Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Wn0JV-0006Op-AP for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 21 May 2014 06:47:45 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of riseup.net designates 198.252.153.129 as permitted sender) client-ip=198.252.153.129; envelope-from=odinn.cyberguerrilla@riseup.net; helo=mx1.riseup.net; Received: from mx1.riseup.net ([198.252.153.129]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1Wn0JT-0000LF-5C for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 21 May 2014 06:47:45 +0000 Received: from fulvetta.riseup.net (fulvetta-pn.riseup.net [10.0.1.75]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "Gandi Standard SSL CA" (not verified)) by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2889C53FD3; Tue, 20 May 2014 23:47:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (Authenticated sender: odinn.cyberguerrilla@fulvetta.riseup.net) with ESMTPSA id A162C320 Received: from localhost (127.0.0.1) (SquirrelMail authenticated user odinn.cyberguerrilla) by fulvetta.riseup.net with HTTP; Tue, 20 May 2014 23:47:36 -0700 Message-ID: <6d3b8553c923f009cdb378c4a4967518.squirrel@fulvetta.riseup.net> In-Reply-To: <1400602373.46778.YahooMailNeo@web160501.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <1400602373.46778.YahooMailNeo@web160501.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 23:47:36 -0700 From: "Odinn Cyberguerrilla" To: "Stephen Reed" User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.21 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8 X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Importance: Normal X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.1 at mx1 X-Virus-Status: Clean Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -2.2 (--) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [198.252.153.129 listed in list.dnswl.org] -0.0 SPF_HELO_PASS SPF: HELO matches SPF record -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.7 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 0.0 UNPARSEABLE_RELAY Informational: message has unparseable relay lines X-Headers-End: 1Wn0JT-0000LF-5C Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin Cooperative Proof-of-Stake whitpaper X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 06:47:45 -0000 > I completed a whitepaper for Bitcoin a proof-of-stake version which use= s a > single nomadic verifiable mint agent and distributed replication of a > single blockchain by compensated full nodes to achieve 6-hop, sub-secon= d > transaction acknowledgement times. Plus it pays dividends to holders > instead of wasting it on miners. Subsidized transaction fees are thus > lower. I look at this and agree of course that the nodes are decreasing, see, https://getaddr.bitnodes.io/ But when I see stuff in the white paper like "misbehaving nodes" in the context of an "audit agent," a "single non-forking blockchain," the notion of "Misbehaving nodes" that would be "banned from the network" so as to "motivat(e) honest behavior," ~ really= , all of this does sound as though a sort of morality is being formulated rather than a mathematical solution. This is not to say that the white paper hasn't addressed a problem that needs to be addressed, namely... the problem of the nodes disappearing, and a few other things. But to take that and then layer onto that the issues associated with proof of stake... There does seem to be a simpler way to address this and I think first without suggesting the complex issu= e of some kind of thing that would involve dividends for those in a proof-of-stake system, consensus achieved by stake-weighted voting, and s= o forth, one would be better off removing all references to voting and stake, and determining ways simply to incentivize more substantively thos= e who actually run a full node. Additionally I am hesitant to characterize behavior as has been described in the white paper, as it would seem that (in such a system) there would be an inclination or a tendency to exclude certain patterns or groups of participants rather than determine ways in which all participants or potential peers can serve the network. > > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1C4m-MFnxw0JjDorzrKs_IRQRqD9ila79o0I= Dt6KsbcE > > > Because the code is not yet written, this idea is half-baked so to spea= k. > Comments appreciated on my project thread, which will be a development > diary. I plan a hard fork of the Bitcoin blockchain in early 2016, afte= r a > year of public system testing, and conditioned on wide approval. > > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D584719.msg6397403#msg6397403 > > -Steve > > Stephen L. Reed > Austin, Texas, USA > 512.791.7860-----------------------------------------------------------= ------------------- > "Accelerate Dev Cycles with Automated Cross-Browser Testing - For FREE > Instantly run your Selenium tests across 300+ browser/OS combos. > Get unparalleled scalability from the best Selenium testing platform > available > Simple to use. Nothing to install. Get started now for free." > http://p.sf.net/sfu/SauceLabs__________________________________________= _____ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >