@protonmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=protonmail3 header.b=RwVgFf6N X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.102 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.102 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4TKuy4EktdlH for ; Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 4F26A60761 Received: from mail-4324.protonmail.ch (mail-4324.protonmail.ch [185.70.43.24]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F26A60761 for ; Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:25 +0000 (UTC) Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:11 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail3; t=1657471101; x=1657730301; bh=bGQwMt8m7sYHFutMQl/QykdDfV+FLKcnAJFdF2Y0tAk=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To: References:Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To: Feedback-ID:Message-ID; b=RwVgFf6NN0j9tXYMtFj1DEFp6A7yNS/p2CccIWUdmJ4uycb9LGBi6wIL3UMh6gBwk iZ166/ANGYpz3MGsNVPe3UyL29pStAQSE+AqvBZ43p3HV30olHSezd2DPB+Y/F77A9 sbDgesNcfPU11pIYdzykGPONdvan1fsqKVcDM25eZ++p0DzF94/8ySNrKWAnCYnqB2 w+IpC2dEF/U0/MmhI9iMAHYSXyVKkd8GFX8zm92RcBXYlN6oYUBMb5KMVo+mLjW4kB 2PExl/fIVw6XoarcBBwSvjj4Ax3bvK5zL1IE5BjuCYwYDp8zveRCmJQLNN2iZWV4SR ZElRJO/lpW6Kg== To: ZmnSCPxj From: alicexbt Reply-To: alicexbt Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: <6xuj-ljJ9hvME-TIgWHmfPpad4aJ-1zTYSH1NBuFL_gi-6hJHMayWLEAhcEyw_lqmkR24ee8uMIAH6n4TDguk_5fJ8och99Em3m5y1R6brE=@protonmail.com> Feedback-ID: 40602938:user:proton MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 17:31:25 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 16:38:27 -0000 Sorry, I made some wrong calculations in the last email. I think the change= would just be required in validation.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a7f3479ba3fda4c9fb29bd7080165744c02= ee921/src/validation.cpp#L1472 /dev/fd0 Sent with Proton Mail secure email. ------- Original Message ------- On Sunday, July 10th, 2022 at 2:17 PM, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hi ZmnSCPxj, > > > Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy mu= st be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a = majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions = without community consensus. > > Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easie= r to deploy. > > > `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] c= an be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 = to 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sur= e if this will be a soft fork. > > I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and p= redictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change.= Maybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start bein= g 'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation. > > [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L= 66 > [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply > > > /dev/fd0 > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email. > > > ------- Original Message ------- > On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev bitcoin-= dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote: > > > > > Good morning e, and list, > > > > > Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to= which I was responding. > > > > > > Math cannot prove how much coin is =E2=80=9Clost=E2=80=9D, and even i= f it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount prod= uced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I=E2=80=99ve already pointe= d out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just = as it does not with any other good. > > > > > > The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorshi= p resistance, not on price. > > > > To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail em= ission"): > > > > * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, an= d one which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible= or zero. > > * Now consider a censoring miner. > > * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the min= er loses out on the fees of those transactions. > > * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from = the censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost. > > * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs= is small relative to the total earnings of each block. > > * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs= is large relative to the total earnings of each block. > > * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains f= rom the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situa= tion. > > > > Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy = erodes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved= . > > But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved = are censored or not censored. > > Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not= censor coin movements. > > Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movement= s. > > > > Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy mu= st be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a = majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions = without community consensus. > > Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easie= r to deploy. > > > > Regards, > > ZmnSCPxj > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev