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From: Miron <c1.sf-bitcoin@niftybox.net>
To: Brooks Boyd <boydb@midnightdesign.ws>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 20:30:11 -0800
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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Tor / SPV
Precedence: list


On Wed, 2014-01-15 at 20:26 -0600, Brooks Boyd wrote:
>         My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still
>         need lots of clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no
>         matter what. Rather we're just using hidden services as a way
>         to get authentication and encryption. Actually the 6-hop
>         hidden service circuits are overkill for this application, a
>         3-hop circuit would work just as well for most nodes that
>         aren't Tor-exclusive. 
>         
> 
> 
...
> communication to Tor doesn't change that. I agree the six-hop circuits
> would be overkill for that; I wonder if the network slowdown you get

BTW, I believe that the number of hops can be reduced below 3 on both
sides (client/server).  For Orchid, this will require a change to
CircuitPathChooser.  For other Tor implementations, it might require
using the control port to custom-build a circuit.