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Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 23:47:36 -0700
From: "Odinn Cyberguerrilla" <odinn.cyberguerrilla@riseup.net>
To: "Stephen Reed" <stephenreed@yahoo.com>
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Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
	<bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin Cooperative Proof-of-Stake
 whitpaper
Precedence: list

> I completed a whitepaper for Bitcoin a proof-of-stake version which use=
s a
> single nomadic verifiable mint agent and distributed replication of a
> single blockchain by compensated full nodes to achieve 6-hop, sub-secon=
d
> transaction acknowledgement times. Plus it pays dividends to holders
> instead of wasting it on miners. Subsidized transaction fees are thus
> lower.


I look at this and agree of course that the nodes are decreasing, see,
https://getaddr.bitnodes.io/   But when I see stuff in the white paper
like "misbehaving nodes" in the context of an "audit agent," a "single
non-forking blockchain," the notion of "Misbehaving nodes" that would be
"banned from the network" so as to "motivat(e) honest behavior," ~ really=
,
all of this does sound as though a sort of morality is being formulated
rather than a mathematical solution.

This is not to say that the white paper hasn't addressed a problem that
needs to be addressed, namely... the problem of the nodes disappearing,
and a few other things.  But to take that and then layer onto that the
issues associated with proof of stake... There does seem to be a simpler
way to address this and I think first without suggesting the complex issu=
e
of some kind of thing that would involve dividends for those in a
proof-of-stake system, consensus achieved by stake-weighted voting, and s=
o
forth, one would be better off removing all references to voting and
stake, and determining ways simply to incentivize more substantively thos=
e
who actually run a full node.  Additionally I am hesitant to characterize
behavior as has been described in the white paper, as it would seem that
(in such a system) there would be an inclination or a tendency to exclude
certain patterns or groups of participants rather than determine ways in
which all participants or potential peers can serve the network.


>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1C4m-MFnxw0JjDorzrKs_IRQRqD9ila79o0I=
Dt6KsbcE
>
>
> Because the code is not yet written, this idea is half-baked so to spea=
k.
> Comments appreciated on my project thread, which will be a development
> diary. I plan a hard fork of the Bitcoin blockchain in early 2016, afte=
r a
> year of public system testing, and conditioned on wide approval.
>
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D584719.msg6397403#msg6397403
>
> -Steve
>
> Stephen L. Reed
> Austin, Texas, USA
> 512.791.7860-----------------------------------------------------------=
-------------------
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